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Abstract
Political parties have been a common feature in non-competitive political systems, but
their fates following an opening of electoral competition vary widely. Some parties continue
to be able successfully compete for power, while many others languish as second-class polit-
ical parties for decades. This dissertation seeks to answer the questions on this variation
based on the institutional and organizational characteristics of these parties during the non-
competitive era. Parties that play a major role in the non-competitive regime should be
more likely to survive after an opening of competition, and parties that are able to reform
anti-democratic legacies will be more able to translate their resources into future electoral
success. This project builds on a literature that is rich in regional and sub-regional case
studies by developing a global approach based upon comparable institutional qualities of
non-competitive political systems and their ruling political parties. I also move away from
the transitions literature and its focus on democracy, and instead focus on continuity and
change in political parties after a time of major political change and the outcomes of that
process.
I develop an original, global database of 105 different regimes and 136 parties and their
successors and their performance in elections ranging from 1975-2013. I find that parties
which are a central institutional feature of the non-competitive regime are likely to survive
regardless of their electoral success, while parties that play only a minor supporting role in
the prior regime are dependent on continued electoral victories in order to survive for any
significant period of time.
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Chapter 1
Introduction to the Question
Political parties are a common feature of democracies and non-democracies alike. Regardless
of the political regime, political parties do fulfill a wide number of roles both in governing
and seeking to gain or retain a role in the governing process. Conventionally, scholars have
approached parties from the perspective of the American and Western European experience
of political parties as tools for competition in a democracy. Parties can still exist where
there is no competition, as the Communist parties of Eurasia and single-party states of post-
colonial Africa have certainly made clear. In most cases, these parties from non-competitive
regimes have been exposed to an opening of the political system to include some degree of
true electoral competition. Some of these parties have been extremely successful at retaining
or regaining control of government in the cases of Tanzania and Mexico, respectively. Some
have managed to survive for nearly two and a half decades as second-class parties with little
hope of governing as in the case of the Czech Communists, and others have faded away into
obscurity. The core question of this project is to explain this variation in the fate of these
parties.
My specific question focuses on political parties as the primary unit of analysis, but by
doing so, I intend to build on the broader literature in Comparative Politics in a number
of ways. The question, what becomes of ruling parties in the face of increased competition,
reflects one of the key themes in our field, the study of change and continuity in politics.
In Comparative Politics, this theme takes on two general forms: those works that seek to
explain when and why change happens (or does not happen), and those works that seek
to explain how change impacts the structures and actors in politics. This particular work
follows the latter approach and seeks to look not at what causes change, but instead to look
empirically at the impacts of change and continuity on political outcomes.
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The study of change in politics also requires an ability to clearly measure the core elements
that are either stable or changing. I seek to contribute to the broader literature by building
comparable data and measures for the classification of key institutions of non-democratic
political systems. My methodological approach seeks to bridge the gap between regional
studies and broader global studies of politics by utilizing theoretical insights from the regional
studies literature in multiple regions with the goal of finding what common features the
regional studies approaches have uncovered. I then combine those core features and develop
a global theory and utilize comparable data in order to determine what leads to broad global
patterns.
To answer my question, I first look at the existing literature on authoritarian parties and
their successors. A rich single-case and sub-regional literature exists on the topic of party
transitions to competitive politics (Friedman and Wong, 2008; Grzyma la-Busse, 2004; Bozoki
and Ishiyama, 2002; Ishiyama and Quinn, 2006) and even their impacts on broader political
outcomes (Grzyma la-Busse, 2002). Much of the theory development has occurred in the study
of how the the transitions from Communism impacted parties in either Eastern/Central
Europe or the Former Soviet Union. Other studies have focused on individual parties in
Africa (Salih, 2003), Mexico (Magaloni, 2006), and Taiwan (Wong, 2008) or on the impacts
of authoritarian rule on the prospects for democracy (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Bratton and
van de Walle, 1997).
The existing literature provides a very strong starting point for this project, as these works
show the advantages of highly-focused studies in both theory development and providing
detailed explanations of causal structures. This literature does fall short on a number of
key points. First, the literature conflates the concepts of political party success and survival
into a single concept. This does not allow for a clear analysis of why some parties succeed
while others merely muddle through. Second, this literature is largely dated as the bulk
of studies date to the mid 1990s to early 2000s and focus almost exclusively on first and
second elections. Third, the literature is largely based in the transition paradigm, assuming
transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Finally, while there are certainly common
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themes in the studies, there is a lack of any broad theory beyond the regional or sub-regional
level which would allow for a greater ability to both test the external validity of these theories
or predict the likelihood of outcomes in future changes.
Unlike the existing literature, my theoretical arguments focus not on an assumption of
transition to democracy, but instead views these parties as institutions that contain both
elements of democracy and elements of authoritarianism. I seek to utilize the observations of
the existing literature on parties in transition to develop my theory. In particular, I focus on
the thread of the literature that concentrates on the role of legacies of the non-competitive
era and their impact on events in competitive politics. My core claim divides party survival
(continued contestation of elections) and success (ability to win government office). Party
survival is dependent on the importance of the party in the non-competitive regime, while
party success is a function of the party’s ability to reform its image to better employ inherited
resources in competitive electoral politics.
I develop this theory and the necessary empirical components based on the existing
literature on political parties, competition in non-democratic and semi-democratic regimes,
authoritarian politics, and transitions to democracy. The first step after developing the theory
is to empirically classify the variations in non-competitive political systems and the organi-
zation and identity of the political parties that wield power in these systems. My cases are
selected to include all non-competitive political systems that become at least minimally com-
petitive between 1974 and 2000. This period is a broad interpretation of Huntington’s (1991)
Third Wave of democratization. Although I am less concerned with democratization, this
period does correspond with a large number of breakdowns of the non-democratic regimes
that had been established in the aftermath of the Second World War and the breakdown
of early post-Colonial electoral regimes. Although regime breakdowns do occur before and
after this period, these boundaries provide two advantages. First, this time period contains
a large number of regime breakdowns that lead to multiparty elections. Second, bounding
the period on both ends means that the number of elections that a party or its successor
faces more is comparable across cases. Openings occurring significantly before 1974 would
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present parties with a much longer time period of elections to survive and those afterwards
would not experience a sufficient number to assess long-term success and survival.
1.1 The Literature
The relevant literature to this topic largely revolves around a few core themes. The first set
of literature focuses on the general study of successor parties in both Africa and the post-
Communist states. This literature largely consists of sub-regional and single case approaches
to the study of how ruling parties in Communist and single-party African regimes have fared
in early competitive elections. These studies provide some insight on the behavior, impacts,
and formation of political parties following an electoral opening, and thus forms a critical
background for my theory development. I also present an alternative view of the transition
to competitive politics based on the transitions literature. This literature focuses largely on
an agent-centered approach to studying the transitions from closed regimes to democracy.
The key contribution of this literature comes from its focus on the who’s who of the non-
competitive system, and how these systems maintained themselves, providing some insights
into the key actors and regime structures at play in the process.
The third area of literature that I will utilize focuses on the legacies of non-competitive
regimes. One key focus is on the role of parties in non-competitive political systems. This
background provides the key elements to developing a theory of what usable past authori-
tarian parties may be able to carry with them through a political opening. From this litera-
ture, I am able to further refine the critical elements for classifying non-competitive regimes
in a manner that is relevant to predicting the success of their ruling parties following an
electoral opening. Finally, I also focus briefly on some of the potential impacts that former
ruling parties may have on competitive politics and the arguments the literature provides
for why this variation may exist.
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1.1.1 Successor Formation and Success
Post-Communist Countries
The most developed literature on former ruling parties reflects the experience of the former
Communist parties of Eastern Europe. The most useful general framework for analyzing the
role of these parties is that used by John Ishiyama (Ishiyama, 1999; Ishiyama and Quinn,
2006). This divides the impacts on party development into two categories he labels internalist
and externalist explanations (Ishiyama and Quinn, 2006). The internalist branch focuses
largely on the endowments that the former regime brought to the successor party. These
include the ability of the party to react to various situations that are presented to it. Ishiyama
(2002) considers the degree of openness in recruiting the upper levels of the party structure to
be the primary variable of interest in determining the impact of the prior regime on current
performance.
Kitschelt (1995) develops a typology of Communist parties that divides them into three
subtypes, patrimonial, bureaucratic-authoritarian, and national consensus Communism. Pat-
rimonial Communist regimes focused heavily on the personal ties in the leaders and followed
a top-down hierarchical model of internal behavior, with little room for contestation among
the factions of the party. Bureaucratic-authoritarian Communist parties were less dependent
upon strong personalist ties, instead using formal institutions to structure governance, but
did not allow for any significant internal competition. The type of regime that Ishiyama
finds of most interest is the national consensus version of Communism. In this version, the
party allowed a significant degree of internal competition on matters of policy and leadership,
so long as the fundamental issues of the party remained a matter of consensus (Kitschelt,
1995). Ishiyama argues that this variation increases the ability of a Communist party to make
the transition to a competitive successor party (1999). This argument combines Kitschelt’s
types of parties with Huntington’s (1991) approach by allowing the moderate and reformist
elements lead the core of the party through the transition.
While Ishiyama is concerned with the nature of party organization, Grzyma la-Busse
focuses on the degree to which the former regime type is translated into competitiveness in
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multiparty elections. She considers the internal organization of a Communist party as one of
the resources that can be translated from the authoritarian era into multiparty competition
(Grzyma la-Busse, 2002). At the core of her argument is that a party must be able to reinvent
itself following the collapse of Communist rule in order to be able to compete effectively.
Drawing upon Ishiyama’s argument on internal organization, she argues that the degree
of internal openness determines the degree to which the party will be able to transform.
Her argument mainly focuses on the Eastern European parties falling under Kitschelt’s
bureaucratic-authoritarian or national consensus models of Communism. From here, she
argues that the parties with the rigid internal structures of the former are more likely to focus
on maintaining the old political base. At the same time, the more open parties of national
consensus Communism will be able to negotiate with society and translate demands into a
political platform that can reach out to new sectors of the electorate.
The other feature of prior regime types that matters is the amount of space allowed
for competition to develop during the Communist period. Grzyma la-Busse argues that the
level of repression under Communism greatly influenced the degree of space for opposition
to develop (2002). The most repressive and personalistic regimes, such as Hoxa’s Albania
and Ceausescu’s Romania, did not allow sufficient space for social organizations outside the
party to function. In these cases, strong opposition parties did not arise following the fall of
Communism. In Poland, matters were different. The Polish experience with Communist rule
lacked a totalitarian phase of leadership and allowed influential elements such as the Catholic
church to organize society (Markowski, 2002). In addition, Poland is a good example of what
Sartori (1976) calls “simulated pluralism.” In this arrangement, loyal opposition parties exist
in non-competitive elections to provide voters some degree of policy choice and the regime
itself feedback on policy alternatives through the performance of these allies of the dominant
ruling party.
Kitschelt (2002) takes a deeper look into the what determines the political space avail-
able to opposition by looking at two other particular features of earlier regimes. The first
of which is the degree to which political associations existed before Communism. This is
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used to explain the differences between politics in the more developed western regions of the
Communist bloc in comparison to their eastern neighbors. In the east, much of the lack of
political opposition is attributed to the fact that modern political institutions were intro-
duced by a system of Russian colonialism that did not place a high degree of importance on
societal organization. Additionally, Kitschelt identifies a difference in the central and periph-
eral party structures in the multinational Communist states. In these, nationalist reactions
to the subordinate role within the national party led to political space to oppose the central
regime and differing organizational structures at the subnational level (Kitschelt, 2002).
Influences external to the party and its past are also considered important to the perfor-
mance of Communist successor parties. These fall into a number of main categories including
the institutional features of the new government, the nature of the opposition and their
placement along the political spectrum, and economic performance following the end of
Communist rule (Ishiyama and Quinn, 2006). Institutions should matter because the degree
of openness of a political system constrains the representation of minority parties. The higher
district magnitudes of proportional representation systems should allow for a greater oppor-
tunity for even unpopular political parties to be able to remain in the electoral game, while
single member seats may make them unable to win seats (Ishiyama, 1999; Norris, 2004).
While parliamentary institutions are important, the institution of the presidency is also
extremely important in the cases where it occurs. An extreme case is the Russian form of
Hyper-Presidentialism which greatly distorts the role of the Communist Party, which was
able to obtain a plurality of the Duma through the 1990s, but remained unable to gain the
50% of the vote needed to win the presidency. This is in contrast to the Moldovan system
which changed from a presidential system to a parliamentary system in 2000, allowing for
the Communists to return to power in 2001 (March, 2006). Parties in presidential systems
are also more likely to have a greater degree of reliance upon clientelistic and personalistic
ties than upon mass membership and organization (Ishiyama, 2002).
The other area in which external factors influence parties falls into defining the available
political space on the left. Valerie Bunce (2002) argues that political space opens on the left
7
for Communist successor parties in the context of the dual economic and political transition.
In this process, the left, represented by the incumbent Communists, is decisively defeated
in the founding elections. Following their election, the new democratic parties in power
are unable to quickly turn around the economic decline that results from the transition to
a market economy. This failure provides the space for the Communist successor party to
reinvent itself as a more mainstream left party committed to reform, but in a less painful
way (Bunce, 2002; Grzyma la-Busse, 2002). This process may not work as clearly when there
are already existing parties on the left, such as the case of the East German successor,
the Party of Democratic Socialism (DPS). In this case the presence of the Western SPD
limited the role of the DPS as the left opposition to the Christian Democrat government,
and additionally led to the DPS becoming primarily a regional party founded on opposing
Western colonization (or Kohlinization as some have called it) of the former East Germany
(Ziblatt, 1999; Segert, 2002).
Economic decline following the transition may also be important in evoking feelings of
nostalgia among a portion of the population desiring a return to the days of stability under
the old Communist regime. This desire for stability following the transition provides electoral
support for parties opposing those who brought on the era of democracy and instability
(Ishiyama and Quinn, 2006). A final external factor shaping the issue space for the former
Communists, particularly in the Balkans, is that of ethnic divisions. This concept is mostly
derived from the experience of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and the movement of this
party from promoting Marxist-Leninist principles of internationalism to a nationalist rhetoric
of pan-Serbianism (Ishiyama and Quinn, 2006; Brankovic, 2002). The degree to which the
SPS was actually founded upon this issue is questionable, as the party is also portrayed as
being simply an opportunistic party of power intended to enrich Slobadan Milos˘evic´ and his
family while maintaining power by keeping the opposition divided (Brankovic, 2002).
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Africa
The literature on political party development and party system development in Africa is
significantly less developed than is its Eastern European counterpart. The scope of the
literature on African parties is largely divided between those studies that cover broad trends
of democratization and opening in Africa and those that cover the changes occurring within
specific political parties over the transition period. In contrast to the literature on Communist
parties where government-opposition dynamics are central, the role of patrimonialism and
individual leaders play a far larger role in the analysis of political change in Africa (Bratton,
1998; Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). The support of these leaders for the process of
transitions can be a major determinant of the ruling party’s ability to survive the shift
to competitive elections. This is particularly the case when leaders such as Ghana’s Jerry
Rawlings and Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere are able to guide both the transition and the role
of their party through the process of opening (Nugent, 2007; Mihyo, 2003; Momba, 2003).
More than in Europe, the leaders of African non-competitive regimes have been able
to hold on to or return to power, with twenty of thirty seven leaders remaining in power
by 1998 (Baker, 1998). Similarly to Europe, the explanations of the patterns of transition
are largely focused on the nature of the previous regime in power. One of the most widely
used descriptions of the former regime types in analyzing transitions is Bratton and van de
Walle’s categorization of single party regimes (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Ishiyama
and Quinn, 2006). These divide in a manner similar to Kitschelt’s typology of Communist
regimes in that they focus on the internal organization of the non-competitive system. The
first type is the plebiscitory single party regime in which there is no competition within the
party, but non-competitive elections with high levels of turnout are regularly held. These
are typically associated with the neo-patrimonialist presidency of either military leaders
or the founding fathers of national independence movements and are typified by a lack of
strong formal institutions of government (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). The second
regime type is a competitive single party regime in which elections consisted of competition
between candidates from the ruling party.
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As a result of prior regime types, there was a degree of variation between the ability of the
regime to manage the protests that swept the continent between 1989 and the mid 1990s.
The plebiscitory regimes, particularly those that had banned parties that had contested
in previous periods of competitive elections, faced protests that were more organized and
capable of pressuring the incumbents (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). This approach has
very clear parallels to the literature on the transitions in Eastern and Central Europe. In
both cases, the degree to which a regime allows independent civil society actors leads to a
greater degree of opposition development during the period in which single party rule comes
under threat. In Africa, much like in Europe those regimes that allowed a greater degree
of civil society development under single party rule also faced strong protests against single
party rule.
The nature of the transition to multiparty elections also had a dramatic impact on the
path of multipartism in Africa. The most important variable of transition in the literature
is the timing of the first election. When leaders were able to delay the electoral process,
they were more likely to retain power following the first elections (Lindberg, 2004; Bratton,
1998; Baker, 1998). When negotiation occurred in transitions, it consisted of the holding
of national conferences, which by and large put the decisions on the future of the state on
the fate of the first elections, or the pacted transitions occurring in the settler oligarchies of
Southern Africa (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997).
Where leaders were able to delay the first election, these regimes were able to do a
number of things to improve their likelihood of remaining in power following the first elec-
tions. Regimes that were capable of delaying the first multiparty elections could take part in
manipulating the electoral process in order to favor themselves and restricting the ability of
other political actors to form a coherent opposition platform and slate of candidates to run
in the first election (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Baker, 1998). One important tactic of
the regime is to use its inherited state resources to ensure that the opposition remains highly
fragmented and unable to gain the highest office (Baker, 1998). This is extremely effective in
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Africa’s centralized presidential systems where a candidate can win with only a plurality of
the votes, as was done successfully in Kenya during the 1992 elections (van de Walle, 2006).
In addition to manipulation of the rules of elections, African political parties can also try
to build a stable base of support. This may be done by transforming the image of the party,
but in a region noted for the lack of programmatic political parties, this usually means a turn
to other mobilization tactics (Baker, 1998; Salih, 2003). These parties, not unlike those in the
former Yugoslav republics, have been able to turn to ethnic mobilization to build electoral
support (Baker, 1998). Those instances where ethnic political violence has been orchestrated
to build support have also proven effective in the maintenance of political support for the
former leaders (Laasko, 2007).
External factors have also impacted the ability of African regimes to hold onto power.
The bulk of the transitions occurred largely due to a pair of exogenous shocks that broke
down the support base of non-competitive rule in Africa. The economic declines and debt
crises of the 1980s followed by falling resource prices led African regimes to need support
from the IMF and World Bank. This support came with conditions that severely weakened
the ability of incumbents to maintain single party rule (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997;
Mihyo, 2003). These economic crises are considered by Bratton and van de Walle to be
one of the key driving factors behind the transitions in combination with the end of Soviet
support and contagion from other transitions in neighboring states (Bratton and van de
Walle, 1997). The parties that were able to hold on to power also benefited from the lack of
consistent external pressure on democratic reforms to shore up a competitive authoritarian
system following the holding of the first elections (Jourde, 2008).
When African parties lost the first elections a number of factors came into play regarding
their survival. The case of Benin shows one example that follows the European model in
which the democratic opposition was unable to bring about the benefits and changes that
they had promised in their electoral victory (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). This failure
to improve the economic conditions, combined with one of Africa’s more genuine democratic
reinvention of a former authoritarian leader led to the return of the former ruler to the
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presidency, albeit without the former ruling party (Baker, 1998). On the other hand, some
parties that have been defeated face a far different fate. A combination of institutions focused
on a very strong presidency and a fear of the return of the former ruling party also lead to
instances of the old authoritarian party being replaced by a new but equally authoritarian
ruler after transition (Jourde, 2008). In the case of Zambia’s UNIP, the first elections were
lost, but in subsequent elections the new ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD)
resorted to electoral authoritarian tactics to bar the return of the UNIP, including banning
former president Kaunda from running in 19961, leading to an eventual decline of the UNIP
from the electoral scene (Momba, 2003).
Actor-based Approaches: Transitions
Another significant literature focuses on the series of transitions to democracy occurring in
Europe and Latin America during the 1970s and 1980s. The core works of this literature
are very much focused on the actions of the agents in the process of regime transition and
the pathway taken to democratic consolidation (Huntington, 1991; Linz and Stepan, 1996).
This literature is notoriously ideosyncratic, but provides a theoretical background in two key
areas: the role of specific actors in the transition to competitive elections, and shedding light
on some key elements of how non-competitive leaders govern. The first relevant component of
this literature is concerned with the actors involved in the transition process. Linz and Stepan
(1996) focus heavily on a model of pacted transition that is based around the interactions
of actors from the incumbent regime. In particular the pacted system is only possible in
the Authoritarian and Post-Totalitarian regimes found in their typology due to the need
for a presence of some sort division within the state and within the opposition in order to
form a pact (something not available in totalitarian systems). Huntington (1991) similarly
provides a clear division of the core actors in a transition process in which there exist a few
key groups based upon their position in government and attitude toward democracy. Within
governments there runs a continuum from Standpatters who oppose democracy outright,
1This election was boycotted by the UNIP due to the banning of the party leader Kaunda.
12
liberal reformers who seek limited change, and democratic reformers who seek democracy.
Outside government the opposition factions are divided from the anti-democratic radical
extremists (often nationalists) and the democratic moderates.
The alignment of these particular groups can constrain the possibilities within a tran-
sition. In Linz and Stepan’s (1996) account of transitions, the existence of such divisions
allows for pacted transitions to occur. In particular the division of both the incumbent and
the opposition into extreme and moderate camps allows for their signature reforma-pactada-
ruptura-pactada mode of transition, in which the moderates in both the incumbent and
opposition break from their respective extremists to form a center coalition for democracy.
Huntington (1991) takes a different approach to the roles within a transition with his concepts
of transformation and transplacement. In transformation scenarios, the moderate reformers
within the regime are more able to subdue the standpatters and co-opt the opposition into
the transition. In transplacement a similar pattern occurs, but instead the opposition is able
to exploit liberalization and force the government to take action to repress or manage the
transition. This particular pattern is noted frequently within the post-Communist transitions
as well (McFaul, 2002)
Non-pacted transitions also make up a particularly important set of pathways for change.
In some cases the incumbent regime acts as an immovable object in the face of reformist
pressures, and only falls in the face of external shocks that undermine their ability to rule.
These largely vary on the question of who is able to capitalize on the breakdown of the
incumbent, whether it is the democratic opposition, revolutionary opposition, or some form
of coup from within the regime or its military (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Huntington, 1991).
The role of elections in transition provide another important insight into transitions.
Elections provide a route through which regimes can potentially solve a number of the
key problems that are inherent in the crisis leading to a transition. Elections provide a
route through which a regime can replace the authoritarian legitimacy that has slipped
away in the lead-up to the crisis, and can also allow a way to break the standoff that may
occur during a transplacement-type transition (Huntington, 1991; Schedler, 2002). A few
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key factors determine how elections impact the transition period. First, how soon does the
election occur? Often elections may be held as some form of quick snap election that attempts
to catch the opposition by surprise and present a degree of legitimacy to the newly (re-)elected
authoritarian government (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Huntington, 1991). The second question
is how is the election conducted? The government retains the option of manipulation but
must balance the factors of certainty of victory against the degree of legitimacy gained by a
free and fair election (Huntington, 1991). The opposition meanwhile must consider a similar
question to whether they are better off contesting the election or undermining the legitimacy
of the incumbent regime in future politics (Smith, 2014).
The final concern is the outcome of the elections. In some cases the incumbent is able
to win the first election, while in others it is delivered what Huntington (1991) calls a
“stunning election” defeat. The success or failure of the government in elections can have a
dramatic effect on the outcome of the transition process. Incumbent victories are likely to
lead to a consolidation of authoritarianism, while split results frequently lead to continued
instability after the election (McFaul, 2002). Opposition victories are able to shift the focus of
politics away from the authoritarian past and into internal competition within the democratic
opposition (McFaul, 2002; Bunce, 2003).
1.1.2 A Party’s Usable Past
The party’s resources and history during the non-competitive era provide crucial information
about what resources they are able to carry over to competitive elections. These fall into
a general group of attributes that Grzyma la-Busse (2002) refers to as the usable past of
the regime. These include the elite resources and skills inherited by the party. Authoritarian
leaders and their parties provide a range of skills and resources that can potentially be utilized
in the process of opening elections to real competition. These can generally be categorized
into manipulative traits to manage the transition while remaining in power or competitive
traits to fairly win early elections or regain office following a loss of power. The literature
on the East-Central European Communist parties centers on these party attributes in one
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form or another to explain the post-Communist transition. Some, like Kitschelt (2002), take
the bureaucratic and historical legacy of the entire country back as far as imperial legacies
around the time of the First World War and earlier. Others like Grzyma la-Busse, Ishiyama,
and Bratton & van de Walle focus more heavily on the more immediate past and how
the party actually governed prior to the end of authoritarianism (Grzyma la-Busse, 2002;
Ishiyama, 2008; Bratton and van de Walle, 1997).
These specific explanations are primarily focused on explaining post-Communist behavior
in East-Central Europe, but they are also nested in a broader theoretical category that can
be more generally applied beyond the region. The majority of these explanations (and other
legacy concepts) can be generalized into models of the role of the party within the non-
competitive regime.
Ultimately the party in a non-competitive regime is some form of organization that exists
to support rulers which may be entirely merged with other regime institutions in the case of
the core Communist countries, or it may instead work as an expediency in personalist and
military type regimes. As in any other context, political parties at a minimum have specific
roles that focus on seeking, holding, and organizing elected office and also providing a route
to organize political support (Sartori, 1976; Janda, 1980). These may overlap and intersect
with other regime elements such as top leaders (as individuals, juntas, etc.), the institutions
of the state (military, bureaucracy, etc.), political or social movements, and finally other
support structures like religious and tribal leaders or paramilitaries.
The Role of Parties in Non-Competitive Regimes
In order to utilize this literature in a way that can provide a grounding for a theory of how
parties make use of their past and other resources under a transition, I will first return to an
older branch of literature on how and why traditional authoritarian and party-based regimes
use political parties in order to operate in power. The key framework that I use here is to look
at the relationship between party and other elements of the regime. What does the party
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provide the rest of the regime, and what do the other components of the regime provide for
the party?
Political parties in authoritarian systems aid the survival of regimes by allowing leaders
to co-opt potential opponents, distribute patronage, manage internal transitions, and pro-
vide para-state institutions for authoritarian leaders (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Geddes,
1999; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Hadenius and Teorell, 2007). Parties can also provide electoral
legitimacy and popular mobilization, even if only one party is allowed to stand for elec-
tions (Hadenius and Teorell, 2007). The next step is to spell out the variations possible in
how regimes are able to use parties as a part of their mechanism for exercising and retaining
power. Parties provide one potential source of political authority for an authoritarian regime.
Huntington (1970) places the party among a number of other competing alternatives for polit-
ical authority. These include individual leaders, traditional actors (clergy, monarchy, tribal),
bureaucratic actors (civil service, military), parliamentary actors (assemblies, sub-national
governments), and socio-economic actors (classes, professions, unions). Regimes can vary
greatly on how they manage these different political competitors.
Parties very often are closely tied with personalistic leaders as is seen by the mixed regime
types mentioned by Geddes (1999) and Hadenius and Teorell (2007). Personal charisma
of leaders is not unique to non-competitive systems and is an important factor in party
organization and institutionalization in democratic political systems as well (Panebianco,
1988). Personalistic leaders may in many instances seek to use parties for many of the
benefits that political parties provide in enhancing the regimes survival. In some instances,
strong personalistic leaders may utilize a party simply as a coordination tool in order to
assist in the institutionalizing of the leader’s rule as was the case of Fransisco Franco and his
Falange party in Spain (Huntington, 1970). In this way, a political party can augment the
leader in the policymaking process and provide regime legitimacy. The balance between the
traditional and personal leadership and that provided by the party determines the overall
strength of the party (Huntington, 1970). These stronger parties may also provide the top
regime leaders in the initial phase of a civilian regime and provide for institutionalization in
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personalist or military based regimes. Parties can also manage leadership transitions as the
regime becomes more consolidated and moves away from its initial charismatic leadership
into a more pragmatic and bureaucratic era (Huntington, 1970). Some parties like Mexico’s
PRI take this to an extreme by providing a mechanism to spread the wealth of power
and prevent any individual from achieving dominance through constant rotation in power
(Magaloni, 2006)
Parties are very effective ways for regimes to maintain a consistent ideology. One of the
key pathways that parties do this is through providing legitimacy to the regime (Huntington,
1970). Parties may take a number of different routes to building legitimacy, depending on
their particular goals. At one end of the spectrum is the totalitarian regime in which the
regime utilizes the party to completely control politics and society. The party may provide
the regime with varying levels of mass mobilization ranging from minimal, temporary, and
pragmatic mobilization of authoritarian systems up to the deep ideological mobilization of
an active totalitarian regime (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Sartori, 1976).
Ideology can vary on the depth and consistency of mobilization; ranging from pragmatism
at one end to consistent ideologies on the other (Sartori, 1976). On the idealist side it involves
the type of ideology that the regime uses to justify its existence. This largely varies on the
depth of the regime’s goals, whether it is to transform society entirely, or whether it seeks
to utilize divides in society to maintain power. Huntington (1970) describes the first as
a revolutionary ideology in which the regime and party seek to completely eliminate the
perceived divide in society and do so by creating an entirely different society around the
regime institutions itself. This ideal type can further be divided on the goals, with some like
the Bolsheviks seeking economic or social equality and others like the Nazis seeking ethnic
homogeneity. The other form of ideological rationale is an exclusionary approach that retains
and utilizes the divide in society in order to mobilize the in-group against the out-group.
This can also occur along ethnic lines as in the case of the Liberian True Whig Party, or
along economic and social lines as in the cases of the KMT in Taiwan and Turkey’s Kemalists
(Huntington, 1970). Parties may also provide legitimacy to external authority in the form of
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a patron or occupier as is the case in many of the Communist parties in Eurasia (Kitschelt,
2002). Sources of legitimacy may also be imported from abroad as in the case of many
Communist parties outside the Soviet Union deriving legitimacy from Moscow rather than
domestic politics (Panebianco, 1988).
Parties are also effective means to provide and control access to the institutions of the
state itself which is helpful in two regards. First it allows a party with a way to co-opt
potential opponents by providing them with the benefits of the state through things like
legislative seats (Geddes, 1999; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007). The second route that parties
use to help the regime with is by managing the state as a potential rival for power. Parties
can be used to allow top leaders to either dominate or manage the state through the party
(Huntington, 1970). Party loyalty can be utilized to maintain control of the leaders of the
state, as the party is a key source of recruitment and career advancement for state officials.
Leaders can do this either by creating their own party as an instrument (or as in revolutionary
regimes starting off as a party), or by adopting an existing political party. In some regimes,
the party may be used to completely control assemblies or instead opt to use a party to
dominate assemblies while retaining some form of either nominal or real opposition (Sartori,
1976; Hadenius and Teorell, 2007).
The other components of the regime provide parties a number of benefits that go with
power and the control of the institutions of the state itself. In the case of military or person-
alist dominated regimes that form their own political parties, these institutions provide the
party with its initial membership. Regimes and the state they control are also able to bring
material and legal capabilities to the table that a political party outside of power would not
have. The state provides parties what Sartori (1976) calls Coercive-Extractive capabilities.
These capabilities can be used in two different ways. First is the coercive ability, which is
simply the ability of state institutions like the police and military to use force to maintain
control of opponents and the population. This provides the party and regime together with
ideally a monopoly on the use of force, a significant improvement from parties that maintain
their own militias. The other side is the extractive capabilities of the state. These come from
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the ability to raise taxes as well as provide money from resource extraction and state-run
industries (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Sartori, 1976). These capabilities give the party
greater resources to buy loyalties and provide spoils to both the general population and
potential rivals for power (Geddes, 1999; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007).
Control of the state by a party can also provide a party legal legitimacy for restricting
access to power. Regimes vary in what degree they restrict pluralism and competition. Plu-
ralism may be allowed in almost all aspects except the few that are critical to the survival
of the regime as in Linz’s conception of authoritarianism. The other extreme is the complete
limitation of pluralism and the homogenization of society that occurs under totalitarianism
(Huntington, 1970; Linz and Stepan, 1996). Regimes also vary in what degree they limit
political competition. Authoritarian political parties do not always exist in the pure single
party format. They cover a range from single party systems in which only one party is legal
to limited multiparty systems in which the party competes in unfair elections against a real
opposition (Hadenius and Teorell, 2007).
Sartori (1976) provides a detailed and useful explanation of the different arrangements
of non-competitive party systems. Sartori compares non-competitive systems based on the
difference in competition (the structure of the political game) and competitiveness (the
closeness of the game at a given moment) and by using Hirschman’s concepts of exit and
voice (Hirschman, 1970). In this scheme, competitive systems allow citizens both exit and
voice, non-competitive systems have one but not both, and totalitarian systems deny both
(Sartori, 1976). This allows for a separation of systems in which competition is fair but
elections are not uncertain at the moment due to the relative popularity of parties, and
those in which the game is tilted in favor of some parties over others. At the most pure form
is the single party system. The most restrictive definition of single party systems is the sole-
legal party in which all participation and competition must go through the party. Others like
Hadenius and Teorell (2007) relax the assumption to allow satellite parties/loyal opposition
and independent candidates as well. Single party systems may also vary depending on the
mode of internal competition. Some parties may be closed and hierarchical while others
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may have higher levels of internal competition (Geddes, 1999; Hadenius and Teorell, 2007;
Bratton and van de Walle, 1997).
The other arrangement frequently used in authoritarian party systems allows parties other
than the ruling party to exist in some form. Hadenius and Teorell (2007) call these systems
limited multiparty systems, while Sartori (1976) refers to them more broadly as hegemonic
systems. In both cases, the competition is extremely limited and elections have a high degree
of certainty. Sartori (1976) uses Communist Poland as a prime example of a hegemonic party
system. In such a system, two classes of parties exist, the governing party (Polish Workers
Party) and then licensed satellite parties that only differ slightly from the ruling party. In
the case of Poland, these parties typically competed instead for favor in a national coalition
led by the governing party. These satellite parties are used by the governing party in order
to create what Sartori (1976) calls simulated pluralism. This practice can help the governing
party to more accurately read public sentiment through the electoral support of the satellite
parties. Voter sentiment toward government policy can be read and reacted to, but without
truly giving voice to the electorate. Regimes can also allow true opposition parties that are
truly different in policy and ideology from the governing party to remain in existence as
well. In the case of Mexico, a true opposition to the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party
(PRI) in the Party of National Action (PAN). In these cases, the two main parties used pacts
(Sartori, 1976) or the institutions of federalism (Este´vez et al., 2008) in order to ensure the
balance of power remained fixed in favor of the dominance of the governing party.
1.1.3 Impacts of Successors on Party System
The next key debate revolves around what impact the old ruling party has on post-opening
politics. The most developed area of theory is in the study of former Communist parties in
East-Central Europe. Grzyma la-Busse (2004) forms a theory based on the actions and nature
of the party after the authoritarian crisis. Her approach is mostly positive on the impact of
these parties in democratic state formation. Parties that are defeated by the democratic
opposition can provide a core of a robust opposition to the new government. The real threat
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of a return by the former Communists leads the new government to create state institutions
that make it more difficult for the former Communists to exploit the state in the event
they return to power. The key factor here is that the defeated party must reinvent itself
as a programmatic opposition party that is capable of dominating the moderate left of the
political spectrum. In cases where the party does not reinvent itself, as in the case of the
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, the party provides no real competition to the
new parties and does not foster this state-building process. Instead these parties leave a
vacuum of power in the left until new center-left parties are able to form and coalesce.
One of the key factors to the successor having a positive impact on post-transition politics
is the degree to which the party remains united (Grzyma la-Busse, 2008). Parties that remain
largely united are able to provide a clear basis for competition in the early years of the
transition to democracy along a clear (post-)Communist-Opposition cleavage structure. In
the event these parties fragmented, the political arena becomes far more confused, with the
Communists dividing into multiple successor parties or joining the opposition as “laundered
Communists” (Grzyma la-Busse, 2008). In the event that there is no strong opposition party,
post-transition politics with a divided former Communist party can lead to a very fractured
and nearly non-existent party system in the form of “pluralism by default” (Way, 2006).
In these cases, the core successor may find itself as the only party in a sea of independent
candidates and pseudo-parties as was the case in Russia until the early 2000s (Ishiyama,
2008).
Parties that stayed in power following the authoritarian crisis were much less benefi-
cial in the process of transition, either leading to a slower process of democratization, more
exploitation of state resources, or some form of semi-democracy as a result (Grzyma la-Busse,
2004). The presence of a former authoritarian also can cause uneven party system institu-
tionalization in new democracies by crowding out newcomers (Randall and Sv˚asand, 2002).
In West Africa, parties often managed to remain in power for long periods of time, essentially
turning a closed system into some form of electoral or competitive authoritarianism by use
of state resources (Jourde, 2008). In the cases in which these parties fail, they often do not
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provide the same robust opposition as seen in East-Central Europe. Instead, the institutions
of the state are frequently exploited by the opposition to become the new authoritarian
party, often justifying repression of competition in order to prevent a return of the defeated
authoritarians.
Parties that faced some form of limited competition during the authoritarian period also
appear to be described differently on their impact after the authoritarian crisis. In this case,
the authoritarian party continued to fall back on some form of mobilizational, issue-based, or
institutional position to continue in politics (Este´vez et al., 2008; Magaloni, 2006; Grzyma la-
Busse, 2004). These party systems were mostly changed in the degree of competitiveness as
restrictions on competition were reduced, but without any fundamental change in the parties
and their behavior otherwise (Wong, 2008).
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Chapter 2
Theory of Party Performance in Post-Opening Politics
My theory of ruling parties following electoral openings revolves around two key outcomes,
whether the party is able to survive in a more competitive environment and whether the
party can be successful at influencing politics and policy in that same environment. My
core claim is based on a synthesis of regional and sub-regional approaches and expands
upon the claims that these ruling parties are able to carry over experience from the non-
competitive era into competitive elections. The nature of the non-competitive regime and
the institutions of the party itself provide the basic elements that can be utilized after an
opening as well as determine the options of the party after the opening. These elements
determine what a party can carry through an opening in terms of institutional resources and
party identity. Structures like party institutions and leaders, skilled staff, financial resources,
coherent ideology, and an existing base of voter support from the non-competitive era can also
be utilized in competitive elections. Prior regimes can provide varying levels of experience
with managed electoral competition as well (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Sartori, 1976).
Finally prior regime institutions are able to impact the space allowed for effective opposition
to develop (Kitschelt, 2002). Some of these components carry over to the ability of a party
to survive while others impact the strategic options available for a party to succeed.
Before going into further detail, it is important to define what my theory both is and
is not. Above all, my theory is one of explaining how well parties are able to translate
resources into achieving their goals. The specific focus is the transferability of resources from
non-competitive politics into a competitive political environment. Although the context in
which these events occur is a movement from less democratic to more democratic politics,
my theory is not one of democratization, but instead views political parties as neither purely
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democratic or non-democratic actors. Political parties are institutions that are a critical
component of democratic competition, but at the same time have a goal of winning and
retaining power in order to execute their own agenda. I intend for this explanation to bridge
the gap between the literature on political parties that is largely developed in the context
of established democracies and the literature on the role of institutions in authoritarianism,
which largely focuses on regime stability.
Finally, this theory is not a theory of transition and does not seek to explain the specific
mechanics of the opening of elections. As has already been mentioned, a significant literature
does exist with a focus on the interplay of various actors in the process of opening politics
to competition. I acknowledge that there are connections between the decisions made by a
regime and/or party in the time period prior to an electoral opening that play a major role
in determining how (or if) an opening occurs. My theory focuses on what happens after the
opening as the central dependent variable, not why or how the opening process occurs. As
the opening of politics to competitive elections is the condition for inclusion in this analysis,
I take openings as a constant factor in my theory. The variation in the type of opening is
considered a potentially confounding factor that can help explain cases, but is not a primary
explanatory factor.
2.1 Party Survival
Party survival in this case is defined as the ability of a party or its successor organization to
continue contesting national elections over multiple election cycles. The degree to which the
party is institutionalized within the regime is the main explanatory factor for why parties
should survive. The key factor is the relative importance of the party in the process of
maintaining power and support during the non-competitive era. A party that has a dominant
role in a non-competitive regime should be able to retain more of its resource base through
the opening of electoral competition. When the political party is the largest player in the non-
competitive era it should be able to remain a major feature in post-opening politics due to a
number of reasons. First, a large and dominant party will control a large mass of the political
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and governing classes of the country. One of the key roles attributed to political parties by
scholars of authoritarian politics is the ability to provide an inclusive institution to co-opt
potential allies and rivals (Hadenius and Teorell, 2007; Geddes, 1999; Gandhi and Przeworski,
2007). A large party may suffer a significant degree of defections to new opposition parties
in the form of what Grzyma la-Busse (2008) calls “laundered Communists,” but a large and
significant core of the party will remain.
Parties that played a dominant role in the non-competitive era also should continue to
be a significant feature in politics after an opening due to their experience in governing.
This gives the party two important benefits for survival. First, due to their experience, they
remain a known and credible alternative to the electorate in comparison to the untested
opposition parties. The time in government also means that they have a track record of
successes (though often failures as well) that can be credited to the party leadership. This
effect has led to the return of former Communist parties in a number of cases in the former
Warsaw Pact states as discussed earlier. The duration of rule is another feature of party
institutionalization that reduces the chance that any banned party or party in exile with
credible governing experience may exist or be relevant enough to push the ruling party aside
completely. Even when these parties are defeated, they should be able to at least rally around
a persistent and dedicated core to remain a significant opposition party even if they take no
effort to adapt significantly to political competition.
The institutional system in which the party existed in the non-competitive era also
impacts the resources available to a party. The placement of the party in the regime bears
a significant influence on the roles of the party and thus the experience it may have gained
during that period. This works along two mechanisms. The first is simply a matter of party
size. When a party takes on more of the complex roles of governance within a regime, it will
have a significantly larger and more permanent staff. These larger parties are likely to be
more robust in the face of defections by its members, and should provide a large enough core
of members and personnel around which a successor party can form.
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The second mechanism focuses on the skills that these partisans can carry forward from
the non-competitive era. Where parties are a central piece of the regime, they will be heavily
involved in a number of processes that are important to the regime. A number of techniques
for maintaining support and legitimacy that facilitated the non-competitive political system
are also useful in a competitive environment. Parties often conduct mobilizational campaigns
to generate public support for a variety of reasons in non-competitive systems. These may
include a variety of types of non-competitive elections, plebiscites, social campaigns, and
supporting various policy goals and initiatives. The party should also have a major role in
the development and maintenance of a general policy platform or ideology that can carry over
into the competitive era. This also provides the party with a significant identity which can be
utilized to connect to potential voters. Additionally, parties are also useful as a mechanism for
the patronage supply chain in authoritarian systems (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Linz and
Stepan, 1996; Geddes, 1999; Hadenius and Teorell, 2007). This experience can be valuable
as the party can utilize this experience in order to better direct resources to gain votes in a
competitive election.
In contrast, when political parties play a minor role and are subordinate to alternative
sources of legitimacy they have a lower likelihood of survival. In cases where other state insti-
tutions like the military and/or charismatic leaders dominate, the party will have far fewer
resources to carry into competitive elections. When parties function merely as expediencies
for other regime elements in order to provide access to state institutions and/or provide a
safe ally in a constitutionally required assembly they are less likely to have the same political
resources as their dominant counterparts. The keys to regime legitimacy in these cases lie in
other institutions while the party plays a secondary role at best. Regimes in which the mil-
itary dominates are typically based on the legitimacy of the military in upholding national
security from internal or external enemies and shored up by direct coercion. Regimes domi-
nated by charismatic leaders are heavily built around the personality and skill of the leader
and his inner circle of allies.
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In these cases, regime support may be based largely on features that do not translate
well into electoral politics, and are not typically carried out by a political party. Parties in
these systems play a lesser role, with much of the regime support work being done by other
actors. These parties also will have little experience in the actual governing process. There
may be some limited role in supporting the regime through mobilization or the distribution
of patronage, but other institutions like the military or the leader and his family/associates
are likely to play a greater role in this process. These parties are thus also less likely to be
as large or complex as those which carry out core government functions.
Parties that play a minor role in the institutions of the non-competitive system are not
necessarily doomed to failure, but should be much less likely to survive over time. The success
of these parties in many ways is contingent on the continued support of the other regime
elements after opening elections to rival parties. When charismatic leaders, military leaders,
or other groups continue to maintain support for the party through the electoral opening, the
party may be able to survive limited competition. Retaining control over the state during
the opening is also important to the survival of these parties. It is possible for the party
to use the post-opening period in order to become more institutionalized. An equally likely
possibility is that the party may be used as a scapegoat for the ills of the non-competitive
era and cast aside in elections. In these instances, the party does not provide a strong or
meaningful label for candidates, even those who are former regime officials, or voters. Parties
also face difficulties when regime officials seek to run as independent candidates or in some
alternative form of party that does not connect to the legacy of the non-competitive era party
in any meaningful way. This situation is illustrated by the fate of the Peoples Revolutionary
Party of Benin (PRPB) which was abandoned by President Kerekou in both the opening and
second elections. Its successor party, the Union of Progressive Forces, was unable to make
any significant inroads with the electorate, despite the success of Kerekou as an individual.
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2.2 Party Success
Party institutionalization provides the basis for party survival following an electoral opening,
but does not entirely explain the success of a party in retaining, regaining, and sharing power
over the state in the future. Party success refers to the ability of a party to directly impact
the governing process by either winning control of national political bodies or offices outright
or by participating as a partner in a coalition that controls these same bodies and offices.
The ability of a party to adapt its capabilities to a competitive environment is the critical
component to success in the competition for power. Following Panebianco (1988), parties
have two general options in politics, either to dominate politics or adapt to unoccupied
political space. Dominating politics can take two pathways. First, a party may successfully
use its strengths to gain a dominant share of voter support in free and fair elections. The
second option is to utilize their assets and experience from the non-competitive era in order
to manipulate the outcome of competitive elections in a manner consistent with Schedler’s
(2002) concept of electoral authoritarianism and Levitsky and Way’s (2002) competitive
authoritarianism. Even in this latter case, parties still rely on popularity and competitiveness
to win elections and only are required to use manipulation as insurance against uncertainty.
A party may also find success by adapting to unoccupied political space by reforming a
party’s identity and using their political assets and experience to become more competitive.
In this route, adaptation does not require domination of politics but instead for the party
to be competitive enough to rotate in and out of office over time.
Party adaptation can be seen as a spectrum of change in the party’s identity. Adapting
this identity to a new political environment may require more or less change depending on
the state of the party prior to the opening. In some instances a party may only require
only minimal reforms to the party, particularly if the party does not have an explicitly
anti-democratic identity. At the other end of the spectrum, a party may be required to
fully reinvent its image through extensive reforms. In these cases, the party makes a major
break from its past identity, only maintaining symbolic connections to a few of its past
achievements.
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A political party can take two potential routes to success as it is defined above. Figure
2.1 shows these routes. The first route involves direct voter support. In this case, the party
must utilize its resources to appeal to a sufficient number of voters to win a large enough vote
share to govern with a majority of the vote (or plurality in the cases of minority parliamen-
tary government or first-past-the-post presidential elections). This approach is particularly
important in presidential systems due to the winner-take-all nature of presidential elections,
and also very important in systems that largely depend on plurality-based electoral systems.
Parties may also utilize manipulative tactics such as the abuse of state resources in election
campaigns and custom-built institutions such as disproportionality in districting and high
thresholds in proportional elections. In the second route shown in figure 2.1, a political party
may become successful by winning the trust of other political parties in order to partici-
pate in government as a coalition partner. This is more important in parliamentary systems
with proportional elections where majority governments are the exception not the rule. This
pathway requires the party to sufficiently demonstrate that it has changed its ways and
broken with the non-competitive past.
Parties must have a sufficient degree of inherited ability that can be applied to winning
competitive elections. Some traits that are important for a party to survive in competitive
elections also overlap with those that bring success, like leadership and organization skills, a
past record of accomplishments, and governing experience. Success is facilitated by parties
that have a greater experience with skills more immediately translatable to competitive
politics. The most valuable of these skills relate to the ability to mobilize voters in elections.
This experience varies depending on the degree of what Sartori (1976) calls “simulated
pluralism” that is allowed in the non-competitive regime. The least likely systems to be
successful are those that do not have regular national elections. These should have little to
no experience with the process of rallying support in an election campaign. A step up in
competitive experience are those parties with experience holding one party, one candidate
elections (Bratton and van de Walle’s (1997) plebiscitory systems). These have experience
in mobilizing voters to turn out at the election (and ideally vote yes). Similarly, single party
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Figure 2.1: Pathways to Success
competitive systems (using Bratton and van de Walle’s (1997) terminology again) provide
parties with the experience in mobilization, but also have the added benefit of providing
the party with candidates that are more experienced with competition. Finally, the most
likely parties to succeed in competition are those that fall into Sartori’s (1976) concept
of hegemonic parties like those in Mexico and Poland. These parties have the additional
experience in competing against satellite parties with differing policy elements and adapting
their platform based on the election results, even though victory was always assured.
The next constraining factor on success in competitive elections is the degree of opportu-
nity that is available to the party. Party opportunity has two distinct elements to it. When
parties are able to maintain power during the opening process, they retain the ability to
utilize manipulation to augment their competitive abilities. In this case, party adaptation
can be more limited in scope. When they do not win elections they must rely exclusively
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on competitive skills to succeed. My approach to the use of competitive skills builds from
Grzyma la-Busse (2002) and focuses on the ability of a party to adapt to multiparty politics
through reinvention. I generalize her approach more broadly to consider whether a party is
able to adapt by credibly reforming its identity to one congruent to the non-competitive era
ideology.
When parties do not maintain control, they must be able to convert their old ideology
into a new environment in a way that is both somewhat credible to voters and not already
occupied by an opposition party. For example, a Stalinist party may reform their ideology to
either nationalism or to social democracy. Parties may also take a conservative strategy, which
as mentioned above is sufficient for survival, but not for a return to power if they are initially
defeated. The success of reform also depends on whether the reform is to a viable position
within the political environment after the opening. The nature of this environment can be
illuminated by political cleavages prior to the non-competitive era Kitschelt et al. (1999). In
some cases the ruling party may have built up a base within the electorate before restricting
competition (as in Czechoslovakia) or alternatively the party was externally imposed over a
previous party system (as in Poland) (Kostelecky´, 2002). Reform is particularly important
for what Panebianco (1988) calls parties with external sources of legitimacy. These parties
lack a native support base like those with internal legitimacy and must translate institutional
strength into a voting base. Though these parties have a disadvantage in that they are not
able to fall back on as strong a base, they also have the advantage of being much more able
to break with the non-competitive past. In some cases reforms may be extremely limited as
there are few options available to the party due to either having an ideology that is difficult
to transform or parties that predate the non-competitive system and/or existed in exile have
occupied the available ideological space.
Although I do not seek to empirically test explanations for why political parties can and
cannot make major changes in response to competition, I will briefly mention what I believe
impacts this ability. Similarly to ideological flexibility, organizational flexibility is a factor
in how capable a party is of adapting to competition. While party institutionalization has a
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positive impact on survival and provides some of the critical elements for parties to succeed, it
can also make reform difficult. One difficulty that has been noted with highly institutionalized
political parties is an inability to change (Harmel and Janda, 1982). A party that has very
strong connections to its core support base may have difficulty in changing course when
politics become more competitive. Parties that are very deeply rooted in particular social
or ethnic groups in domestic society are expected to have more difficulty in changing their
identity.
In the case of Communist parties, this pattern is visible in the Russian and Czech parties,
both of which had a strong domestic base of core supporters and a highly developed party
organization before coming to power. In each of these cases the party did not significantly
reform their policy platform and instead chose to shed the moderates from the party in
order to maintain their position. Similarly, Communist successors in the peripheral Soviet
Republics in Europe were at times able to cast aside their Marxist ideology, but retained an
ethnic Russian identity. In contrast, Communist parties that were established at the close of
World War II, such as the Polish Workers’ Party, were less deeply entrenched in society and
were more able to make major alterations.
Party reform has both benefits and drawbacks. Reforming a party’s identity frees them
from the harmful elements of their legacy, but in doing so sheds some of their inherited
resources. Ultimately the decision of reforming a party is a gamble that a party can attract
new supporters by breaking from the past, but at the same time not alienating the party’s
core supporters in the process. A party that makes too many changes may weaken itself in
such a way that makes success unattainable. A party that does not change enough may suffer
from stagnation as they are never able to win enough new voters to govern.
The value of party reform is largely contingent on the legacy of the party. Many parties
enter into competitive politics with highly defined ideologies to which multiparty democracy
is anathema. For instance, Fascist and Marxist-Leninist ideologies enshrine the state and
the vanguard party, respectively, as fundamentally non-competitive features of the regime.
Beyond ideology, parties may also be connected to a particularly unpopular leader or sym-
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bolic connection to the past. In order to break from that legacy, these parties will require
a greater break from the past than others if they are to be competitive in post-opening
politics. In other cases, major ideological reform may not be needed as the non-competitive
regime utilized a vague or flexible ideology in the first place and thus has no ideological
burden as is the case in many African single party systems. These parties, along with those
having clearly defined identities that are relatively amenable to multi-party democracy (for
instance, Socialists, Conservatives, etc.) have far less need to reform their identity. In fact,
these parties should be punished for altering their identity, as they will alienate their base
supporters and lose important resources inherited from the non-competitive era.
2.3 Interaction of Success and Survival
The combination of these two mechanisms defines the likely outcomes for parties and their
successors after electoral openings. Table 2.1 shows the core expectations of this theory.
Parties that were a central institution in the non-competitive regime should survive regardless
of the reform strategy taken. Parties that played a major role in the non-competitive regime
and that follow an adaptive strategy in response to a burdensome legacy when faced with
an electoral opening are likely to both survive for a significant amount of time and have
long-term prospects at winning top national offices regardless of whether they remain in
power. Parties that played a major role in the prior regime and did not make major reforms
to a non-burdensome legacy should also see a similar outcome. Parties with a major past
role in their regime that choose to retain a burdensome legacy will likely continue to survive
based on a limited but loyal voter base developed in the non-competitive era, but be unable
to remain a viable competitor for newer voters. Those that enacted major reforms despite
not having an overtly anti-democratic identity are likely to have a similar outcome as they
distance themselves from many of their positive achievements.
Parties that were only a minor part of their non-competitive regimes are less likely to
survive overall, but success and survival are possible in some conditions. These parties are
largely dependent upon a victory and retention of state support in the opening elections
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for both success and survival. These parties are initially dependent on the protection that
control of the state provides through the use of state resources and the ability to manipulate
competition. Those that have success in the first few elections should be able to survive
defeats if they are able to increase the role of the party and institutionalize while in power.
Parties with a minor role in the non-competitive regime are less likely than those that
played a major role to survive long or return to power if they lose power regardless of their
reform strategy as they will face the same uphill battle of any new political party. In some
cases where the party has shared power with a charismatic leader, the survival of these
parties may also be dependent on the continued association and leadership of that leader.
Parties with a minor role in the past regime that either do not reform a burdensome legacy
or excessively reform a positive legacy strategies are even more dependent on victory. The
least likely group to survive are those parties that do not make the “correct” reforms and
do not win opening elections. Those that do win the opening election are likely to survive in
the short term, but are unlikely to survive a defeat in future elections.
A few additional interactions of reform and a party’s role in the past regime should be
put in place. Having a major role in the prior regime should benefit party survival across
the board, but it may in some ways hinder party reforms. This means that parties that are
extremely deeply rooted in the non-competitive regime are likely to survive for long periods
of time after an opening, but with only limited success. This should create a certain “sweet
spot” regarding the depth of party institutionalization in the past regime where parties
are strong enough to survive, but flexible enough to reform to compete. One exception
would be cases in which the cleavages and underlying political conditions at the time of
the electoral opening are not significantly changed from those in which the ruling party
established restricted competition. In these cases, reform may be less important.
2.4 A Side Note: The Role of Charismatic Leadership
A side note must be made on the impact of charismatic leaders. These leaders have a number
of impacts on both the attributes a party carries over from the non-competitive regime, and
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Table 2.1: General Theory
Reform Given Party Role in Regime
Legacy Burden Major Minor
Reform, Burden Survival Likely Survival Possible
No Reform, No Burden Success Likely Success Possible
No Reform, Burden Survival Likely Survival Unlikely
Reform, No Burden Success Unlikely Success Unlikely
also on the internal leadership within a party. Charismatic leaders in this context are a
double-edged sword for parties and present a serious confounding factor for the social sci-
entist. The presence of strong charismatic leadership inserts a degree of predictable unpre-
dictability into the equation in a number of places. As already mentioned, a regime in which
a party shares power with a charismatic leader may survive an electoral opening depending
on the survival of the leader, or fail with the leader. The presence of such a leader does
mean a weaker role for the party as well, thus a lower likelihood of survival. In the context
of party reform, individual leaders provide a potential benefit for success in that they are
highly capable of leading a party through a rapid change in program and ideology. Also,
in many cases, highly personalized regimes have vague ideologies which are not particularly
burdensome or can easily be altered to fit a more competitive environment. The downside
to this ability to change is that parties are also able to make the “wrong” decisions for a
given circumstance. This creates an expectation that those parties that rely on personalized
leadership are potentially capable of early successes when failure or minimal survival is pre-
dicted, but may also disappear from politics rather suddenly (particularly if the leader dies,
is arrested/exiled, or otherwise abandons the party).
2.5 Competing/Confounding Factors
In addition to structural legacies, I must also account for competing external factors that
may determine the success and survival of these parties. Table 2.2 lays out these specific
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factors alongside the primary explanations for party success and survival. The nature of
the opening process can seriously constrain the options available to a party. Actions by
victorious opposition parties (or in some cases self-imposed or negotiated conditions of the
transition process) may constrain the options of the former ruling party through bans, pros-
ecution of party leadership, and other constraints on competition. Parties may be stripped
of essential resources in openings where they are defeated either in elections or by violent
means (coups, wars, etc.). Another external factor is the economic situation surrounding
the electoral opening. In the long term, parties that presided over long periods of economic
prosperity should ride on some wave of nostalgia for the “good old days” while parties pre-
siding over long terms of stagnation or decay should be less trustworthy. The short term
impacts of economic performance should impact success and survival by boosting the for-
tunes of those parties that preside over prosperity after the opening and harming those that
see stagnation or contraction. The long and short term impacts should interact as well with
favorable performance in the non-competitive era combined with bad performance under a
new government enhancing the likelihood of success for the former ruling party, while poor
performance under non-competitive rule and positive performance under a new government
make failure more likely.
Table 2.2: Factors for Party Survival and Success
Survival Success
Concept Measure Concept Measure




Conditions of Opening Violent? Electoral Experience Mobilization
Electoral? Competition
Confounding Factors Party Bans/Defeat Confounding Factors Party Bans/Defeat
Who Holds Power? Who Holds Power?




Testing these theoretical claims requires the utilization of global data on a large number of
cases. The task of selecting the data in order to carry out this task has multiple components.
First, I must define the universe of cases to be tested. This task involves setting clear selection
limitations on when a non-competitive regime and political party are sufficiently associated
for inclusion. The next tasks are to establish criteria for when or if an electoral opening
occurs, and if so, whether a political party or its successor exists after that opening. It is
also important to bound the cases in time both in order to have largely comparable cases
and also to have a sufficient time period after openings occur in order to test my claims on
party survival and success.
After bounding the universe of cases both conceptually and temporally, the remaining
tasks involve gathering the data on these cases that is needed to test my theory. I do so
in two different ways. First, I derive my key independent variable of regime type by using
global data to place these regimes in the context of all possible regime arrangements. I then
develop measures for the specific parties in question, with a focus on key features of each
party’s identity and available resources both before and after the opening. Finally, I collect
electoral data for each party or successor party in post-opening elections to provide measures
for success and survival.
3.1 Case Selection
Selecting cases for analysis involved finding all of the potential cases in which relevant non-
competitive regimes could face the potential of an electoral opening. This meant finding
all the regimes that have utilized some form of political party to support their rule. This
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explicitly excludes military, monarchical, and personalist regimes that did not form a political
party or adopt an existing party before the end of their rule. The first step was to narrow
down the relevant cases from all other non-competitive regimes. The first decision I made
was to bound the time period of observation. Regimes needed to have existed during the
broad period Huntington (1991) describes as the Third Wave of democratization starting
with the Portuguese Carnation Revolution in 1974. As there is no clearly defined end to the
Third Wave as Huntington was writing during the middle of this time period I have placed
the end date for regime existence to be the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1992. This
decision is made because the legitimacy of non-competitive rule and single party systems
is greatly diminished after the fall of the Soviet Union, and those regimes that exist or
form after this period will not have a similar environment to build a particular institutional
legacy. Finally, I choose to end my period of analysis of regime openings in 2000 before the
start of the “Colored Revolutions” which mark secondary transitions from post-Communist
governments. This makes the end of Suharto’s New Order in 1998 the last electoral opening
observed. In addition, utilizing this time period is useful as it allows for a sufficient time
period to observe party survival and success over multiple electoral cycles following the
opening.
A regime is considered relevant if it has the following traits. The key source for regime
selection is Hadenius and Teorell’s (2007) typology of authoritarian regimes. I select a broad
set of regimes that are relevant as my key variable is how the regime utilized parties in the
non-competitive period. Using the following criteria, I find 105 qualifying regimes as defined
above (this includes the Soviet Union as one and not all of its successor states). The first set
of selection criteria are unconditionally selected into my data. These include all the regime
types that are explicitly one party regimes (military, civilian, monarchies) and dominant
multiparty regimes. Their categories of limited multiparty, military multiparty, other, and
military no-party regimes all held some relevant cases but needed additional conditions to
justify inclusion. In the cases of limited and military multiparty regimes, the key condition is
that despite having multiple political parties, there must not be open competition between
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these parties. This is accounted for by only including those cases in which the Polity IV
subscore for the competitiveness of participation (PARCOMP) indicates either repressed or
suppressed participation. Selection for military no-party regimes revolved around the problem
of “movements” such as the General Peoples’ Congress in North Yemen and the National
Resistance Movement in Uganda. These cases are conditionally selected in the instance that
they are included if they are also coded by Cheibub and Gandhi (2004) as civilian or military
dictatorships. The regime type for “other” requires additional qualifiers that the regime is
also coded as a civilian dictatorship by Cheibub and Ghandi.
The second criterion for selection is whether there was some form of electoral opening.
Electoral openings are simply defined as events in which the degree of competition with real
(non-loyal) opposition political parties for the top institutions of the state is significantly
increased. Openings can occur either by electoral reform by the non-competitive regime, or
by cases in which the regime is removed (resigned, deposed, etc.) and multiparty elections
are held afterward. I find that out of the 105 regimes that qualified, 10 have faced no opening
at all, 60 have faced openings by elections, 24 by coups, and 11 by military defeats. Of the 35
events that were not regime-initiated electoral reform, and 18 had held multiparty elections
within 5 years. The remaining cases typically had multiparty elections between 10 and 20
years later, usually including at least one other non-competitive regime in the intervening
period.1
The final selection criterion is to determine what constitutes a successor party. In many
places, successor parties are very clear, with the only differences from before and after the
electoral opening being a more competitive environment and perhaps minor name and per-
sonnel changes. Some others are much more complicated. Romania presents a good illus-
tration of a complex successor situation in which the Communist Party disbands with the
execution of Ceausescu, but essentially is reunited within the National Salvation Front. This
group then splits by the second elections as various former Communist officials seek to win
1In a number of cases, political parties have formed successors after extensive periods of time
either banned or in exile. A few notable examples include MDR-PARMEHUTU in Rwanda and the
PPN-RDA in Niger.
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power. This leads to a need to decide which parties are successors. To do so, I build on
Pop-Eleches (2008) and his typology of successor parties. Successor parties contain three
(often interlinked) dimensions of continuity from the ruling party. Pop-Eleches (2008) lists
these as Institutional Continuity, Leadership and Personnel Continuity, and finally Ideolog-
ical Continuity. Institutional continuity refers to the party’s organizational structures (and
sometimes state offices held by party members). Leadership and Personnel continuity refer
to the party’s leadership and membership with or without the organization of the party itself
(often the case if a party is banned). The third dimension involves the continuation of the
ruling party’s ideology after a transition. I modify these by adding two changes that are
important to measuring party transformation. First, I add the party name as an additional
trait of successor parties. Second, I break leadership and personnel into two separate cat-
egories, distinguishing from top regime and party leaders (Presidents, Politburo members,
etc.) and partisans (MPs, apparatchiks, members, etc.).
These dimensions allow a way to both qualify successor regimes and to classify them
into a few general types (a more detailed treatment of the subject is contained in the next
section). Some successors may be ideal types, carrying through only one dimension, while
others may carry multiple dimensions of continuity. The simplest qualifying successor type
are those parties that retain all dimensions like the PRI in Mexico. Many of the East/Central
European Communist parties follow a pattern of retaining both the personnel and organiza-
tional aspects while dropping the name, ideology and top leadership of their parent parties.
Others may form almost purely around former leaders, as is the case in Soviet Central Asia,
where Republic level party chairmen formed the new parties with little to no other continuity.
Many of these leader-centric successors also may have had little ideology (African military
presidents) or independent party institutions (former Soviets) to draw from as well. In many
cases, particularly in the former Communist systems, there are second-tier successors. These
secondary parties typically are purely nominal or ideological successors, often picking up the
scraps of the party legacy left behind by the partisans and core institutions of the party
either after the party was banned from competition in early elections, or these parties form
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as splinter groups opposed to the reforms taken by the primary successor party during the
opening.
3.2 Measuring Prior Regime Attributes
In order to test a theory of how regime attributes impact the success and survival of ruling
parties, I must first settle on a method for measuring these core attributes. A number of
methods have been used by scholars to define types of non-competitive political systems.
These tend to focus on a few general approaches. First, many scholars focus on answering
the “who rules” question by focusing on the key actors in a system. Others focus more on
the nature of how a regime rules, and how it legitimizes its rule. I combine critical elements
of these two general approaches in order to develop a general scheme for measuring regime
types that is suitable to my analysis.
3.2.1 Institutions of Non-Competitive Regimes
One classic way of describing non-democratic systems is based around who controls the
top levels of the state. A number of major works have focused on the distinction between
different ruling groups. Most of the key works analyzing the who rules dimension of non-
democratic systems are derived from the broader literature on regime durability and regime
transitions. At the most basic level, there is the division used by Gandhi and Przeworski
(2007) in which systems are divided based upon whether the rulers are civilian, military,
or monarchs. Geddes (1999) takes a more specific approach, dividing regimes into military,
single-party, and personalistic systems and the possibility of mixing these types. In a more
complex vision of regime types, Hadenius and Teorell (2007) build on Geddes by going into
more depth on how regime types are mixed, including systems that go beyond the pure single
party approach.
As described earlier, non-democratic systems vary widely in how they rule. The key
elements from the literature largely focus on how various institutions are utilized to maintain
power and legitimacy. Elections may be used by rulers in a number of ways. First, elections
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do have a strong mobilizing role even when there is no competition, as is demonstrated in the
case of Bratton and van de Walle’s (1997) plebiscitory systems and Dahl’s (1971) inclusive
hegemonies. Elections may also include minimal or loyal opposition parties and candidates
in order to provide both limited voice for voters and information on policy preferences as
in the case of Sartori’s (1976) “simulated pluralism.” Finally, elections may also provide
regimes with external legitimacy in the eyes of democratic states but fall short of democracy
in systems such as Schedler’s (2002) Electoral Authoritarianism and Levitsky and Way’s
(2002) Competitive Authoritarianism.
Regimes may also use other sources of legitimacy as well. As described earlier, political
parties may be used in a number of ways to either co-opt potential competitors or to provide
leaders with a vehicle to dominate competition. In other cases, more traditional institutions
may be at the center of how a regime functions. In some cases, this means utilizing the
legitimacy of traditional leaders (like a monarch) or institutions with an established role
in society like the military (Huntington, 1970). Regimes also vary on the degree to which
they are inclusive or exclusive to the population. Some cases may use ideology to unite and
mobilize the population (with or without elections) while others may seek to use it to divide
sectors of the population based on nationality, ethnicity, and other identities (Huntington,
1970; Linz and Stepan, 1996).
I utilize a combination of these approaches to develop my measurement of regime types.
I utilize three key dimensions: who rules, how leaders attain power, and the role played by
elections. First, I follow the path of Geddes (1999) by utilizing the dimension of who is the
dominant ruling factor. The key advantage of this approach is that it allows me to indicate
where the party fits in among other actors within the regime. Knowing whether a party is in
a dominant, shared, or subordinate role is crucial for my theory of party survival. I focus on
the role of the party, personalist leaders, the military, and monarchies based upon the data
developed by Geddes et al. (2013). The second dimension that is important is the method
by which leadership transitions occur. In this dimension, I look at whether leaders come to
power by force, as handpicked successors, or by legal transitions, based on data from the
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Polity IV dataset (Marshall et al., 2014). This measure permits me to identify the degree
of stability in regimes and differentiate transitional regime types from their more stable
counterparts. Finally, I look at the role of elections in the regime. I utilize Dahl’s (1971) core
dimensions of contestation and participation in national elections. This dimension allows me
to separate out regimes that contain hybrid elements of democracy and non-democracy. It
also permits me to grasp how differing regime types utilize elections to support their rule.
These concepts are operationalized as described below in order to utilize cluster analysis to
measure the final regime types.
I also choose to utilize a very broad set of cases in my measurement of regime types. I
compare all regimes in the world (limited only by Polity IV’s data availability in microstates)
over a time period ranging from significantly before and after the period in which my quali-
fying regimes must exist. I do this for a number of reasons. First, a broader analysis allows me
to show where my cases fit into the broader universe of cases, including democracies. Placing
these regimes in a broader context in both time and space allows me to show the degree
of similarity in regimes. Having a broader context of regimes also prevents the clustering
methods I use from dividing regime types on extremely minor details, as would be the case if
only regimes with qualifying parties are included. One of the major issues in the regionalist
approaches to parties and transitions is that there is often too much attention paid to the
minor differences between cases within a region and at the same time a great deal of neglect
of the broad similarities in the cases. There are also a few reasons why a broader time period
is analyzed. First, many of the regimes that qualify for my study existed for a significant
time period before 1974. Tracing these cases back to 1950 allows me to also grasp a greater
understanding of the life-cycle of these regimes and to see what predated those regimes that
came into being more recently. Finally, tracking the regime types beyond the time of opening
allows me to view what type of post-opening environment a party faces. This is particularly
valuable when controlling for the role of competitive and electoral authoritarian systems in
post-opening election outcomes.
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3.2.2 Descriptive Analysis of Regime Types
I utilize a method of hierarchical agglomerative cluster analysis to show the variation in
types of regimes observed. Cluster analysis is not a method utilized for hypothesis testing
in the way that traditional regression analysis and its derivatives are. At its most basic
form, cluster analysis is a data mining technique; the goal is to focus on population data
and determine the groupings that exist in the observations. When the dimensions on which
the observations are chosen with a sound theoretical reasoning, this classification method
allows the researcher to utilize these data in order to generate descriptions based on these
concepts. These descriptive variables are then useful as variables in conventional hypothesis
testing methods. One key advantage over qualitative classification this technique provides
involves the ability to analyze a large number of observations on multiple dimensions based
on real patterns in the data rather than on purely ideal types, or limiting the analysis to the
two to three dimensions that can be visualized. Hierarchical cluster analysis also provides
another advantage as it allows the researcher to describe data at various levels of similarity
as categories are nested within one another. This allows for focusing on the various types
and subtypes of regimes that are present.
The general process of this form of cluster analysis involves measuring how different each
observation is from every other observation. This creates a massive dissimilarity matrix from
which groupings can be determined. Measuring this dissimilarity matrix requires different
techniques depending on the nature of the data. Given the fact that I utilize mixed data types,
the appropriate measure for forming the dissimilarity matrix is Gower’s (1971) measure.
This measure is able to accommodate multiple data forms in order to produce a dissimilarity
matrix (Kaufman and Rousseeuw, 1990). In this case, I did not weight any of the variables
specifically as there is no clear theoretical reason why any one of the variables should be
weighted differently from others.
This measure is then used to derive a set of clusters. I have used a hierarchical agglom-
erative technique to generate the clusters in my data. The hierarchical approach indicates
that each group is nested into a series of other groups, thus an observation may belong to a
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series of supergroups, groups, and subgroups. These approaches have been heavily adopted
by biological taxonomists due to the heavy role of classification in their analysis2 (Kaufman
and Rousseeuw, 1990). Hierarchical approaches can be either agglomerative or divisive. Both
give very similar results, with the main difference being that agglomerative approaches work
from the bottom up, in which each observation is a cluster of its own, and work to combine
similar observations into increasingly large clusters. Divisive approaches take the opposite
approach by starting with a group of all cases and breaking it out until each observation is
a group of its own(Kaufman and Rousseeuw, 1990).
Multiple methods also exist for determining how to combine observations within the
agglomerative approach. In my analysis I have chosen Ward’s method for cluster combination
as it tends to provide internally consistent clusters and avoid chaining compared to other
methods. Ward’s method functions similarly to the widely known least squares approach
to regression by minimizing the increase of the sum of squares of the dissimilarity values
between the center of the cluster and each added variable (Kaufman and Rousseeuw, 1990).
This approach avoids some of the difficulties like forming chain-like clusters that are found in
single and complete linkage approaches that utilize the distance from an extreme observation
in the cluster (nearest and farthest, respectively).
Table 3.1: Regime Dimensions for Cluster Analysis
Dimension Source Data Type
Executive Type Geddes et al. (2013) 5 Binary Variables
Executive Recruitment Polity IV: XRREG Nominal, 4 categories
Electoral Competition Vanhanen (2000) Continuous
Electoral Participation Vanhanen (2000) Continuous
In my analysis I used four key dimensions to operationalize the key concepts of regime
type. The first is a measure based upon the core concepts from Geddes (1999) and opera-
tionalized using the Geddes et al. (2013) (GWF) dataset. This data fundamentally describes
which actors in a given regime are politically dominant. The original data includes both
pure regime types and hybrid types focusing on the role of militaries, parties, personalist
2For example: oak, pine, corn, and wheat are all observations in which oaks and pines are both
part of a subgroup of trees, while all four are part of the wider group of plants
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leaders, and monarchs as well as a number of residual categories. I recode their data into five
separate asymmetric binary variables. My coding of these variables is asymmetric in that
belonging to one category does not explicitly mean that an observation does not belong to
another. Thus by being coded as a military regime, an observation may also be coded as a
personalist or party regime as well. The coding scheme includes values for military regimes,
party regimes, personalist regimes,and monarchies as well as categories for democracy and
a residual category for other systems (these include foreign occupations, non-sovereign ter-
ritories, warlord states, and provisional governments). Additionally, I filled in the coding for
a number of states that are excluded by the GWF dataset for population size, but were
still included in the Polity IV data by using the coding rules provided with the GWF data
and filling in missing information based on the coding of Cheibub and Gandhi (2004) and
Hadenius and Teorell (2007). 3
The second measure focuses on how the chief executives obtained their office. This con-
cept is operationalized using the Polity IV component variable EXRREG. This value provides
a variable with four levels of measurement. The first indicates that leadership transitions are
not regulated in any way. These are generally self-selected leaders who have come to power
by way of either a coup d’etat or by victory in war. The second category includes systems in
which transitions are handled by some form of designated succession. These include hand-
picked successors or systems in which an internal regime elite has a procedure or institution
for selecting a new leader. The third category involves institutionalized succession patterns
that are institutionalized outside the ruling elite of the regime. This includes competitive
elections and hereditary succession (in monarchies). Finally, a residual category exists for
disrupted or unsettled systems. This category collapses the Polity codes for interruption of
rule, interregnum periods, and transitional years. Most often, these only last a few years,
but they are all examples of a state of exception in which the political system is not fully
institutionalized.
3These cases were: Bahrain, Bhutan, Cape Verde, Comoros, Cyprus, Djibouti, Equatorial
Guinea, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Suriname, and the Yemen Arab Republic.
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The next two measures focus on the role of elections within the system. Though all of
the systems I am focusing on do not utilize elections in a fully competitive way, elections
also have other roles within the regime. I utilize Dahl’s (1971) concepts of participation and
contestation in order to measure the nature of elections in the system. The first measure
covers electoral contestation and uses Vanhannen’s (2000) measure of electoral competition.
This measure gives the percentage of the vote in national elections not won by the winning
party. The second variable also comes from Vannhannen’s measures and focuses on electoral
participation. Participation is measured as the percentage of the total population that voted
in national elections.
Figure 3.1: Distribution of Dominant Actors
In my analysis, I utilized a data set covering the years 1950-2010 including all regimes
populous enough to be included in the Polity IV dataset. Using all regimes instead of just
those with qualifying political parties means that I can more clearly determine where these
parties are found in a more general scheme of non-competitive political systems across a
broad period of time. This leaves a very large number of observations, as there are 8157
distinct observations in 171 countries. The distribution of the variables is described below.
Figure 3.1 shows the frequency of the dominant political actors in each regime type (note that
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the proportions will not add up to 100% as some observations belong to multiple categories).
Of the 8157 observations, the largest proportion are democracies (39.8%) followed by party-
based (28.3%) and personalist systems (24.8%). The other types of regimes are significantly
less common (likely due to a combination of rarity and lack of durability) with military
regimes making up 11.6% of the observations, monarchies 8.5%, and states of exception
rounding out the observations at 2.1%.
Figure 3.2: Distribution of Executive Recruitment
Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of systems of executive recruitment across the data.
This shows that the vast majority of cases either utilized regulated transitions or transition
by designation with over 3000 observations of each. Self-selection was a much less commonly
observed format, with just under 600 observations. States of exception were the least com-
monly observed, with 343 cases. These last two forms were, not surprisingly, less common
as they are both normally considered temporary arrangements when compared to the more
institutionalized arrangements in the first two categories. Figure 3.3 shows the distribution
of my two electoral variables. Both have broadly similar distributions over the data. Elec-
toral participation ranged from zero in cases with no elections up to a high of 71% of the
population participating in elections, with a mean around 30%. Competition had a similar
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distribution ranging up to 70% of the vote share going to non-winning parties and a mean
of 28% of the vote share going to non-winners.
Figure 3.3: Distribution of Electoral Variables
As a final note before going into the description of the clusters produced by the analysis,
I want to mention alternative specifications that were not included. Initial models included
a number of additional variables that correspond with traits of non-competitive political
systems. First, I included a measure of political violence (Gibney and Dalton’s Political
Terror Scale) into the analysis. I also included economic data corresponding to economic
growth rates and potential rentier effects from oil production. These variables were dropped
from the subsequent analysis for two key reasons. First, limited data availability over time
and space for these variables meant not having regime type data on a significant number of
relevant regimes (a reduction from 8157 country-years to 5076 and no observations before
1976). Second, when I did utilize these variables in a cluster analysis, they had very little
noticeable impact on the clusters (other than the loss of cases). Although cluster analysis
is not a confirmatory method for such things, the description of the top level groups does
give an indication that violence, economic growth, and rentier states vary evenly across
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regime types and vary significantly within regime types. The only exception to this was the
noticeable connection between oil revenue and monarchies.
The cluster analysis results in number of different outputs. The main format for displaying
the data is a treelike graph known as a dendrogram, which is essentially the family tree of
all of the cases in the analysis. This format provides a good description of the relationship
between clusters and how each group is nested into other groups. The resulting analysis can
also be cut into any number of different clusters. Choosing the correct number of clusters
in very large data is in many ways more of an art guided by summary statistics and test
scores than it is a science. A number of techniques known as stopping rules exist to guide
in this process, but frequently these rules give conflicting results, some biased to very few
groups, other to very many groups. I have utilized graphical cutting techniques based on
the dendrogram and analyzing the internal consistency of the clusters given at that point.
The end goal is a reasonable number of clusters with internally consistent qualities. I find
a solution based on twenty basic clusters that divide into seven families and three major
groups. I settle on three different cut points for regime classification. At the most detailed
level, I identify twenty unique regime types. These are then aggregated into seven major
regime families and then again into three major groups as described below in greater detail.
The overall distribution of the number of observations for each of the twenty regime types
can be seen in Figure 3.4
Figure 3.5 shows the dendrogram with the three largest groups of regimes highlighted.
The first group of regimes (highlighted in pink) represents various forms of democracy. Using
my clustering technique, democracies do not divide at the level of seven groupings but do
when the number of groups is increased to twenty. In those cases, democracies largely split
into democracies (high competition), democracies (low competition), and a number of cases
which represent years in which democratic regimes are overthrown in coups.4 Classifying
4These are essentially produced by data “ghosts” in which the electoral variables are coded
as competitive, but the Polity coding indicates a self-selected or transitional arrangement. This is
typically the result of mid-year events that are coded as belonging to one year in one data source
and the next in another.
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Figure 3.4: Frequency of Twenty Regime Types
democracies is not the primary goal here, but it is useful to provide the context of the
environment for successor parties after an opening occurs.
The next two major groups provide more insight into the differences in non-competitive
regime types. The first of these (in green) consists of regimes that are backed by traditional
institutions. These include monarchies, personalist systems, military systems, and excep-
tional political systems (civil wars, failed states, etc.). These systems may include institu-
tions like elections or political parties, but they are dominated by the traditional sources
of power and legitimacy. The other major group (in blue) contains regimes that are largely
based around modern institutions like elections and parties. Like the previous group, they
may also utilize traditional sources of legitimacy, but are dominated by modern institutions.
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Figure 3.5: Major Regime Groups
The two non-democratic major groups can be divided into a number of key regime fam-
ilies as well. Figure 3.6 shows these seven different groups. Four major families are derived
from the traditional institutional group. The first of these groups (in gold) represents per-
sonalist systems. This family subdivides into two distinct regime types. The first has 486
observations and consists of pure personalist regimes. These are typified by having little to no
electoral competition or participation and mostly being self-selected leaders, like Haiti under
the Duvaliers and Spain under Franco. The second group has 632 observations and repre-
sents personalist systems that also utilize elections in some form. These electoral personalist
systems vary slightly on the allowance of multiple parties from non-competitive limited mul-
tiparty systems like that of the Samozas in Nicaragua, to plebiscitory single party elections
in Mobutu’s Za¨ıre, but these regimes remain highly personalized in the top leader.
The next group (in olive green) represents a largely residual category with under 200
observations. These regimes share one key feature in that they are all in some sort of transi-
tional or exceptional status. These break down into three subtypes, those that are occupied
by a foreign power, those that are in transition, and those in which control of the state
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Figure 3.6: Regime Families
is unsettled due to civil war. Most of these are not long-term regime types but instead
represent only one or two years during a transition. Those that do not are often unusual
cases like the failed state in Somalia or long-term occupations or peacekeeping missions like
Bosnia, Lebanon, and Iraq. One exception to this is the unrecognized state in Rhodesia from
1965-1978 which is considered to be transitional in this analysis.
The next family in the traditionally supported regime group consists of a variety of
military-based regimes. Three distinctive groups occur within this family. The first consists
of 215 observations of collegial military regimes. These tend to be regimes in which a broader
military junta controls politics and include examples like the early part of the Brazilian
military government, Nigeria from 1967-1993, and the Yemen Arab Republic. These cases
are all self-selected and have little to no electoral turnout or competition. In many cases,
these transition into other military types either by the rise to dominance of an individual
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General or from the establishment of limited electoral politics. Another 268 observations of
presidential military systems, in which power is concentrated in an individual military leader.
These cases have little to no electoral participation or contestation. These systems are often
more institutionalized than the juntas mentioned previously. In these cases, elections remain
rare or unimportant as well. This category is typified by examples like Panama under Torrijos,
Ethiopia under Mengistu, and Chile under Pinochet. The final military regime type consists
of electoral military regimes in which the military uses some form of limited competitive
elections under its rule. This category is relatively uncommon with only 126 observations and
have relatively high levels of competition (around 45% on average) but only modest voter
turnout (around 25% on average). Frequently these systems contain competition between
loyal or licensed parties as is the case in the later phases of the Brazilian military government.
The last group of traditional regime types encompasses monarchies (in light blue). This
group has almost 700 observations and is the most consistent group through every speci-
fication of clustering. The group eventually divides further down the dendrogram into two
subgroups, one of absolute monarchies and those having some form of elected parliament.
Much like democracies, this group is relatively unimportant to my analysis as only two cases
(Iran and Swaziland) make any use of political parties or movements to support their rule.
The next major family (in darker blue) consists of regimes in which political parties play
a major role in the regime, but share that role with at least one other actor. These shared
party regime split into two subgroups based on who the party shares power with, either a
charismatic leader or the military. The personalist party family of regimes splits into two
sub-groups. The first, with 199 observations, is largely defined by its lack of participatory
elections to back the party. These non-electoral personalist party systems may have either
no elections at all (like Cuba before 1976), utilize some form of indirect elections (like Cuba
from 1976-1992), or have relatively low electoral turnout like Gabon. This group’s closest
cousin, the electoral personalist party regime, is very similar on the who rules dimension but
instead has much higher electoral participation (around 50% of the population on average).
These 231 cases typically have high voter turnout but almost no electoral competition, and
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typical examples include Ceausescu’s Romania, and Cuba after the introduction of direct
assembly elections in 1992.
The other two shared party systems involve parties that share the leading role in the
regime with the military. These break down into two separate sub-types similarly to the
military types mentioned above. The first of these groups, military party regimes, includes
131 observations in which the military is not overly dominated by a single individual. These
cases vary on the role of elections, but most have little to no participation and/or competition.
Typical cases in this group include Algeria from independence to 1991 and the Republic
of the Congo from 1969-1989. The second group, presidential military party regimes, is
differentiated by the dominant role of an individual military leader in combination with the
party. These cases are seen slightly more frequently with 208 observations. These cases also
differ from military party regimes in that there is a more consistent role of elections in these
systems, although the average turnout remains a modest 28% and competition remains a
very low 10% on average. Many of these cases are extremely long-lived regimes as well and
examples include General Suharto’s New Order in Indonesia, General Stroessner’s Colorado
Party in Paraguay, and Egypt from Nasser to Mubarak.
The final family of regimes (in purple) consists of those in which the party is clearly the
dominant institution of the regime. These break down into three specific subtypes. The most
clearly distinct group consists of plebiscitory party states. These 505 regime observations
make this one of the most common non-democratic regime types in the period of analysis.
These are distinguished by the lack of electoral competition but the importance of electoral
mobilization indicated by the presence of extremely high voter turnout (around 60% on
average, higher than democracies). These states are mostly found in the Soviet Union and
its satellite states in Eastern Europe, but are also noted in Africa as well. Two more party
dominated regime types are also found. Non-electoral party states, with 489 observations,
is distinguished by the lack of importance given to elections. In some cases like Yugoslavia
and the People’s Republic of China, only indirect elections are used, while others have con-
sistently low electoral turnout, like Tanzania and Tunisia. In all cases, elections are truly
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non-competitive. Electoral competition separates the final category from its partisan cousins.
These electoral authoritarian party regimes are another common regime type with 561 obser-
vations. These cases resemble Schedler’s (2002) ideal type of Electoral Authoritarian systems
in that they hold multiparty elections consistently, but opposition parties are not allowed
to win. These systems typically display large majorities for the ruling party, with average
winnings in the 70% range against a token opposition. In addition, these elections also tend
to also be associated with relatively modest turnout numbers only with only about a quarter
of the population voting on average. Good examples of this type include Mexico under the
PRI, Senegal under the Socialists, and Malaysia under the BN/UMNO.
When only qualifying regimes are considered we see that there are clear patterns of where
political parties are found. Figure 3.7 shows the general distribution of modal regime types.
This measure includes 105 distinct regimes.5 As is no surprise, this distribution differs from
the whole population of regimes in that there are no democratic regime types represented in
the modal groups.6 This measure also is not weighted by regime duration in the same way that
the regime distribution in figure 3.4. The modal regime type provides a useful reference to
demonstrate what the dominant institutional arrangement was under a particular incumbent
government. Although regime types are largely stable, there is some variation over time in
the type of regime under a particular leadership. These changes typically occur early in
the establishment of a government or around a later consolidation of rule. These changes
are almost always between regime types within the same regime family; for instance a pure
personalist regime becoming an electoral personalist regime due to the repeated holding of
non-competitive presidential elections.
What this measure shows is that there is a relatively wide variation in the types of
non-competitive regimes that utilize political parties. Not surprisingly, the most common
modal type falls into regimes in the pure party regime family, with forty one observations
5This number reflects only a single observation for the central party in states that break up
during the opening as in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union.
6Although some observations are democracies, particularly in cases where a party or leader
initially rises to power in democratic elections before consolidating non-competitive rule as in the
case of the Marcos government in the Philippines.
56
Figure 3.7: Qualifying Regimes Only
between its three subtypes. Within that group, the plebiscitory party subtype is the most
commonly observed modal regime type, with seventeen regimes utilizing that as the primary
institutional arrangement and the non-electoral and electoral authoritarian subtypes equally
common with twelve observations each. The next most common regime family for qualifying
cases was in the personalist category with thirty observations in total. Pure personalist
regimes were the most common, with sixteen observations and electoral personalist systems
following with fourteen observations.
All of the other groupings were not surprisingly less well represented, as these regime types
were generally less common in the overall scheme of regimes as well. The family of shared
party regimes represents a total of twenty regimes divided into twelve personalist party types
which are then evenly divided into electoral and non-electoral subgroups. The eight military
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party regime types were similarly subdivided into two equal groups along the line between
the presidential military party systems and military party systems. Military regimes are less
common within the qualifying observations with only eleven regimes observed having this
as the modal type. The electoral military regime is the most commonly observed variant
of these with seven observations and collegial and presidential military systems having two
observations each, respectively. Finally, monarchies and transitional systems presented the
least commonly observed modal regime type in the qualifying systems. Only two observations
of monarchies, Iran before 1979 and Swaziland, neither of which had a strong party associated
with the monarchy. Transitional systems are typically not long-lived, but the one observation
that we do see as a modal type is Rhodesia. This observation is largely due to the lack of
international recognition of the Smith government’s declaration of independence as a factor
that leads to Polity coding the case as a state of exception. Were this case not coded as
exceptional, it is likely that it would have been measured as an electoral authoritarian party
state like the regime in neighboring South Africa.
A look at how regimes are distributed regionally shows a few key traits. As figure 3.8
shows, about half of all observations (48%) are found in Africa. This is not overwhelmingly
surprising given the number of states in the region and tendency of the smaller states of
Western Europe to be democratic during this period. The remaining regimes are divided
relatively evenly through the other regions. Europe is a bit deceptive in the lower number of
regimes as three of these European regimes break up into multiple countries to change the
balance dramatically when successors are involved as I will show later.
There are some patterns of difference in how regimes are distributed throughout regions
too. Figure 3.8 shows that Africa has greatest variation in regime types of any region, likely
due to the larger population of states. The diversity of regime types in Africa presents a
relatively reflective sample of regime types found in the other regions when divided into the
seven main regime families. The region is largely dominated by both pure party regimes and
personalist systems. The Middle East (including North Africa) follows a similar pattern to
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Figure 3.8: Regional Distribution of Qualifying Regimes
Africa, but does not have the diversity, largely due to the smaller number of observations in
the region.
Asia and Europe both show a preference for regime types in which the party plays a
larger role. In Europe, the Communist states of Eastern Europe dominate, with the bulk
of observations being plebiscitory party systems. The other three observations are the two
personalist regimes in Spain and Portugal, and on shared party system in Ceausescu’s per-
sonalized Communist Romania. Asia shows a similar combination, with the party-dominated
Communist systems in East (non-electoral) and Southeast Asia (mixed plebiscitory and non-
electoral), but also includes a number of shared party systems like the highly personalized
North Korea and military based Indonesia. Personalist regimes are limited to the two elec-
toral personalist regimes in Bangladesh (the BNP and Jatiya regimes) and the Marcos regime
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in the Philippines. Finally, the purely military regimes in Burma and South Korea round out
the observations. The Americas present a somewhat different pattern of cases. This is the
one region where the “middle categories” are dominant. Though there are not very many
cases, in the Americas, parties appear to play a smaller role in non-competitive regimes than
do military and personalist leaders. Pure party systems only occur in two instances, Mexico
and Nicaragua (Sandinistas) while others share the role with either personalist leaders as in
Guyana and Cuba, or with the military in El Salvador and Paraguay (also personalized).
Purely military systems and purely personalist systems round out the Americas, with almost
as many observations as there are of the party based systems.
Classifying regime types shows a few key patterns in the data. One initially striking point
is the diversity of regime types and the ways in which they utilize both political parties and
elections. Elections are utilized not only by stable and transitional democracies, but they are
also found in a wide variety of non-democratic regimes. This finding is interesting in the light
of the recent turn of comparative politics scholars to studying hybrid electoral authoritarian
regimes. My findings appear to indicate that perhaps instead of one distinct electoral or
competitive authoritarian regime category, there is a great diversity in how non-democracies
utilize elections. The next finding is that there are distinct differences between the family
of party-centered regimes and other forms of non-competitive regime types. These break
away from the remainder of regimes far earlier than personalist or military regime types do,
indicating a number of common features within party-centered regimes.
Another finding from measuring these regime types may help explain some of the differ-
ences in how various regional literatures view non-democracies. In regions where a regime
type is particularly overrepresented compared to the global distribution of types, it becomes
the core focus of the study of non-democratic politics in that region. This may help explain
the focus on the role of Communist parties in Central and Eastern European, personalist
leaders in African politics, and the military in Latin American politics. The distribution of
regime types may show regional clustering, but it is also clear that most major regime types
are not exclusive to any particular region (the exceptions being that military regimes are
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not found in Europe and no monarchies are found in the Americas). An exclusively regional
focus may help provide a strong understanding of the predominant regional regime types,
but at the price of neglecting those cases that do not conform to the region’s iconic regime
types. My findings provide evidence in favor of utilizing a global regime-based approach
to understand non-democracies both within a regional context and beyond. Finally, I do
not fully explain the distribution of regime types across regions and over time. This is an
important topic to study and understand, but is beyond the current scope of this project.
3.3 Political Party Organization
3.3.1 Party Institutionalization
The other key component that derives from a party’s non-competitive past focuses on the
party itself rather than its interactions with other actors within the regime. This perspec-
tive focuses on the political party as a goal-oriented organization rather than just another
institution of the regime (Janda, 1980; Panebianco, 1988). I follow two particular approaches
that focus on parties very broadly. Panebianco (1988) presents his genetic model of polit-
ical parties as a three dimensional approach to institutionalization. Janda (1980) provides
a more detailed coding of ten dimensions of political party qualities that overlaps well with
Panebianco and adds more specific coding options.
Panebianco’s first dimension, penetration/diffusion, focuses on the process of party
nationalization; whether the party formed from the center and spread to the periphery,
formed in the periphery and captured the center or some combination. Janda also focuses
on the degree of party nationalization, but approaches this from a perspective of measuring
the degree of organization of a party at the local, regional, and national levels and the cen-
tralization of power at those levels. Janda also extends these concepts to the relationships a
party may have with different sectors of society as a support base.
The origin and sponsorship of a political party is also a critical element in measuring
institutionalization. Both Janda and Panebianco utilize similar ways of conceptualizing the
sources of party legitimacy. The focus on internal or external party sources revolves around
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whether the party derives loyalty directly, or as an intermediary between other social orga-
nizations. Janda takes this concept further and looks at where the party originated, ranging
from formation by elected office holders to outlawed fringe groups and foreign political par-
ties. The focus on outlaws and foreign political party origin is exceptionally important for the
study of parties in non-competitive regimes, many of which started either as revolutionaries
or were imposed from outside as in the case of many Eastern European Communist parties.
Origin and history of party development are also critical concepts for determining party
institutionalization. In their work on party institutionalization in Third World transitions,
Randall and Sv˚asand (2002) also focus on party history as an important factor. They argue
that party longevity and historical factors (like being revolutionary or independence move-
ments) enhances their reification dimension of party institutionalization. Janda focuses in
particular on the age and organizational continuity of a political party through name changes,
merges with other parties, and the departure of splinter factions.
Party leadership is another important factor in institutionalization. Panebianco focuses
on the role of charismatic leadership as his third dimension of party institutionalization. This
dimension divides parties into situational parties, those that can exist without those leaders
and pure charismatic parties, those that are unthinkable without the leader (Panebianco,
1988). Janda also focuses on individual leadership in his dimension of personalism as a
measure of what proportion of the party is dedicated to the leader as opposed to other
motivations. Janda also adds other dimensions of leadership as well, such as the processes
for selecting party leadership and punishing deviant party militants (Janda, 1980).
Party strategies and behavior also play into Janda’s coding of political parties. Parties
may utilize different strategies to seek their goal of placing candidates in office. The three
key strategies are restrictive, competitive, and subversive (Janda, 1980). These strategies are
important to my particular work in that all ruling parties in non-competitive systems begin
with a large reliance on restrictive strategies, with little role for subversion while in power. A
critical variation when regarding electoral openings is to what degree does the ruling party
utilize competition prior to that opening. As mentioned earlier in the regional literature,
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competitive institutions during the non-competitive period are said to be important in per-
formance in later multiparty elections (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Kitschelt, 1995;
Grzyma la-Busse, 2002).
Issue orientation also provides another dimension in which party reform can be easily
measured. Janda (1980) provides a measure of multiple issue dimensions in which party
policies are measured. One key problem with directly using these measures is that they are
largely dated to the Cold War era. Another is the relativism of political issues at a national
level, which Janda does address. What is a salient and divisive issue in one state may be a
forgone conclusion in another. What this measurement dimension does provide though is an
ability to generalize what potential issue areas and congruent policy zones a party may be
able to move into. The example given in the post-Communist literature is that of Communist
parties’ successors moving into positions of the social democratic left after opening elections
(Grzyma la-Busse, 2002).
3.4 Anatomy of a Ruling Party
A ruling party is a part of the entire regime which may carry more or less weight into the
transition depending on the regime type. The elements that the party contains within the
regime fit very closely to those described by Pop-Eleches (2008). I differ from his approach
slightly by adding the regime name as an additional attribute that a party has. The party
name becomes quite important for successor parties as it does provide a strong label that
can attach a successor to the prior regime. This is an important attribute in particular in
terms of party reinvention. I also differ by breaking apart leaders and party personnel. As
leaders are often also regime leaders, it is important to distinguish the top leaders from the
mid-level party personnel. To do so, I consider leadership to only refer to the highest levels of
the party leadership (Presidents, Politburo members, etc.) while considering partisans (MPs,
members, mid-level officials) as a separate part of the party. Before an opening occurs, parties
also have control of elements of the state in order to maintain a non-competitive system.
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Figure 3.9: Elements of a Non-Competitive Regime
The relationship between the features of the party and the regime itself is show in figure
3.9. I conceptualize a party as one symbolic institution that is made up of the components
that are mentioned above. The core pillars of a ruling party include the key instrumental
resources of a party in the form of the organization and assets and partisans, as are seen
in the outer pillars of figure 3.9. Parties also contain identity resources as well. These are
represented in the central pillars and include the party’s ideology, top leaders, and name.
The balance of these elements in a party will vary depending on the depth to which the party
is involved in the prior regime. Where the party plays a major role, the outer columns in
particular are likely to be more robust, as the party carries out a significant role of governing
duties. In regimes where the party plays a minor role, those are likely to be less important.
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Finally, the party may also be supported by other regime institutions. All ruling parties will
have some degree of protection given by the state, but other institutions like charismatic
leadership and military support are likely to vary depending on regime type.
Measuring the traits of political parties in detail can be an extremely laborious task (see
Janda (1980)). Here I have focused on some of the key elements of party institutionalization
with a focus on what measures are realistically attainable on such a scale.7 I primarily
utilized the four volume set, Political Parties of the World by Day and Degenhardt (1980,
1984, 1988); Day et al. (1996); Day (2002) and for parties existing well before 1980, I used
regional election reference volumes by Nohlen et al. (1999, 2001); Nohlen (2005). From these
sources, I have constructed a dataset for 105 distinct political parties and their successors.8
The origins and founding of parties show a significant amount of variation. Party ages
vary significantly from some parties like Ghana’s NDC which were officially formed at the
opening election, to extremely long-lived parties like Paraguay’s Colorados and the Liberian
True Whig party, 102 and 111 years old respectively at the time of opening. The general
distribution of party and regime ages can be seen in figure 3.10. The bulk of parties had been
in existence for less than fifty years at the start of the opening, but there are a significant
number of cases in the tail of the distribution ranging from 50-111 years in age. Figure
3.10 also shows a similar age distribution for regimes. The regime distribution does show a
more clear peak in duration before opening, with the largest grouping of cases having existed
between ten and twenty years prior to the opening. A secondary peak in the distribution also
exists between forty and fifty years of age that corresponds largely to the Communist states
established at the end of the Second World War. Finally, Liberia presents the one outlying
observation, with the True Whig regime in power for 102 years at the time of Samuel Doe’s
1980 coup.
The difference between party and regime age also shows variation. Figure 3.11 shows
the distribution of the difference in party age and regime age. This distribution centers
7A full list of values is contained in Appendix B.
8This includes only one observation for the national parties in Yugoslavia and the USSR. Some
particular variables will have fewer than 105 observations due to data not included in these sources,
particularly for the few cases in which the party lost power before 1980.
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Figure 3.10: Party and Regime Ages at Opening
around the party and regime being essentially the same age, with the bulk of cases showing
a difference of less than ten years. The largest category consists of parties that were formed
in the first decade of the regime being in power. Far fewer regimes set were in power for
over a decade before setting up an official party. The distribution is much wider on the
side of parties predating the regime, ranging from parties that were formed in the decade
preceding attaining power up to parties that had existed for over half a century before
attaining power (the Communists and their Socialist predecessors in Romania and Bulgaria
and the Paraguayan Colorado party).
As Figure 3.12 the method of party founding varies among the categories given. Two
categories dominate the distribution, with a third of all parties formed by leaders in power,
typically after a coup or other seizure of power. A quarter of all cases consist of parties formed
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Figure 3.11: How Much Older is the Party?
prior to independence from colonial rule (mostly in Africa) to contest competitive elections
within the colony. At around ten percent each, are parties formed as rebel groups, those
formed by mergers of existing parties, and those that were formed by illegal organizations
in the country. The remaining categories only scrape out around five percent of the parties
observed, including parties competing in national elections before coming to power, legal
organizations that did not contest elections, and finally parties formed in exile.
Figure 3.12 also shows that continuity in the party organization is dominant over change.
When considering mergers, name changes, and party splits, the bulk of parties do not expe-
rience any of these events. Name changes are the most frequent occurrences, with forty three
percent of parties having at least one name change prior to opening. Mergers are similarly
common with about thirty two percent of parties merging with another party, though no
party ever experiences more than two mergers. These frequently occur as parties in power
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Figure 3.12: Founding and Continuity Measures
absorbing other minor parties in parliament to form a single party system as is frequently
seen in both Communist parties in Eastern Europe absorbing existing Socialist parties under
Soviet direction and the winners of post-independence elections in Africa absorbing their
competition. Party splits are less common, only occurring in about a quarter of all parties.
Figure 3.13 shows the trends in how party leadership changes. The largest category of
parties (44%) are those in which the founding leader remained in control of the party up
until the time of opening. In the cases where leadership change occurred, about half had
experienced between one and three party leadership changes. A small number had experi-
enced four or more changes in leadership. These are split between long-lived parties like the
Colorados, True Whigs, and Soviet Communists, and those with frequent party leadership
changes like Mexico’s PRI. What may be more telling in terms of party institutionalization
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Figure 3.13: Party Leadership
than the number of changes, is the mode of changes. The right graph in figure 3.13 shows
that in almost all cases party leadership is a matter of “until death (or an extraordinary
party congress) do us part.” Less than ten percent of all parties observed had some form of
regular leadership rotation.
Figure 3.14: Party Ideology
The ideology of these parties varies significantly as well, as is shown in figure 3.14. About
half of all parties clearly identify as some form of leftist organization. The largest category
of these identify as Marxist-Leninist parties (28%), while the rest are either Socialists (16%)
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or other leftist groups (6%). The remaining half of observations is split into two distinct
groups. Right-wing parties make up a small proportion of the total compared to the other
categories and are relatively evenly divided among other right, nationalist, and conservative
parties. Finally, the largest group of observations were those parties that did not fit into a
clear ideology. These are often vague or ideosyncratic ideologies that do not fit neatly into
the traditional ideological spectrum like “African Unity” or “Zambian Humanism.”
Figure 3.15: Party Ideology by Region
Ideology also varies significantly between region. Figure 3.15 shows how ideologies vary
by region when broken down into the main three categories. Right-wing parties are over-
represented in the Americas and Asia, while leftists are overrepresented in Europe and the
Middle East. Vague ideologies appear to be a predominantly African trait, though they are
found scattered in all of the regions other than Europe.
Measuring the party structure presents the most difficult challenge for data availability
of all measurements I use for party institutionalization. The data availability tends to follow
a pattern in which it is more likely to have data on these cases when parties are both more
institutionalized and found in more developed states. Because of this, I have also included
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measures for no data given to represent these cases. Figure 3.16 shows the variation in four
measures of party structure. Not surprisingly, given its close association with Marxism, about
half of all parties utilized some form of Democratic Centralism (party congress, political
bureau, central committee, etc.) as the key principle for organizing the top tiers of the
party. Another quarter of observed parties (usually right-wing parties) had clearly defined
organizations that followed a more Western model of political party organization. A few
cases were explicitly tied to the individual leader, and the remainder were unspecified.
Figure 3.16: Party Structure
Mass movements of some type were noted along with just over half of all parties observed,
while the other forty five percent had none mentioned. These include specific institutions
associated with the party such as youth wings, local organizations, labor unions, and similar
structures controlled by the party. The inclusiveness of party membership similarly had about
half of all cases unknown or unreported. When membership is reported, the breakdown is
relatively consistent with about ten percent of observations in each category (categories
are: under 1%, 1-5%, 5-10%, 10-20%, and over 20%). These ranged from parties with fewer
than 1% of the population as members up to cases like Za¨ıre in which party membership
is given to all citizens automatically. Finally, most parties maintained some form of official
publications. Of those with data available, the largest proportion of parties utilized both
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dailies and periodicals with a similar proportion using only one format, and a final group
that either used other methods like radio or the type of publication was not given clearly.
Finally, I look at how the party deals with competition in figure 3.17. Almost half of all
observations are of parties that are de jure single party systems in which only the ruling
party is legal. Another nine percent of parties were de facto single party systems in which
other parties were not legally prohibited but did not exist. Fourteen percent of the cases
had some form of loyal or permitted opposition parties (these are mostly found in Eastern
European and East Asian Communist systems). A quarter of all cases did permit some form
of independent opposition parties to contest in unfair elections.
Figure 3.17: Competition and the Party
The predominant form of competition between candidates does vary somewhat over time
within regimes. I focus on the predominant system used under a regime (simply the modal
type) but also look at what the electoral system was in the last non-competitive elections
before opening (or in 2010 for cases not experiencing openings). In both cases, the most
prevalent system was competition between multiple candidates, either by having multiple
parties on the ballot or multiple candidates from a single party on the ballot. This system
becomes even more frequent when we look at the final electoral system before opening. The
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next most common system found in both cases involves non-competitive elections in which
there is one candidate nominated for each seat, usually by a single party, but sometimes
loyal opposition parties or social movements as well. This category reduced in popularity as
regimes neared opening, with some turning to internal competition in their final years. Many
regimes simply had no elections at all (often military coup regimes in Africa). These often
held one or two elections prior to opening in which there was competition between ruling
party candidates. Finally, there are a few odd cases in which only indirect elections are used
(Cuba, China, Yugoslavia, Mozambique, and Angola). These become even less common over
time, for instance, Cuba ended indirect elections in favor of internal party competition in
the early 1990s.
Finally, I have also included the type of opening that occurred.9 In ten percent of the
cases, no opening occurred before 2000. The dominant type of opening was the holding of
special elections. These include any type of election that may be held after an interruption
of elections (like in no-election systems) or early elections held by either the ruling regime
or an interim body like the national conferences held by many African countries. After that,
the most frequent opening types are the removal of the party from power by either a coup
or defeat in war. Finally, around ten percent of the cases had openings that occurred during
regularly-scheduled elections and mostly involved reforms that made that particular election
significantly more competitive.
3.5 Successor Party Traits
These regimes produce a variety of different successor types. Figure 3.18 shows the range of
successors seen. These types are coded by the general characteristics of what elements the
successor party can claim as a legacy from the prior party as well as elements of how the
successor formed. The dominant successor type present is a simple continuation of the ruling
party. These parties may make some changes (modifying name, top leaders, ideology) during
the opening period, but the party retains all the core elements of the non-competitive era
9This does include openings that happened from 2000 to 2013 in the count.
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without significant disruption (for example, the PRI in Mexico or Polish Workers Party). A
number of other parties are coded as a reformation of the ruling party. These similarly retain
their core traits, but are disestablished for some time period as in the case of the Communist
Party of the Russian Federation (which did not exist as an organization from August 1991
to its re-founding in 1993 Klyazm Conference).
Most other parties tend to carry on partial legacies of the parent party. These are rela-
tively evenly distributed with around 10 observations of each type. These are coded based on
the primary element that the successor retained. Organizational successors are based around
party personnel and resources (an example being the National Salvation Front in Romania),
personal successors are formed around a major leader of the party (an example being Aliyev’s
New Azerbaijan Party), while splinter successors are formed around dissident factions of the
party that typically resisted reforms enacted by the mainstream factions of the party during
a transition. Successors also form by adopting the ideology and names (often abandoned
by the main successor) of parties without any significant inheritance of other resources. A
number of parties are formed by either minor party personnel or newcomers after the opening
which focus on these elements of the party, but with little else. Finally, a small number of
parties form successors that function as armed opposition groups rather than contesting in
competitive politics (the main examples being in Cambodia, Somalia, and Chad).
Focusing on the distribution of ideology among successor parties in Figure 3.18, a few
trends are visible. First is that there is a change in the relative distribution of leftist parties,
with the proportions of Socialist parties becoming the dominant leftist identity at the expense
of Marxism-Leninism. In addition, there is a slight increase in parties that have vague or
ideosyncratic ideological identities after opening, and the inclusion of parties that claim an
official ideology of Liberalism (not present in ruling parties). Otherwise, the general trend
for party ideologies remain relatively stable.
The other key traits of successor parties are shown in Figure 3.19. The first distinction is
between primary and secondary successor parties. A successor party is said to be a primary
successor in the case that it inherits the predominant share of the ruling party’s resources
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Figure 3.18: Successor Types and Ideological Orientation
following the opening. In cases where only one successor forms, it is the primary successor by
default. Where multiple successors form, this is coded using Day (2002); Day et al. (1996)
to determine which successor derives the greatest share of party resources and members.
Secondary parties typically form as splinter, personal, nominal, or ideological successors
as described above. These parties often carry out roles as placeholder parties for members
and resources of the original party in the event it is banned during the opening, or are
hardline elements of the party that break away rather than join the core of the party in
reforming. One key feature of secondary successor parties is that they almost always occur
in the party-dominant family of regime types, a problem that is revisited in the next chapter.
This observation indicates that the largest and most strongly institutionalized ruling parties
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Figure 3.19: Successor Party Traits
contain a surplus of institutional legacies that can form the basis of multiple parties (as
many as four in the case of Bulgaria).
The next key set of successor traits revolve around the changes made to parties between
the non-competitive era and the post-opening period. The opening process frequently brings
about some form of change in the top officials of the party. In 60% of successor parties,
the top leader was removed during the opening period, while the remainder saw no change
in leadership. Ideological changes also showed a degree of variation. In about a third of all
cases, the party made no changes to its claimed ideology at all (in some cases, this was quite
easy as the party had no clear ideology to begin with). Another third of successors exhibited
some minor degree of change, typically the abandonment of the party’s role as a vanguard
party or role of single-party rule in their ideology. The remaining third made some form of
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major change to their ideology, going beyond simply accepting real opposition and altering
their core goals and beliefs, most frequently a renunciation of Marxism in favor of Socialism
or to a more vague ideology.
The opening process produced a varying degree of hardships to the successor parties.
In addition to the nature of the opening in terms of elections or violence described above,
some these parties faced the difficulties of both losing power and being banned during the
opening process. In two thirds of all the observed successor parties, control over both the
legislature and executive was lost during the opening election (including if the party was
ousted before the vote was held). The remaining third of parties managed to retain power
through the opening election. Parties were less likely to be banned in the opening process
than they were to lose elections. In only about a quarter of all cases was the party explicitly
banned. In general, bans fell into a few distinct categories. The first being ruling parties
deposed by coups or rebel groups which were banned by the intervening non-competitive
regime before the next of elections. The second revolved around the post-Soviet republics.
In these cases the ban on the CPSU after the unsuccessful coup of August 1991 impacted
successor parties somewhat differently. In some republics, the parties had already changed
their identity significantly enough to avoid the ban. Others faced bans into the early to mid
1990s, leading some to create placeholder parties (Day et al. (1996) frequently refers to these
as “would-be successors”) which last until the reformation of the party in the mid 1990s.
The final trait I cover in figure 3.19 refers less to the successor itself, but to what oppo-
sition it faced in the opening period. These are divided based upon when their opposition
formed. About half of all successors were faced with opponents that either were parties-in-
exile or claimed to be successors themselves to parties that pre-dated the non-competitive era
in question. These parties vary between the electoral parties from previous periods of elec-
toral government as in inter-war Europe or post-colonial Africa to former non-competitive
ruling parties themselves that were deposed either prior to or by the regime in my analysis.
About a quarter of successors faced opponents that formed as organizations opposed to the
rule of the regime in question which took on the electoral role of a political party for the
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first time during the opening election (for example, Solidarity in Poland). In the remaining
quarter of cases, the successor party only faced new opposition parties, those that formed at
the time of opening.
78
Chapter 4
Determinants of Party Survival
The first theory-testing objective of my project is to test my theory of party survival. The
initial step in this process is to revisit the key theoretical ideas in order to develop clearly
testable hypotheses. From these hypotheses, I proceed to operationalize the data in a way
that allows them to be tested. The nature of a concept like survival makes this process
somewhat complex and open to interpretation. I focus on measuring survival in multiple
ways, first focusing on which parties survive until the most recent national elections available,
and then following up with a look at when and how parties fail along the way.
Recalling from above, the key to party survival in my theoretical framework is the role
of the party during the non-competitive era. At the core of this argument is the claim that
political parties are able to carry resources through from that period into competitive politics.
Parties that had a dominant role in the prior regime should have sufficient resources that
can carry over and allow the party to survive in a more competitive environment. Parties
with a major role in the prior regime bring with them a number of benefits from their tenure
in power including experienced staff, financial resources, governing experience, and party
supporters. It is these resources that should lead a party to continue to survive over a long
period of time in competitive elections.
4.1 Hypotheses
The balance of forces in the non-competitive regime shape the resources available to a party.
When parties are a central feature of the regime, they are more likely to have a greater
share of resources than those that merely played a supporting role. This leads to my first
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hypothesis, that parties which are the dominant feature of a regime will be more likely to
survive after an electoral opening.
H1 : Party Dominant Non-Competitive Regime → High Likelihood of Survival
A side note to this is that in many cases, these party dominant regimes form more than
one successor. In most cases, these secondary successors are splinter groups from the original
party that opposed the opening process or start up around a radical party leader and do not
obtain any of the party’s resources. These secondary parties are not expected to fare well
in elections over time, and are expected to become irrelevant in elections over time, if they
were ever relevant in the first place.
When a party shares power with other institutions, the logic behind survival is less
certain. The first approach considers other regime institutions like personalist dictators and
the military to be rivals for the resources accumulated during the non-competitive era. In
this case, the party is likely to either receive only a partial share of the regime’s resources,
or alternatively only receive a dominant share in some cases while they may end up losing
resources to other regime in others (for instance the recent events in Egypt in which the
military retained the bulk of the NDP/Mubarak regime’s resources). In either case, when
looking at a sufficient number of cases, regimes in which the central institutions are shared
should be less likely to survive than their party dominated counterparts in the aggregate,
but still more likely to survive than those in which the party played only a minor, supporting
role.
H2a : Party Shared Role in Non-Competitive Regime→ Moderate Likelihood of Survival
An alternative approach to shared party regimes argues that they are at least as likely to
survive if not more likely to survive than their dominant counterparts. There are two logical
paths behind this argument. The first is that when parties share power with either personalist
and/or military leaders, they have deeper resources and are able to draw on support from
institutions other than the party after a political opening. In this “deep state/deep pockets”
approach, these parties may also be able to better withstand bans or the confiscation of
property during an opening due to the ability to draw resources from alternate sources.
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The second possible way a shared role helps is quite the opposite. The alternative is a
“scapegoat” hypothesis in which parties are able to focus the positive legacies of the regime
on the party and its members, while focusing all of the negative or onerous legacies on the
other institutions. In either approach, these parties should either have the same level of
support as their party dominated counterparts, or potentially even more (particularly in the
instances of restrictions on the former regime).
H2b : Party Shared Role in Non-Competitive Regime → High Likelihood of Survival
When parties are merely a supporting feature of a regime that is dominated by other
institutions, it becomes less likely that the party will inherit the underlying resources of the
regime. In these regimes, the party’s survival becomes highly contingent on the behavior of
other actors. In some cases, the party may be dropped completely by regime leaders and
have little but a name or ideology to carry into elections. In others, the core of the regime
may retain the party and allow for it to institutionalize after the opening elections. This
means that parties that play a minor role in the non-competitive regime may potentially
survive over long periods of time, but in the aggregate should be less likely to survive than
those that held a larger role in the regime as their survival is highly contingent upon the
behavior of leaders outside the party and on events following the opening.
H3 Minor Party Role in Non-Competitive Regime → Low Likelihood of Survival
Finally, I must also take into effect contextual factors. As my theory of party survival is
based upon the ability of a party to carry resources over from the non-competitive era into
competitive elections, I must control for any circumstances that may diminish the ability of
a party to do so. There are a few key instances in which a party may be limited in its ability
to carry over resources into competitive politics. These are all measurable conditions of the
process of an electoral opening. First is the type of opening. When the opening occurs as an
election, a party should be able to carry its resources into the opening election unfettered.
The case of violent openings like defeat in war or coups d’etat mean a party is likely to be
stripped of its resources in the opening process, leaving little to work with in subsequent
elections. Also, parties that are defeated in opening elections face potential problems as well.
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At worst, a party may be banned outright by their newly empowered opposition. Short of a
ban, a defeated party will also lose access to state resources and potentially have significant
losses through confiscation of property and defection of partisans to join the new winner.
In cases of defeat or bans, the party (or successor in the case of a banned party) will face
significant losses of resources which should negatively impact their survival in both the short
and long term.
4.2 Data and Operationalization
Testing these hypotheses requires a few different approaches to get at the key questions. The
first approach I take is to look at survival over the long term. To do so, I simply focus on
the question of whether a party survives to the most recent elections (as of 2013, the last
full year of data available at the time of writing). This way of measuring survival has some
advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage is it provides a good view of how regime
traits and the opening impact long-term survival, and provides a very concise way of testing
those hypotheses. The main disadvantage is that it tells us little about the when, why, and
how a party ceases to exist. In addition, the performance in a single election is not always
telling, as some parties do skip or boycott elections and make a comeback afterwards. In
order to get around this problem, I additionally utilize a series of duration models to test
party failure on multiple criteria of failure.
The first challenge in testing party survival to the most recent elections is to operationalize
the concept of survival. At its most basic level, survival is a measure of whether a party exists
as an organization in any form. This is of course extremely difficult to operationalize as
some parties may exist as a group of like-minded followers that meet irregularly and have no
outward indications of their existence. In order to get around this problem, I must set some
thresholds for party survival. The minimal threshold is whether the party has disbanded as a
group or not, but this faces a similar problem to the fundamental definition, as many parties
simply fade into obscurity and confirming their disbanding is often impossible. The next
level fits Sartori’s (1976) definition and focuses on whether a party contested elections. This
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also has problems of missing cases which may have contested, but fared so poorly that their
results were not included in published election results (a common problem when parties do
not receive any representation. These problems have led me to primarily utilize measures of
representation as a measure of survival. Drawing thresholds of performance at winning any
representation, 5% of seats, and 10% of seats won1 allows an indication of whether the party
exists at any relevant level.
The second challenge is to manage the comparability of survival in presidential and par-
liamentary elections. As not all of the post-opening political systems utilized directly-elected
presidencies and/or upper houses of parliament, the primary measure for survival is lower
house elections. Parallel models are also run for presidential elections to test for whether the
same hypotheses hold in presidential contests as in assembly elections. Presidential elections
are treated separately as there are also reasons to believe that the role of parties is less
important due to the role of individual personalities in the electoral process.
Given that these measures are all discrete thresholds, the dependent variable is a dichoto-
mous value of whether the party exists or does not at a given threshold, I choose to use a
basic logit model for analysis. With regards to independent variables, I focus on measures of
prior regime traits and conditions during the opening process. The primary independent vari-
able is a collapsed measure of the regime clusters and indicates whether a party is dominant,
shares power, or has only a minor role in the non-competitive era. This measure was chosen
over more specific measures of institutionalization like party age, more specific regime types,
and particular party traits as it provides a more concise measure. In addition, these other
measures of institutionalization are all positively correlated with the three-category modal
regime types, making the regime type the best choice for a measure of institutionalization in
order to more easily interpret the resulting model.2 In addition to this, I also include controls
for conditions during the opening period that may have a negative impact on party resource
transferral. These include whether a party is banned at any time during the opening process,
1Alternative but similar measures are used for presidential elections as described below
2This correlation also provides support to Geddes (1999) in that party-based regimes are more
durable and thus more frequently observed than are other types, and also that regimes with a minor
party role often set up the party once in power, thus having younger parties.
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was defeated in the opening election, and if the opening was a violent process (coup, revolt,
or defeat in war).
This analysis looks at a long period (in some cases almost 40 years) and provides the big
picture look at how party survival is predictable based upon conditions observable at the
time of opening. The factors that determine when a party fails cannot be easily measured in
this analysis, thus I also utilize a duration model in a later section to allow for the inclusion of
other election-specific factors such as economic performance, previous electoral performance,
internal divisions, and exogenous shocks.
4.3 Long Term Survival
I first look at answering the question of whether a party survives to the most recent elections
with available data. This means survival is defined by whether a party remains involved in
electoral politics in the last observed election before the start of 2014. The distribution of
party outcomes can be seen in tables 4.1 and 4.2. In all 135 parliamentary elections were coded
in those countries in which any form of successor existed. When only the primary successor
is counted, this number of observations is reduced to 101 elections. The general trend shows
that when survival is measured in a minimalist sense, most parties are survivors, with 85%
of all successors contesting in election3 and over 90% of primary successors contesting.4 In
general, as the threshold for survival is increased, the proportion of party continuing to
qualify drops. In the case of all parties, a majority of parties have at least one seat in the
lower house, and when only primary successors are considered, a majority of parties remain
represented at the 10% threshold.
Values for presidential election performance follow a similar trend. Table 4.2 shows a
somewhat more dramatic difference in survival between the full set of 110 parties and the 82
primary successor parties. Overall, the percentages for the minimal threshold of nominating
365.2% if missing cases are considered not contesting.
477.2% if missing cases are considered not contesting.
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Table 4.1: Parliamentary Survival to Most Recent Election by Threshold Criteria
All Successors Primary Successors
Condition Survived Failed % Survived Failed %
Contested∗ 88 15 85.4 78 8 90.7
Represented 76 59 56.3 74 27 73.3
5% of Seats 61 74 45.2 61 40 60.4
10% of Seats 55 80 40.7 55 46 54.5
Parties 135 101
∗ - Values do not add up due to unclear cases coded as missing.
Table 4.2: Presidential Survival to Most Recent Election by Threshold Criteria
All Successors Primary Successors
Condition Survived Failed % Survived Failed %
Nominated Candidate∗ 54 29 65.1 52 19 73.2
5% of Vote 43 67 39.1 43 39 52.4
10% of Vote 42 68 38.2 42 40 51.2
Parties 110 82
∗ - Values do not add up due to unclear cases coded as missing.
a candidate show that in either set a sizable majority of parties continue to nominate can-
didates for president.5 Primary successors typically remain involved in presidential politics
by the last observed 10% more frequently across all three categories. This basic descriptive
data appears to indicate the critical role of party resources necessary for a national campaign
for presidential elections, with parties more likely to pass the basic thresholds of survival in
regards to parliamentary elections than presidential elections.
The first set of multivariate models focus on the difference between primary successors
and all successors. For comparison, I utilized the 5% threshold as the dependent variable (seat
share in the case of parliamentary elections and vote share for presidential) as it provides a
reasonable measure and the dependent variable is balanced enough for all subsets to allow for
5When missing data is considered as not nominating, the proportions change to 49.1% for all
parties and 63% for primary successors.
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the logit model to be accurate. The main findings in table 4.3 show an intriguing relationship
between the set including secondary successors and that only including primary successors.
Focusing on the parliamentary model, the impact of party dominant regimes when compared
to the omitted category of parties with a minor role is negative and statistically insignificant
when all cases are included together, but positive and reasonably significant when only
primary successors are included. This difference is largely due to the confounding nature of
secondary parties, as all but one observation of secondary parties come from party dominated
regimes (the exception is the Socialist Party of Labor in Romania, a shared party regime).
This finding provides support for my first hypothesis that the resources a party can carry
over into competitive elections do matter over a long period of time, as those successors that
inherited resources fared better than those that did not.
Regimes in which parties shared power with other institutions are the largest surprise.
Regardless of whether secondary parties are included or not, these regimes fared significantly
better than the omitted category of parties with a minor role in the regime. In each model,
these estimates indicate a positive impact on the likelihood of survival over a long period
of time with a reasonable degree of statistical confidence. This finding appears to uphold
hypothesis H2b that these parties are able to retain a significant degree of resources as well.
Not surprisingly, there were negative impacts for both values of constraints on party resources
in the opening process. In the small set, both were significant with at at least the 90% level,
while there was less confidence in the estimate of the impact of violent openings in the larger
model.
When survival in presidential elections is concerned there are some immediately notable
differences. Just as in the parliamentary model, there are differences in the direction of the
impact of party dominance between the large and small set of cases. Unlike the parliamen-
tary model, the presidential model does not provide the same across the board support for
hypothesis H2b. In fact, these models provide more support to hypothesis H2a in that there
is little significant difference in the likelihood of survival between shared party regimes and
minor party regimes in presidential elections. The only values that are consistent between
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Table 4.3: Party Survival
Parliamentary (5% Seats) Presidential (5% Votes)
All Successors Primary Successors All Successors Primary Successors
Variable Coef. p > |z| Coef. p > |z| Coef. p > |z| Coef. p > |z|
Party Dominant Regime −0.276 0.550 1.019 0.058 −0.199 0.718 0.892 0.138
Party Shared Regime 1.455 0.058 1.875 0.029 0.334 0.676 0.452 0.569
Violent Opening −1.045 0.145 −1.298 0.090 −1.179 0.225 −1.513 0.131
Banned after Opening −1.505 0.011 −1.554 0.040 −1.936 0.025 −1.581 0.123
Defeated in Opening −1.482 0.001 −0.875 0.103
Constant 0.309 0.430 0.367 0.350 0.934 0.072 0.643 0.212
Observations 135 101 110 82
the two models are those representing the conditions of opening. In addition to violence and
bans, defeat in the opening election also had a notable negative impact on party survival in
presidential elections.6
If only primary successors are included, a number of patterns can be seen in presidential
survival. First, the number of cases drops significantly. This appears to impact the degrees
of confidence in the estimations as the reduction in cases begins to affect the asymptotic
properties of the logit model.7 Despite the fact that no variable attains a p-value indicating
better than 90% confidence, a number of measures fall quite close to that threshold. Party
dominant regimes fit a similar pattern to what was seen in the parliamentary model, giving
no evidence to contradict the claims made above. Shared party systems appear to remain
without any significant impact on surviving as a presidential contestant. This finding when
combined with the findings in parliamentary survival appears to indicate support for the
hypothesis that these shared party regimes are able to put off their negative legacy on
individual leaders, but in doing so lose resources that are important if they are to participate
in presidential politics.
6This variable was excluded from the parliamentary model as it had no impact on the overall
explanatory power of the model, but was important in the presidential model. The number of
elections held since opening was similarly excluded from both models.
7In addition to the conventional logit model, the estimates and confidence levels were additionally
checked using a Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation method that is not prone to
the same limitations as the maximum likelihood estimator. These estimates were not remarkably
different both in regards of posterior means and credible intervals, indicating the MLE approach is
still valid despite falling below the general 100 observation rule of thumb.
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Table 4.4: Alternative Thresholds of Survival: Parliamentary
Represented 5% of Seats 10% of Seats
Variable Coef. p > |z| Coef. p > |z| Coef. p > |z|
Party Dominant Regime 0.985 0.109 1.019 0.058 1.150 0.030
Party Shared Regime 0.768 0.358 1.875 0.029 1.939 0.021
Violent Opening −0.749 0.312 −1.298 0.090 −1.739 0.036
Banned after Opening −1.962 0.010 −1.554 0.040 −1.353 0.086
Constant 1.274 0.004 0.367 0.350 0.002 0.997
n 101 101 101
Table 4.5: Alternative Thresholds of Survival: Presidential
Nominated Candidate 5% of Vote 10% of Vote
Variable Coef. p > |z| Coef. p > |z| Coef. p > |z|
Party Dominant Regime 0.111 0.876 0.892 0.138 0.728 0.215
Party Shared Regime −0.529 0.573 0.452 0.569 0.457 0.563
Violent Opening −1.147 0.255 −1.513 0.131 −1.568 0.117
Banned after Opening −1.422 0.141 −1.581 0.123 −1.464 0.150
Defeated in Opening 0.054 0.934 −0.875 0.103 −0.735 0.162
Constant 1.641 0.008 0.643 0.212 0.570 0.262
n 71 82 82
The next step is to look at how the results change with different thresholds of survival
for primary successors. Table 4.4 shows the different levels at which parliamentary survival
is measured (though it excludes contestation due to a lack of confidence in the meaning of
non-contesting observations coded as missing). The first observation of note is that when
representation at any level is utilized, few measures have any degree of significance. This
is no surprise, as the high rate of survival at this threshold, as noted earlier, means the
dependent variable of survival is strongly asymmetric, violating a basic requirement of the
logit model. Despite this, the direction of all coefficients is the same as in the 5% threshold
model. Raising the bar for survival to a 10% threshold shows the same pattern seen at the
5% level, but provides stronger coefficient estimates for all values other than a ban of the
party (which remains significant at a 90% confidence level).
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Table 4.5 shows the same approach taken with presidential survival. Utilizing nomi-
nation of a candidate as the survival criterion is doubly problematic for the model. First,
missing observations reduce the number of observations from an already bare minimum level.
Second, of the remaining cases the data is asymmetric in favor of party survival. Due to these
two problems, it is not surprising that this model is not extremely informative. When the
threshold for survival is raised to 10% of the presidential vote, the pattern remains similar
to that seen at the 5% level. A few noteworthy differences are a weakening of the coefficient
estimates for party dominant regimes, party bans, and defeat in opening elections.
Overall, the models regarding presidential elections are less clear and less informative.
This may be for a number of reasons. First, there are significantly fewer observations in each
case as not all cases have directly elected presidencies. The next potential issue is the ability
of a party to survive in parliamentary elections, but choose to avoid wasting resources in
a costly presidential election in which defeat is total in favor of focusing on parliamentary
representation where a party can get a share of power with only a small vote share. Finally,
the ability of leaders in minor party regimes to retain the presidency in and after opening
elections (as noted in the case of many African leaders by Baker (1998)) weakens the role
of pre-opening resources, as these leaders are able to retain and build resources to maintain
power in semi-competitive systems after the opening election.
4.3.1 Substantive Impacts
The final step regarding the logit models is to take a look at the substantive impact of
these variables. In order to do so, I have utilized the Zelig package for R (Imai et al., 2007,
2008) to simulate expected values for the various potential arrangements of the independent
variables. For both presidential and parliamentary elections, I have generated the estimated
likelihood of a primary successor party surviving at the 5% threshold in a given condition.
Figure 4.1, shows the patterns for survival in parliamentary elections, with each estimate
of the probability of survival indicated as a point estimate with a 95% confidence interval.
The conditions are grouped by prior regime type and show the differences when applying
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the various opening conditions. The dashed line in the center indicates an equal chance of
survival or failure in the last observed election.
When a party is a minor feature of a regime, it is extremely vulnerable to constraints in
the opening process. Even when opening conditions are favorable for survival, these parties
are only slightly more likely to survive than fail. Applying even one constraining condition
on the party leads to a prediction of a negative outcome, while applying both provides a
high degree of confidence in predicting a party will not survive in the long term.
Dominant party regimes that do not face any constraints in the opening process are
strongly predicted to survive in the long term. The application of one constraint or the other
essentially reduce the likelihood of survival to an equal probability of a party surviving or
failing. The application of both a ban on the party and a violent opening process are able
to outweigh the positive impact on survival that is provided by the prior regime type, with
a confident prediction of party failure in the long run. Regimes in which parties share the
dominant role with another major actor follow a similar pattern, but are generally predicted
to be more survivable in parliamentary elections. Like their party dominated counterparts,
they are confidently predicted to survive given benign opening conditions. Given only one
constraint, these parties are predicted to be more likely to succeed than fail, but either
option is possible given the wide confidence interval. When both constraints are in place, it
becomes most likely that a party will fail, though there is some chance of survival, unlike
the prediction for minor parties and party dominated regimes.
The same estimated probabilities are provided for presidential elections in figure 4.2 (also
based on the 5% threshold model for primary successors). In this case, the interaction between
the conditions are somewhat more complex due to the addition of a variable accounting for
defeat in the opening elections. Despite the lack of reasonably significant coefficients in the
initial logit model, the predicted probabilities do show some conditions in which a party will
be reasonably expected to survive or fail. Overall, this figure shows the strong impact of
constraints during the opening process on party survival in presidential elections. Regardless
of the role of the party in the prior regime, having all three constraints lined up against the
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Figure 4.1: Parliamentary Elections
party provides a confident prediction of party failure. The same pattern exists when looking
at conditions where the party is violently overthrown and banned in the opening, as none
of these are considered likely to survive either. The least damaging constraint to a party in
presidential elections is defeat in the opening election, given the opening is by election and
the party is not banned. In each system, the estimated likelihood of survival is notably higher
than in instances where only a ban or violent opening occurs. When opening conditions are
benign, party survival becomes more likely than not for all three prior regime arrangements,
though only the case of party dominated systems is predicted to survive with a high level of
confidence.
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Figure 4.2: Presidential Elections
4.4 Party Failure
The previous models were able to show what the impacts of regime traits and characteristics
of the opening process were on the ability of a party to survive to the end of the analysis
period, but were unable to take into account when parties fail and what impact post-opening
conditions may have on party survival. In order to do so, I utilize event-history (or survival)
analysis to focus on the various causes of party failure. These models follow the general theme
of above models by focusing on measures of regime resources and threats to retaining those
resources, but additionally account for post-opening factors including economic performance,
electoral systems, and variations in the nature of post-opening regimes.
Before proceeding further, I will make a brief note on how event-history analysis works
and how I define party failure. At its most basic level, event-history analysis provides a
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maximum likelihood estimator similar to a logit model, but includes time as a key feature
of the model. The end results are estimates of the likelihood that a condition (event) will
occur to the subject at a given time, and what impact covariates may have upon that
condition occurring. In my analysis, I define failure based on thresholds of party performance
(contesting elections, winning N% of seats, etc.). In the analysis below, I define failure based
on the following rules. First, if a party is known to have disbanded as an organization or is
absorbed by a significantly larger party, it is considered to have failed immediately. In terms
of electoral performance, a party must fail to meet the defined threshold of performance in two
consecutive elections in order to account for one-off “unlucky” elections from which a party
recovers. In addition, if a party does recover to above the given threshold of performance
before the end of the analysis period, it is considered to have survived. These last two
conditions make no difference in most parties, but do make a difference when looking at
higher thresholds of electoral performance.
At a first glance, it is once again visible that those successors that are the primary
resource inheritors of the prior regime fare far better in terms of survival. Figure 4.3 shows
the likelihood of a party failing to attain a 5% performance threshold at a given time. This
is divided in presidential (vote share) and parliamentary (seats won) measures and shows
for both a notable difference in the two groups of parties, with secondary successors much
more likely to fail early while primary successor parties fail at much lower rates over time.
Figure 4.4 uses the same form of graph to demonstrate the failure rates of primary
successor parties over time; this time divided by the type of prior regime. These graphs
help support and explain some of the findings from the logit models earlier. In the case of
parliamentary representation, it is clear to see that both shared party and dominant party
regime types are notably more enduring at the end of observation than are their subordinate
party counterparts. Both groups with a strong party role follow a very similar trajectory in
terms of failure rates, with minor variations at the ends of the time period involving shared
parties failing more commonly early but less commonly at the end of analysis.
93
Figure 4.3: Primary vs Secondary Party Survival
Figure 4.4: Party Survival by Regime Group
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In the case of presidential elections, the graph is more unclear, much like the logit analysis
in the previous section. In the case of presidential elections, the failure rates by regime type
appear similar for the first five to seven years, then diverge in the seven to twenty year
range before converging again around the two-decade mark. This graph helps explain some
of the confusion that is seen in the logit models. First, there does appear to be a difference
in survival rates of the differing regime types for a significant period of the time analyzed,
but that difference breaks down at the final observation points. Shared party regimes fare
notably better than their party dominant counterparts for this divergent period, but then
suddenly begin failing at higher rates around the seventeen year mark. The opposite happens
with regimes where the party has only a minor role in the regime; these cases are prone to
failing after the first two or so election cycles, but if they survive that point appear to fall
away at a much lower rate in their second decade.
These graphic representations are very informative, but they are limited in being unable
to compare the competing impact of other variables. In order to do so, I include a multivariate
analysis that includes competing risk factors for party failure. In addition to the variables
used in the logit analysis, I have added three time-varying control variables that capture
conditions in the post-opening period. The first focuses on economic performance in the
country after the opening. This value is represented by a one-year GDP growth rate based on
the World Development Indicators measure of GDP with missing data imputed from the Penn
World Tables (versions 8.0 and 7.1) (World Bank, 2014; Heston et al., 2012, 2014). The second
additional variable is an indicator variable denoting when parties are non-incumbents in non-
democratic post opening regimes. Non-democratic regime types are defined by the clustering
scheme used above and include all regime types that are not in the broad democratic family of
regime types. For the years 2011-2013, missing values for regime type were imputed based on
Freedom House and Polity IV measures (Freedom House, 2014; Marshall et al., 2014). Finally,
I include a measure for electoral systems that indicates whether any form of proportional
representation is used (based on DPI and IAEP coding) (Beck et al., 2001; Regan and Clark,
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2007). This last measure was particularly troublesome as it quite frequently had missing data
for a significant number of my cases.
The particular model used to test the impact of these variables is the Cox semi-
proportional hazard model. This particular model is chosen due to the lack of any pre-
conceived model of a baseline hazard function for political party survival (as opposed to the
example of a living organism with a known lifetime and mortality rate). In the remaining
portion of this chapter, I analyze multiple specifications of both independent variable con-
figurations and survival thresholds for both parliamentary party survival and presidential
party survival. The results of these models are presented in the form of hazard ratios instead
of coefficients. A hazard ratio is interpreted in a similar way to odds ratios in a logit model.
In this case, values between zero and one indicate that the impact of this variable protects
the subject from failure over time, while values higher than one lead a subject to be at a
greater risk of failure.
I begin with a five percent threshold as a failure condition in order to look at the impacts of
various independent variables on survival in Table 4.6. Overall, there is very little variation
in the substantive impact of the variables across the four model specifications. The main
difference in the models is the levels of statistical significance, particularly as the number of
observed elections is increased. The same general pattern from the logit models previously
demonstrated is seen here as well. In the first model, all the control variables are included.
The most prominent features of this model revolve around one variable that is far from
statistically significant. The impact of proportional electoral systems is not only far from
significant, but also has a counter-intuitively negative impact on party survival. The model
indicates that there is no real impact of electoral systems on whether or not a party is
able to survive. This appears to indicate that both proportional systems and single-member
constituencies provide similar opportunities to even small parties in these cases. The other
problem with the electoral system variable is the number of missing observations that are
deleted from the model. When compared with the full model, one entire party is dropped, five
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Table 4.6: Survival Model: 5% of Lower House Seats, All Successors
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Haz. Ratio p > |z| Haz. Ratio p > |z| Haz. Ratio p > |z| Haz. Ratio p > |z|
Party Dominant Regime 0.559 0.216 0.589 0.235 0.583 0.215 0.485 0.086
Party Shared Regime 0.302 0.070 0.299 0.060 0.293 0.054 0.277 0.046
Violent Opening 5.788 0.000 5.942 0.000 5.659 0.000 5.900 0.000
Banned after Opening 1.554 0.171 1.484 0.194 1.503 0.176 1.979 0.022
Primary Successor 0.062 0.000 0.052 0.000 0.054 0.000 0.055 0.000
GDP Growth 0.990 0.073 0.989 0.062
Opposition in Non-Democracy 2.587 0.001 2.781 0.000 2.765 0.000
Proportional Elections 1.185 0.717
Subjects 129 130 131 131
Failures 56 60 61 61
Elections 481 564 591 591
Time At-Risk 1655 1987 2036 2036
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years containing failures and over 100 observed elections are also dropped from the model,
leading to weaker claims of significance for other variables.
When the other variables are considered, the pattern is very consistent across specifi-
cations. Regimes dominated by the party alone retain a relatively constant hazard ratio
indicating improved survivability when compared to parties with minor regime roles in the
first three models, but just outside a reasonable significance level. This is not surprising, as
the same pattern is seen in final election data as well when all parties are included in the
model due to the high prevalence of secondary parties in this regime type. In the final model,
the estimate for party dominant regimes does become significant at a 90% threshold due to
the omission of the indicator for opposition in non-democracies. Shared party regimes have
a notably stronger impact on party survival than their dominant counterparts. In all four
models, the results for shared party regimes provide estimates with confidence levels of over
90%. In addition, the visual findings from Figure 4.3 are upheld in each model, showing that
those parties that are the primary resource inheritors of the prior regime fare far better than
secondary parties.
Controls regarding the nature of the opening are also similar in their impact across the
four models. Violent opening is consistently the variable with the strongest impact on party
failure. In each model this finding holds up to even the most stringent standards of statistical
significance. Party bans have an impact that is consistent across the first three models but,
similarly to party dominant regimes, improves in both substance and significance in when
opposition in non-democracy is dropped from the analysis. This makes sense in light of many
of the cases in which party bans (particularly in the Soviet successors) are temporary and
parties have some or all of their resources returned at the end of the ban. Economic growth
also appears to have a significant impact on party survival. In the two models that include
the variable, both show that economic growth in the year preceding an election lead to a
reduction in the risk of party failure. In both cases, this finding is within a 90% level of
statistical confidence. The other main impact of economic growth in the model comes from
missing data. Much like electoral systems, the variable leads to a number of missing cases
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that, when included, do assist the statistical leverage on the other estimates. Finally, a party
being in opposition in a non democratic system has a major negative impact on its survival.
In the three models that include this measure, the impact of this variable is statistically
significant at levels well beyond the 90% point. The other impact of this variable is that
when it is omitted, it increases the impact and significance of a number of other variables.
This is likely in part due to a relationship with the type of opening, as the condition is also
associated with violent openings and party bans.
Table 4.7 shows the same four models when only the primary successor party is included.
A number of differences can be seen from the model that included minor successor parties.
First, there is a much more notable impact of party dominant regimes on party survival,
with lower hazard ratios and results that are statistically significant at the 90% level in
two of the four models (and close to that level in two others). Shared party regimes once
again are significantly more likely to survive than the omitted category of subordinate party
regimes. Violent openings have a similarly negative impact, though the degree of risk is
lowered somewhat when only primary parties are considered. The impact of being out of
power in a non-democracy also remains almost identical to the model including all parties.
Once again, electoral system has no notable impact other than to reduce the number of
observations available. I suspect that this is likely due to the fact that both proportional
and single member district based electoral systems have mechanisms that can benefit minor
parties in particular scenarios and that the positive effects essentially cancel each other out.
Proportional systems favor successors that maintain a narrow, national voting base and
permit a party that could not win a plurality in any one district to win seats. The other
mechanism can be seen in the survival of the East German successor (Linke) which was able
to remain relevant by winning single-member seats in the former territory of East Germany
despite polling below the 5% national threshold.
Other variables that do change in impact include the effect of a party ban. Party bans
are notably more threatening when primary parties are considered, with results that are
significant well beyond the 90% level in each model. This indicates that the loss of resources
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Table 4.7: Survival Model: 5% of Lower House Seats, Primary Successors
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Haz. Ratio p > |z| Haz. Ratio p > |z| Haz. Ratio p > |z| Haz. Ratio p > |z|
Party Dominant Regime 0.454 0.120 0.492 0.135 0.459 0.091 0.382 0.032
Party Shared Regime 0.211 0.046 0.249 0.067 0.236 0.056 0.241 0.062
Violent Opening 4.059 0.007 3.760 0.007 3.738 0.006 3.930 0.003
Banned after Opening 3.436 0.017 3.092 0.019 3.117 0.015 3.993 0.004
GDP Growth 1.014 0.456 1.003 0.859
Out of Power in Non-Dem 2.700 0.024 2.661 0.016 2.798 0.010
Proportional Elections 1.338 0.623
Subjects 98 98 99 99
Failures 26 29 30 30
Elections 393 471 489 489
Time At-Risk 1411 1730 1770 1770
100
during a party ban is far more threatening to those parties with more resources in the first
place than secondary parties that, in essence, have nothing to lose. Economic growth intrigu-
ingly enough produces null results in the model of primary successors alone. In addition to
the result being null in both models that include the measure, the direction of the impact
is reversed from what is observed in the full set of parties. When only secondary parties are
observed (model not shown) growth remains significant and the hazard ratio is lower than in
the combined model. This appears to help support the idea that there are slightly different
causal patterns associated with primary and secondary successor parties. In the case of eco-
nomic growth, it appears that secondary parties may benefit from the greater availability
of new resources in a growing economy and suffer from scarcity in a weak economy, while
primary parties carry enough resources that they can weather poor economic conditions.
Table 4.8 shows once again that presidential survival is a different story from parliamen-
tary survival. Using the same model as above, the results show that the role of parties in the
regime has no reliably discernible impact on party survival at this level. Though the direc-
tion of impact is the same as for parliamentary elections, the estimates in all four models
given in Table 4.8 are far from significant at any reasonable level. The relationship between
primary and secondary parties seen in Figure 4.3 is also upheld by all four models given.
Of the opening condition variables, violent opening, bans, and defeat in the opening process
all have some degree of negative impact on presidential survival. Violence provides the most
confident and consistent measure, while there are weaker findings in terms of defeat and
bans, with bans only having a significant effect in model 4. Defeat at opening is consistently
significant across the four models with the exception of model 3 in which it is extremely
close to the 90% threshold.
The time varying controls have similar effects as were seen in parliamentary elections.
Economic growth again has a positive impact when all party types are considered that is
significant at the 90% threshold in model 2 and extremely close in model 1 (the difference is
due to the increase in observations when electoral system is dropped). Parties in opposition in
non-democracies are significantly less likely to survive with similar magnitude and confidence
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to what was seen in the parliamentary model. Finally, electoral systems made no significant
difference, other than by dropping seven parties, nine failures, and almost eighty observed
elections from the model.
Table 4.9 focuses on only the primary successor parties in presidential elections. This
model in particular shows a departure from what was seen in the logit model given in
the previous section. In this case, there is really no significant impact of party dominant
or shared regimes over their subordinate brethren. Few variables have a significant impact
in the reduced set of cases shown here. In fact, only banning parties has a result that is
consistently significant at the 90% level. Violent openings and parties in opposition to non-
democratic regimes both cross that threshold in some models, while both are close to 90%
in all models.
As party survival is a concept that can be interpreted in many ways, I next take a look
at how primary parties fare at different thresholds of survival. For both presidential and
parliamentary elections, I retain model 2 from the previous analyses, dropping the unhelpful
and problematic variable of electoral systems. In each, I set thresholds of of whether the
party participates in any form,8 win 5% of seats (or presidential vote in the first or only
round), and a higher 10% threshold.
Table 4.10 shows the results for parliamentary elections. What is perhaps most intriguing
is how the results change based upon the threshold set. Parties originating in party dominated
regimes were already shown to be close to a 90% threshold of significance in the previous
models based on a 5% success mark. What Table 4.10 shows is that the impact of prior
regime differs at different thresholds of survival. In the case of party dominant regimes, the
impact is very strong and significant in favor of survival when participation is considered,
but the strength of this impact is reduced as the bar for survival is raised. This indicates
that these parties are more likely to survive even without winning 5% of seats. The impact
of shared party regimes is somewhat different. In this case, the strength of the impact and
its statistical significance improve as the threshold is raised.
8I include boycotts as a form of electoral participation as they may not be contestation, but a
party must make some form of active campaign for their supporters to not participate in elections.
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Table 4.8: Survival Model: 5% Presidential Vote
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Haz. Ratio p > |z| Haz. Ratio p > |z| Haz. Ratio p > |z| Haz. Ratio p > |z|
Party Dominant Regime 0.879 0.789 0.902 0.810 0.913 0.834 0.833 0.661
Party Shared Regime 0.539 0.316 0.651 0.437 0.671 0.471 0.648 0.442
Violent Opening 3.978 0.006 2.805 0.026 2.991 0.019 2.894 0.020
Banned after Opening 1.679 0.212 1.518 0.259 1.323 0.435 1.956 0.049
Defeated at Opening 2.008 0.087 1.928 0.069 1.738 0.120 1.933 0.062
Primary Successor 0.169 0.000 0.189 0.000 0.187 0.000 0.183 0.000
GDP Growth 0.983 0.101 0.981 0.048
Out of Power in Non-Dem 2.127 0.045 2.520 0.004 2.324 0.009
Proportional Elections 0.716 0.493
Subjects 107 114 114 114
Failures 44 53 53 53
Elections 328 400 407 407
Years At-Risk 1268 1514 1524 1524
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Table 4.9: Survival Model: 5% Presidential Vote: Primary Successors
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Haz. Ratio p > |z| Haz. Ratio p > |z| Haz. Ratio p > |z| Haz. Ratio p > |z|
Party Dominant Regime 0.663 0.426 0.784 0.588 0.788 0.597 0.700 0.412
Party Shared Regime 0.555 0.395 0.702 0.556 0.732 0.602 0.746 0.630
Violent Opening 2.903 0.077 2.171 0.153 2.192 0.152 2.267 0.130
Banned after Opening 3.630 0.028 2.527 0.071 2.348 0.093 3.664 0.012
Defeated at Opening 1.503 0.427 1.563 0.311 1.493 0.358 1.663 0.245
GDP Growth 0.987 0.405 0.985 0.290
Out of Power in Non-Dem 2.222 0.129 3.018 0.012 2.849 0.015
Proportional Elections 0.741 0.636
Subjects 83 86 86 86
Failures 25 31 31 31
Elections 266 325 330 330
Years At-Risk 1055 1280 1288 1288
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Table 4.10: Survival Model: Lower House Thresholds - Primary Successors
Variable Participate Win 5% Win 10%
Haz. Ratio p > |z| Haz. Ratio p > |z| Haz. Ratio p > |z|
Party Dominant Regime 0.194 0.032 0.492 0.135 0.607 0.205
Party Shared Regime 0.330 0.308 0.249 0.067 0.167 0.020
Violent Opening 1.359 0.687 3.760 0.007 2.287 0.065
Banned after Opening 7.463 0.018 3.092 0.019 3.241 0.006
GDP Growth 0.994 0.782 1.003 0.859 1.023 0.148
Out of Power in Non-Dem 1.605 0.451 2.661 0.016 3.790 0.000
Subjects 98 98 98
Failures 12 29 39
Elections 519 471 459
Years At-Risk 1929 1730 1680
When the opening is violent, the impact varies based upon the threshold used. Violent
openings have no significant impact on party survival when defined as participation, but when
the higher thresholds are applied, violence has a significant, negative impact on survival. Bans
applied to the party on the other hand has a different pattern. Bans present a much more
grave threat to parties when participation is the given threshold, but remain significant
threats at higher thresholds as well. Economic growth has little effect any of the given
models, as seen above, but does become close to significant at the 90% level when the
highest threshold is applied. Finally, being out of power in a non-democracy also shows an
interesting impact across the models. In both threshold models, this variable has a strong,
significant, negative impact on party survival, but it has a much lesser and statistically
insignificant impact when the minimal threshold is considered. This indicates that in non-
democratic/semi-democratic regimes, these parties are not actively forced out of politics,
but instead are simply excluded from representation or led to boycott elections (a common
occurrence in such regimes (see Smith (2014)).
The same analysis applied to presidential elections is seen in Table 4.11. Some similar
patterns are visible compared to parliamentary elections. Regime type as seen earlier, has
little clear impact on whether a party can survive above a certain electoral threshold. The
only potential exception is shared parties with a 10% threshold which nears a 90% level of
significance. In the case of whether a party nominates a candidate for presidential elections,
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the matter becomes a bit more complicated. Party dominated regime successors appear to
be more likely continue to participate over time than are their subordinate counterparts. The
matter of shared party regimes runs afoul of the fact that there are no instances of primary
parties from this regime group failing to participate in presidential elections.9
A violent opening also has similar impacts to what was seen above with parliamentary
survival. No meaningful impact is found at the level of simple participation, but a significant,
negative impact is found at the higher thresholds. Bans, likewise are universally negative and
significant, but more influential at the minimal threshold. Defeat in opening elections, which
was influential in the logit model for survival to the most recent election, had no significant
impact in any specification of party survival. Of the time varying controls, economic growth
was the least meaningful in the analysis. None of the three specifications of party survival
appears to be impacted by economic growth at all, agreeing with the earlier presentation
of presidential results. Parties that were out of power in non-democracies faced a more
difficult time in presidential survival than in parliamentary elections. Both vote threshold
amounts had large and significant negative impacts on survival for this condition. The case
of participation was extremely close to statistical significance at the 90% level (in fact, it
does become significant at that level when GDP growth is dropped due to the increase in
observations).
4.5 Conclusion
There are a number of conclusions that I can make from the analysis presented above. First,
is that former ruling parties do not necessarily die easily or quickly. At the most basic level,
some form of party organization or successor party continues to at least contest or aspire to
contest elections more often than not. What does vary widely is the degree to which some of
these parties slip away into obscurity while others remain a relevant factor on the political
scene. Having analyzed the electoral survival of these parties for a length of time ranging as
long as three decades, there are some major conclusions that can be reached.
9In fact, there is only one instance of a secondary party from this regime type failing, the
Romanian Socialist Party of Labor.
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Table 4.11: Survival Model: Presidential Vote Thresholds - Primary Successors
Variable Nominate Win 5% Win 10%
Haz. Ratio p > |z| Haz. Ratio p > |z| Haz. Ratio p > |z|
Party Dominant Regime 0.223 0.055 0.784 0.588 0.753 0.508
Party Shared Regime † † 0.702 0.556 0.382 0.140
Violent Opening 0.865 0.854 2.171 0.153 2.898 0.042
Banned after Opening 7.943 0.014 2.527 0.071 2.217 0.083
Defeated in Opening 1.927 0.362 1.563 0.311 1.056 0.896
GDP Growth 1.007 0.830 0.985 0.290 0.995 0.745
Out of Power in Non-Dem 3.238 0.110 3.018 0.012 5.455 0.000
Subjects 86 86 86
Failures 12 31 34
Elections 359 325 316
Years At-Risk 1441 1280 1235
† - No failures in variable, unable to compute values.
Overall, the general conclusions of all these models imply that the inheritance of resources
from the prior regime do matter for survival. In most models there is a significant influence
of both regime types in which the party plays a major role when compared to the minor
types. Generally it is also noted that parties that share governing with other institutions are
not detrimentally impacted by this relationship, but in many cases actually show greater
durability than those that dominate their regimes. This is particularly influential in parlia-
mentary elections when primary successors are concerned. Additionally, the fact that those
parties that were the primary inheritor of regime resources fare better than their minor
counterparts all around support this claim.
The main negative impacts against party survival in fact are those conditions during the
process of opening or the post-opening environment that can potentially strip a party of part
or all of these resources. When the conditions surrounding the opening and the post-opening
period are benign, party survival is much more likely. Parties that played a major role in the
non-competitive regime (whether they shared that role with another actor or not) are much
more robust when faced with these difficulties than are their counterparts that only played
a minor role. Parties in with a minor role in the prior regime appear to be dependent on
having favorable conditions for survival in the opening and post-opening periods.
107
There are a few explanations for why there is such a difference in presidential and par-
liamentary survival. The graphic representation of failure rates at the 5% threshold in figure
4.4 sheds some light on this, as the hazard rates for presidential elections appear diverge
after about five years before converging after about twenty years after the opening election.
The fundamental force likely behind these observations is likely not a failure of resources
to translate effectively into presidential elections, but instead a combination of two factors.
First, the unpredictability of personalist actors as mentioned earlier appears to come into
play more in presidential elections than assembly elections. The ability of personalist leaders
with presidential ambitions to remain involved in presidential politics by either retaining
power in the opening election, or continuing to run with their party after defeat means that
even in regimes where the party played a minor supporting role for the president, they are
more able to continue competing in elections if that leader remains involved in the process.
The second factor at play is that presidential elections may be seen as an inefficient use
of limited resources by political parties. Due to the winner-take-all nature of presidential
elections, a basic reading of Duverger (1954) points out that parties unlikely to finish in the
top two (or three in two-round systems) will not waste resources on presidential elections
(except perhaps for egotistical reasons mentioned above). In these cases, parties do not run
their own candidate, but instead endorse independent candidates or those of friendly party
coalitions instead, or simply ignore presidential politics and focus on winning assembly seats
where even in defeat, a party can still receive a few seats.
Finally, it is important to point out that, while the inherited resources of a party do play
a major role in survival, they do not determine everything. My theory and findings on party
survival are probabilistic, the party’s past and opening conditions can predict likelihoods but
not perfectly. Parties that did play a major role in the regime do fail, and those that played
a minor role do survive. What is seen is that it takes more to bring down those parties with a
stronger role in the past. In some cases, relatively rare or unique circumstances may impact




Determinants of Party Success
5.1 Theory and Hypotheses
As I have shown above, parties are able to utilize their inheritance from non-competitive
politics in order to survive for extended periods of time in competitive elections. The next
question focuses on whether these parties are able to actually have an impact beyond merely
continuing to exist. One of the fundamental reasons political parties are formed is to win
elections. The ability to actually do so provides a good measure of whether they are successful
in that regard or not. In this chapter, I seek to demonstrate evidence on what allows former
ruling parties to win elections in a more competitive electoral environment.
A party may potentially win power through two routes. Most simply, a party wins power
by building a sufficient voter base to win a majority of the vote in an election. Alternatively
a party may come to share power through partnerships and alliances with other political
parties with similar goals. In order to achieve these goals a party must either adapt to this
changing political environment, or shape the political environment to suit its goals. A party’s
ability to do either are dependent on the actions and assets of a party and the constraints
placed upon them by other actors in the political system and opening.
My core explanation of party success is the ability of a party to reform itself into a party
more suited to competitive politics. As described earlier, parties face a dilemma over whether
they should significantly modify their identity in search of new supporters (voters and/or
coalition partners) at the price of losing core supporters, or retain core supporters at the
cost of potential new voters. The key factor in whether a party should reform itself lies in
the nature of the party’s ideological past. Parties with an ideology that is not overtly anti-
democratic or is vague and flexible should incur a greater cost by losing inherited legacies
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than would be gained by reform. Those parties (Fascists and Marxist-Leninists) that have
inherently anti-democratic ideologies face a different calculus, as they will only be able to
appeal to a limited minority of voters in a competitive environment. If no significant reforms
are made, these parties face a future of stagnant vote share without bringing in new voters.
This leads to the following hypotheses:
H1a: Party reform has a positive impact on the likelihood of winning elections in parties
with anti-democratic ideologies.
H1b: Party reform has a negative impact on the likelihood of winning elections in parties
with vague or ideologies accepting democracy.
H1alt: Party reform has a positive impact on the likelihood winning elections regardless of
ideological past.
The second potential explanation for party success is the degree of experience a party
has with elections. There are two potential pathways through which electoral experience
may work. The first is that those parties that ruled over non-competitive elections should
have an advantage over their counterparts that governed without electoral backing. These
parties should have a greater degree of experience in the process of campaigning, mobilizing
the electorate, and putting forth a platform for the election that can translate into electoral
success in more competitive elections. The other possibility is that electoral experience cuts
both ways. In this alternative argument, experience with elections is not monopolized by
the former ruling party and thus elections are more competitive when opposition parties
have electoral experience, negating any positive impact of the ruling party’s experience and
making it harder for the former ruling party to win elections.
H2a: Past electoral experience makes electoral victories more likely.
H2b: Past electoral experience makes electoral victories less likely.
The next argument is that these parties are able to dominate their electoral environment.
This effect should be most visible in semi-democratic systems in which the ruling party is
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able to manipulate the political process in its favor. This form of domination should show
that when former ruling parties are incumbents in non-democracies they are more likely to
continue winning elections and that when they are in opposition in non-democracies, the
opposite should hold true.
H3a: Incumbency in non-democratic system makes electoral victory more likely.
H3b: Opposition in non-democratic system makes electoral victory less likely.
A number of other factors may also be at play in answering the question of when parties
succeed. One explanation that is heavily entrenched in the literature on the return of Euro-
pean Communist successors to power is the role of economic performance. Successor parties
are expected in general to be more likely to win elections if they have either presided over
positive growth or are in opposition when negative economic conditions prevail. In addition,
success should be less likely for parties when they face serious material constraints following
the opening. Events that negatively impact a party’s resource base like violent overthrows,
bans, and defeat in early elections should lessen the likelihood of party success.
5.1.1 Variables
To answer these questions, I utilize a number of different models. In each of these models,
I focus on the same core set of variables that cover the concepts described above. I use
two general approaches to the concept of party success. The first is a discrete measurement
of whether a party succeeds in an election or not. There are four basic levels of success
possible. First, a party can win an election outright, by either winning a majority of the
seats (for an assembly election) or of votes (for a presidential election). Below this level
there are intermediate levels of victory that vary between presidential and parliamentary
elections. In presidential elections, candidates typically win elections outright, but may be
forced to a second round (although this is relatively uncommon in my data, occurring in
less than 10% of elections). Parliamentary elections allow for two levels of partial victory
as well. When parties win too few votes to govern alone, parties will be required to either
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form a government in coalition with other parties. A party of interest may participate in a
coalition either as the lead party or as a junior partner. Finally, in a small number of cases
(about 5%), parliamentary elections may end with a party winning a plurality of the vote,
but remaining in opposition.
In my analysis of all election types, these indexes of party success are collapsed into a
dichotomy focusing on the difference between parties that lead government either as the only
governing party or leader of a coalition and those that do not. In my analysis of success in
parliamentary elections, I do look at the difference in parties that govern in coalitions against
those that are in opposition and those that are majority governments. Additionally, I utilize
raw vote/seat shares as a measure of voter support for both presidential and parliamentary
votes to show how these factors influence voter support directly.
The primary independent variable in all of the models presented below is the degree
to which a political party reforms. This is operationalized into an additive index of party
reform ranging from zero (no change) to seven (full reinvention). Three different components
make up this variable; leadership, name, and ideology. Leadership change is a simple binary
indicator of whether a party changes the top leader during the opening. Name change takes
three different levels. Parties that do not change their name at all receive a value of zero in
this index. A value of one is given to parties that make minor name changes such as changing
the word order or 1-2 words, but retain core elements of a party name (an example being
the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia becoming the Communist Party of Bohemia and
Moravia). A value of two is given to those that change their name completely (an example
being the Communist Party of Slovakia becoming the Party of the Democratic Left).
Finally, party ideology rounds out the index. Changes to ideology typically fit into one
of three different categories. First, and most simply, the party may retain its prior ideology
without any notable alteration. This is particularly common for parties with vague or prag-
matic ideologies and are given a value of zero. The next level of change a party may make are
considered minor changes and add a value of one to the index. These changes typically revolve
around renouncing the party’s special role in politics and/or making an explicit change to
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accept multiparty democracy. Such a change may indicate a more pragmatic approach to
politics, but does not significantly alter the identity of the party to supporters. The typical
example of this change is an explicitly Marxist party which retains the official Marxist iden-
tity, but accepts multiparty elections as a means for change instead of revolution and the
dictatorship of the proletariat. A major change of ideology receives an increase of four points
on the scale and implies a party alters its ideology radically, breaking from the core ideology
to another, for instance renouncing Marxism in favor of a more generic leftist position. This
level of ideology change is more heavily weighted as it does significantly alter how the party
seeks to be viewed by potential supporters. This scale is also interacted with an indicator of
whether the original ideology of a party is overtly anti-democratic as described earlier. This
is operationalized by a multiplicative interaction with a binary variable coded as one if a
party is either Marxist or Fascist and zero otherwise.
The next set of variables focus on traits of the prior regime and opening. The first set of
these are both indicators of how the regime utilized elections. These are based on the regime
cluster types derived above, but instead of selecting regime groups based on the party role,
they are instead focused on the role of elections. These include cases in which elections
were a minor or unimportant feature (category omitted as reference for analysis), if elections
were plebiscitory (high turnout, negligible competition), or competitive (moderate to high
turnout, moderate competition). In addition, a value for whether the party played a major
role in the regime is also included in order to control for one of the theorized causal factors
for survival. This measure is a collapsed value of the measures used in the previous chapter
for party dominated and party shared regime types. Opening conditions include the same
indicators for whether an opening was violent, led to the defeat of the party, or whether the
party was banned during the opening. I also include the measure from the previous chapter
regarding whether a party was the primary successor to the non-competitive era party.
Finally, I include two sets of control variables to account for environmental constraints on
the party. The first accounts for the role of being in a democratic or non-democratic political
environment following the opening. This is important, as many of these systems have turned
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to some form of competitive authoritarianism whether the former ruling party remained in
power or not. This value is generated based on the regime-type clusters, collapsing all types
in the democratic family of regimes and all in the non-democratic family into two categories.
As the cluster values ended in 2010, values for 2011-2013 were generated using multiple
imputation based on both Polity and Freedom House scores. The second control variable
utilized is a measure of economic growth. As mentioned before, a major area of the literature
on former Communist comebacks is based around the poor economic performance of the
parties that defeated them in opening elections. To account for this, I have operationalized
the concept as the GDP growth since the last election as a percentage of the value in the
last election year based on World Bank World Development Indicator data.
In both cases, the impact is expected to be different based upon whether a party is in
power or not. Economic growth should benefit a party in power, but harm the chances of
one that is not in power. Similarly being the governing party in a competitive authoritarian
system has advantages over being in opposition. Due to these problems, I have also interacted
each control with whether the party comes into the election in question as an incumbent
(based on holding either presidential or parliamentary majority). Because of this interaction
with incumbency in both variables, I am unable to show both variables in the same model
without creating interaction terms that are excessively difficult to comprehend. In each
model, these controls are shown as Model 1, with the control for democracy, and Model 2,
with the control for growth.
5.2 Analysis
My analysis includes three basic models and a few variations. The first analysis seeks to
focus on whether parties win in any form of elections. The nature of the data indicates
the use of panel data models, as there are multiple observations (two to eighteen elections)
for each party. The testing of the model began with a panel logit model due to the binary
dependent variable and the format of the data having multiple observations of subjects over
time, but diagnostics revealed that little was gained by choosing the panel model over a
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simpler pooled logit model. I have opted to utilize the pooled logit model with cluster-robust
standard errors (clustered on party) in this analysis as it is a less complex model and avoids
any complications from the use of a random-effects model.
In the second set of models, I look at how much each factor influences the vote share of
the party. These are split into presidential vote share and parliamentary seat share (lower
house elections only). In each case, I select a Random Effects GLS panel regression model due
to the dominance of time-invariant measures based on the regime and opening traits. The
primary reason for including these models is that they provide easily interpreted measures
of how much each different condition impacts the electoral performance of a given party and
allow me to note both the magnitude of impact on vote share and whether there are any
differences in the variables that impact winning votes and winning elections.
Finally, I focus on only lower house parliamentary elections to try to test whether party
change makes any difference on how a party comes into power. These elections are singled
out for two reasons. First, all systems have directly-elected lower houses and second, lower
house elections can vary in the dimension of how seats are translated into power. In order
to do this, I utilize a three-level measure of party success to account for whether a party
is in opposition, in a coalition government, or governs alone. To analyze this, I utilize a
multinomial probit model. This model allows me to see the impact of my variables on each
level of performance as compared to the others instead of assuming that one level is more or
less successful than the other. This will allow me to show how the parties that win at each
level differ.
5.2.1 When Parties Win
The first set of models focuses on the general question of when parties are able to win
elections. Both models include a combination of both presidential and parliamentary elections
in the analysis. Elections where a successor is known to have not formed or has clearly been
organizationally terminated previously are not included in this analysis.1 As both types of
1No successor party forms in only eight cases in which there are openings.
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elections are utilized, the measure of victory is designed to include similar winning conditions
for each. In the case of presidential elections, victory is simply defined as winning the office,
regardless of what round in the event of two-round elections. Parliamentary elections are
considered won in this analysis if the party leads the government after an election either in
a majority government or as the leader of a coalition government. Junior coalition partners
are not considered winners in this model.2 This condition is met in nearly thirty percent
of all elections in which a successor party exists, while parties are either in opposition or a
minor coalition partner in the remainder.
Table 5.1 shows the results of the two models utilized. In both cases, the models show a
strong general fit and ability to explain party performance in these elections. In general, both
are very similar in both coefficients and measures of significance. Model 1 utilizes controls for
democracy and incumbency. In this model, the party reform variables are shown to have an
important impact on party success. In this model, the impact of party reform is most notable
in parties that had a burdensome ideological past. When these parties do not reform, they
show a significantly reduced likelihood of winning elections than the reference category of an
unreformed party lacking a burdensome ideological past. These burdened parties also show
a significant improvement over the reference category when they do take actions to reform
themselves. In both cases, the hypothesis that reform improves the chances of success in
ideologically burdened parties is strongly upheld, with both estimates statistically significant
at conventional levels. The impact of reform on parties without an ideological burden is
somewhat less clear in this model. The estimate is negative, indicating that the hypothesis
that reform is universally beneficial is not upheld, but the negative estimate in this model
is not backed by a high degree of statistical confidence, although it is very close to a 90%
threshold in the model.
The next variables are somewhat striking in their non-findings. Having more organiza-
tionally established parties beyond the ruling party that either predate the regime or that
2The only difference made by changing this specification is to change the impact of party reforms
in parties without an anti-democratic ideological burden. When junior members are included, it
weakens the coefficient estimate notably and when coalition leaders are excluded it strengthens the
same estimate.
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Table 5.1: Pooled Logit: Party Success - All Elections
Model 1 Model 2
Variable Coef. p > |z| Coef. p > |z|
Party Reform (no burden) −0.250 0.119 −0.312 0.039
No Party Reform (burden) −1.305 0.014 −1.720 0.008
Party Reform (burden) 0.437 0.015 0.569 0.002
Rivals Predate Regime −0.042 0.887 −0.254 0.437
Rivals Opp. to Regime 0.214 0.571 0.012 0.976
Major Party Role −0.253 0.463 −0.269 0.505
Primary Successor 1.791 0.000 1.949 0.012
Prior Elec. Plebiscitory −0.159 0.710 −0.334 0.504
Prior Elec. Competitive −0.801 0.010 −0.785 0.037
Violent Opening −0.605 0.157 −0.545 0.168
Defeat at Opening −0.624 0.010 −0.671 0.011
Banned at Opening −0.900 0.048 −1.387 0.019
Number of Elections −0.050 0.111 −0.056 0.121
Incumbent in Non-Dem. 1.002 0.012
Opp. in Non-Dem. −1.385 0.005
Opp. in Democracy −1.630 0.000
GDP Growth (in Gov.) 0.011 0.042
GDP Growth (in Opp.) −0.015 0.016
Party in Opposition −1.912 0.000
Constant −0.141 0.854 0.327 0.712
Parties 127 125
Elections 1024 883
Log Likelihood -353.285 -292.020
χ2 254.72 170.39
p > χ2 0.000 0.000
AUC 0.908 0.910
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existed as organized opposition (defined to include loyal opposition, legal and illegal social
groups, and underground/exiled parties) to the regime appear to have no more or less impact
on how well the former ruling party fares than the reference category of new opposition par-
ties. This finding appears to refute the idea that having ready-made opposition parties puts
the former ruling party at any particular disadvantage. Parties that had a major role in the
prior regime (a collapsed measure of shared and dominant party types) in the pre-opening
regime were also not any more or less likely to win elections, despite the importance of this
condition on party survival. On the other hand, party resources do appear to matter as
primary parties are more likely to win elections than are secondary parties (which do win a
small number of elections). These findings do appear to show that success and survival have
a limited relation, but do have different causal processes, as will be detailed below.
Electoral legacies have a mixed and somewhat surprising outcome. Parties originating in
regimes that primarily held plebiscitory elections were not significantly different than those
in which elections were rarely or never held. The main finding is that parties originating
in regimes that utilized elections with some form of opposition party are less likely to win
elections than those holding no elections. These findings appear to indicate that the claimed
benefits of electoral experience in the non-competitive regime are not realized in the data. In
fact, taken together, these findings appear to support the hypothesis that electoral experience
benefits the opposition more than the former ruling party.
Opening conditions also have a significant impact on party success. Both initial defeat
and being banned during the opening have statistically significant, negative impacts on party
success. The case of violent openings appears less clear, as it is above even a 90% threshold of
significance, but does continue to have a negative impact on success. Time was also controlled
for in this model by including a measure for the number of elections (any national election
type) held since the opening. This measure has a negative impact, but one that is not quite
upheld by any widely accepted level of confidence.
The controls for incumbency and democracy also proved informative. All three coefficient
estimates shown in Table 5.1 are in reference to the omitted category of a party that is the
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incumbent in a democracy prior to the election in question. Not surprisingly, being the
incumbent in a non-democracy has clearly measurable advantages as demonstrated by a
positive and significant estimate. Being in opposition negatively impacts the likelihood of
winning elections in both democracies and non-democracies. What is interesting here is that
there is not much difference at all between the two conditions. Altogether, these findings
indicate a few things. First, incumbents in non-democracies are less likely to lose the next
election than are their democratic counterparts. The other side of this is that being in
opposition has a notable negative impact on the likelihood of winning an election in both
non-democracies and democracies. Essentially, being in opposition is bad across the board,
being an incumbent in a democracy is good, and being an incumbent in a non-democracy is
best as far as improving the chances of victory. This provides some evidence that electoral
manipulation is occurring in these particular cases.
There are very few differences between Model 1 and Model 2. Only one variable changes
from non-significant to statistically significant across the 90 and 95% threshold. Model 2
shows a slightly stronger and significant negative impact for party reform in parties without
an ideological burden than does Model 1. This is most likely due to the loss of a number of
observations due to a lack of data for pre-independence elections in the newly independent
post-Communist states and that a large number of parties with a lack of an ideological
burden are found in smaller, poorer countries that are less likely to have complete economic
data.
The economic controls are also not overly surprising either. All three indicators used show
clear results which are statistically significant within a 95% threshold. Economic growth
between elections appears to broadly benefit the incumbent party. When the successor party
is incumbent, economic growth increases the likelihood that they will retain power in the
next election. When the successor is in opposition, they are less likely to win office when
there is positive growth, but should be more likely to win if there is an economic contraction
while in opposition. Finally, when economic growth is zero, successors are more likely to win
when incumbent than when they are in opposition.
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These two models together paint a picture of which parties are able to win. Overall,
winning parties appear to be those that take the “correct” strategy on reforms given their
ideological past at opening. Confounding factors include hostile opening conditions and com-
petitive electoral past. The next step is to look at how parties come to winning elections.
I address this by looking at how parties perform in both presidential and parliamentary
elections, followed by a look at how parties come to power in parliamentary elections.
5.2.2 How Parties Win
The previous analysis showed when parties won at any level, but did not fully get at the
impact on how much support matters for a party in getting there, nor did it divide presi-
dential and parliamentary elections. In this section, I divide elections and analyze the same
general specification for both presidential and parliamentary vote shares. In the first model,
I utilize a linear panel model to measure the impacts of the same variables on presidential
vote share. Like the above model, I utilize two specifications, one with controls for democracy
and incumbency and the other with controls for economic performance and incumbency. An
advantage of this model is also that it is able to more easily demonstrate the relative impact
of each condition on the vote share won by a party. Finally, I repeat the model again but
instead utilize the proportion of lower house seats won in parliamentary elections.
Table 5.2 shows the results of the regression for presidential vote share. Overall, there
are few differences from the pooled logit model. The directions of all coefficient estimates
remain the same, but there are some differences in significance. The impact of party change
on presidential vote share does show that there is a clear relationship between party reform in
parties lacking an ideological burden. The coefficient estimate here significant within a 90%
level of confidence, unlike that in the pooled logit model, but indicates a relatively modest
relationship between reform and vote share, with about a three percent decrease in vote
share for each level of change in the index of party reform. This smaller share is quite likely
why I find a less significant impact on the victory/defeat threshold, but do find significant
difference in vote share. In some cases this may mean winning an election by 51% rather
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Table 5.2: Random Effects: Party Success - Presidential Vote Share
Model 1 Model 2
Variable Coef. p > |z| Coef. p > |z|
Party Reform (no burden) −2.832 0.090 −3.165 0.035
No Party Reform (burden) −15.110 0.048 −13.664 0.111
Party Reform (burden) 4.644 0.026 4.796 0.013
Rivals Predate Regime 1.257 0.754 0.237 0.956
Rivals Opp. to Regime 3.563 0.508 3.548 0.552
Major Party Role 1.331 0.787 3.267 0.555
Primary Successor 11.869 0.012 10.048 0.054
Prior Elec. Plebiscitory −6.293 0.236 −12.539 0.055
Prior Elec. Competitive −11.275 0.012 −14.156 0.004
Violent Opening −10.964 0.020 −11.200 0.006
Defeat at Opening −9.353 0.020 −11.471 0.006
Banned at Opening −6.681 0.132 −5.431 0.199
Incumbent in Non-Dem. 16.204 0.000
Opp. in Non-Dem. −15.448 0.002
Opp. in Democracy −11.746 0.000
GDP Growth (in Gov.) 0.031 0.070
GDP Growth (in Opp.) −0.038 0.043
Party in Opposition −18.203 0.000




p > χ2 0.000 0.000
ρ 0.307 0.297
Overall R2 0.543 0.522
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than 54%. In fact, few parties go beyond two on the index of reform when they do not have
an ideological burden.
The same index of reform has a stronger positive impact on presidential vote share when
applied to parties with a burdensome ideological legacy. In this case, the value remains
significant at the 95% level, and the impact is around four and a half percentage points
per level of reform. This makes for rather substantively significant differences in vote shares
between those that made only minimal reforms to those that were completely reinvented.
Additionally, parties that chose not to reform at all were far worse off when they had an
ideological burden than those that did not, with a fifteen percent difference in presidential
vote share.
Once again, the variables for rival parties and party role in the prior regime were not
statistically significant in this model. Prior experience with plebiscitory elections had a neg-
ative but insignificant impact in Model 1. Parties with a competitive electoral past were once
again significantly worse off than those with no electoral past. In fact, there is a reduction
in vote share by about ten percent over those parties that had no electoral past. This again
appears to indicate the presence of more competitive opposition parties in these cases. A
similarly strong but positive impact is found for parties that are the primary successor party
when compared with those that are only secondary successor parties. Opening conditions
differ slightly in significance from the pooled logit model only in the areas of violence and
bans, with the levels of significance swapping places. In all cases, there are relatively steep
penalties for parties facing harsh opening conditions across the board.
The controls for democracy and incumbency also have very clear and strong impacts on
party vote shares in presidential elections. Incumbency in non-democracies has a very clear
advantage of sixteen percent over incumbent presidents in democratic systems. Unlike the
model with all elections included, the presidential model shows a notable difference in the
negative impact of being in opposition between democratic and non-democratic systems,
with non-democratic opposition parties faring about three percent worse. This finding once
again points to evidence of electoral manipulation in these competitive non-democracies.
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The second model for presidential elections follows a relatively similar pattern to the
first. The first of the differences is that the impact of non-reform on parties with an ideo-
logical burden is slightly reduced and the estimate falls below a 90% significance threshold.
This is likely due to the reduction in cases due to missing economic data in that the drop-
ping of cases as is mentioned above. Once again, the model change makes party reform in
non-burdened parties significant at a more restrictive threshold, but does not change the sub-
stantive impact notably. Another major difference is an increased negative impact for both
plebiscitory and competitive electoral histories. In fact, this model doubles the estimate for
plebiscitory regimes and brings the estimate very near the 95% significance threshold.
The economic controls all show results that are within a 90% statistical confidence level
and follow the same pattern seen above. The most striking result here is the vast difference
between incumbents and opposition parties in their ability to gain votes in presidential
elections, with an eighteen percent difference estimated when there is zero economic growth.
The values for economic growth are much less impressive when accounting for the fact that
the coefficient expresses the change in vote share for a single percentage of economic growth.
A country experiencing a reasonable rate of economic growth of five percent for a four year
presidential election cycle (20% over the cycle) would be expected to see a boost of around
0.6% of their vote share in the next election if they were an incumbent and a 0.8% reduction
if in opposition. This indicates that, barring major economic changes between presidential
elections, there is not likely to be a major change in the vote share of a successor party, and
that this difference is not likely to matter unless elections are already close for other reasons.
When the same models are run with lower house seat share as the dependent variable,
the results are broadly similar. Table 5.3 shows the results. In the model controlling for
democracy and incumbency, the general trend when compared to presidential vote share is
for slightly less harsh penalties and benefits for party reform. While all three indicators are
significant within a 90% threshold, the substantive impact on seat share is notably lower
than that in the presidential model. Once again, rival party indicators are both inconclusive
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as is the party role in the prior regime (although it has a much larger impact), and being a
primary successor party has a positive and significant impact.
Lower house seat shares differ from presidential vote share also in that there is no signif-
icant relationship found between electoral past and parliamentary performance. Though the
direction of each estimate is similar to those seen before, neither estimate comes with great
confidence due to much weaker impact estimates. This appears to indicate that the driving
factor behind victory or defeat that is found in these two variables largely derives from pres-
idential victories and not parliamentary victories. On the other hand, opening conditions
appear to differ very little from the equivalent analysis of presidential vote share.
The controls for incumbency and democracy are once again statistically significant and
follow the same pattern as seen in the prior models. The main difference from the presiden-
tial model is that the impact of being in opposition differs even more between presidential
and parliamentary performance. Being opposition in a democracy means an estimated ten
percent deficit compared to being incumbent, but the difference for opposition parties in
non-democracies is much more severe. Finally, incumbency advantages are much greater in
non-democracies than democracies, with incumbents estimated to hold much larger shares
of the seats in the lower house.
When the second model including economic growth controls is taken into account, there
are few differences once again. The first notable change is an increase in the impact of all
three party reform variables, leading to greater confidence in the estimates as well. The other
areas where the estimated coefficients are improved is for electoral experience and opening
conditions. In the former, the estimates are more negative than before, but neither makes it
to the 90% threshold of confidence. Defeat and bans at opening both have notable increases in
their negative impact, with the estimate of the latter crossing the 90% significance threshold.
Once again, economic growth has a statistically significant but substantively weak impact
on vote share. Only very large growth or decline rates between elections will have a major
impact on vote share, although in close competition even a minor impact may make the
difference between a victory and defeat.
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Table 5.3: Random Effects: Party Success - Lower House Seat Share
Model 1 Model 2
Variable Coef. p > |z| Coef. p > |z|
Party Reform (no burden) −2.572 0.072 −3.221 0.042
No Party Reform (burden) −11.894 0.024 −16.076 0.008
Party Reform (burden) 2.941 0.066 3.999 0.024
Rivals Predate Regime 0.815 0.801 1.245 0.722
Rivals Opp. to Regime −3.913 0.351 −2.064 0.678
Major Party Role 5.056 0.206 5.535 0.236
Primary Successor 15.692 0.000 13.894 0.000
Prior Elec. Plebiscitory −1.608 0.686 −5.879 0.232
Prior Elec. Competitive −3.932 0.322 −7.646 0.104
Violent Opening −9.315 0.018 −9.029 0.021
Defeat at Opening −10.246 0.001 −14.905 0.000
Banned at Opening −4.502 0.154 −6.181 0.072
Incumbent in Non-Dem. 17.451 0.000
Opp. in Non-Dem. −18.012 0.000
Opp. in Democracy −10.556 0.000
GDP Growth (in Gov.) 0.026 0.001
GDP Growth (in Opp.) −0.054 0.000
Party in Opposition −12.115 0.000




p > χ2 0.000 0.000
ρ 0.116 0.226
Overall R2 0.530 0.524
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The models represented in Table 5.4 seeks to find the difference in when parties participate
in coalition or form majority governments. This model is intended to attempt to gain some
leverage over whether parties are winning power by electoral strength alone, or instead by
becoming trustworthy coalition partners. Once again, models including economic controls
and controls for democracy are included separately. The multinomial model allows me to
look at the various categories of victory as distinctly different processes rather than an
ordered process. In the analysis shown, the tables demonstrate the differences based on a
reference category of parties that won outright majorities. The categories shown are parties
that were in opposition and those that were in some form of coalition government, either as
the lead party or a junior partner.
Two things become visible right away. First is that there are fewer differences between
winning parties and opposition parties than would be expected. The general pattern of all
the previous models is visible between winning and losing parties is seen (though the signs
reverse due to the change in reference category), but they fall short of statistical significance.
This is in part likely due to the fact that parties that win elections do not always win them,
and spend their share of time in opposition. The main differences in opposition parties and
majority parties are found in a few different categories of variables. First, time appears to
weaken the ability of successor parties to win elections outright, with a greater likelihood
of being in opposition in both models. Second, being a secondary successor makes a party
significantly more likely to be in opposition than winning an outright majority (not surprising
considering previous results). Competitive and plebiscitory elections in the non-competitive
regime both increased the likelihood of a party being in opposition, though these findings
fell just short of a 90% level of confidence. Of the opening variables, only defeat in the initial
election appears to have a consistent impact on whether a party is in opposition or in the
majority.
All controls for democracy, incumbency, and economic growth had estimates with high
degrees of statistical confidence. Controlling for democracy and incumbency followed a sim-
ilar pattern as seen before, with parties in opposition more likely to stay in opposition, and
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Table 5.4: Multinomial Probit: Lower House Victory by Type
Opposition: Majority Reference Coalition Member: Majority Reference
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Variable Coef. p > |z| Coef. p > |z| Coef. p > |z| Coef. p > |z|
Party Reform (no burden) 0.165 0.228 0.187 0.224 0.252 0.089 0.345 0.043
No Party Reform (burden) 0.690 0.162 0.925 0.120 0.102 0.858 0.429 0.530
Party Reform (burden) −0.198 0.209 −0.243 0.178 −0.095 0.585 −0.174 0.386
Number of Elections 0.118 0.040 0.147 0.038 0.106 0.092 0.173 0.024
Rivals Predate Regime −0.095 0.734 0.024 0.939 −0.149 0.641 −0.058 0.870
Rivals Opp. to Regime −0.004 0.990 0.169 0.667 0.460 0.215 0.337 0.451
Major Party Role −0.355 0.248 −0.334 0.337 −0.164 0.640 −0.147 0.720
Primary Successor −1.034 0.016 −1.196 0.052 0.047 0.922 −0.061 0.927
Prior Elec. Plebiscitory 0.487 0.185 0.545 0.180 0.357 0.385 0.169 0.724
Prior Elec. Competitive 0.498 0.109 0.475 0.169 0.110 0.760 0.269 0.507
Violent Opening 0.394 0.260 0.084 0.825 0.604 0.118 0.292 0.483
Defeat at Opening 0.818 0.001 1.097 0.000 0.676 0.018 1.026 0.001
Banned at Opening 0.105 0.766 0.445 0.307 −0.539 0.190 −0.184 0.706
Incumbent in Non-Dem. −0.929 0.005 −0.456 0.227
Opp. in Non-Dem. 1.064 0.012 0.054 0.911
Opp. in Democracy 1.119 0.000 1.257 0.000
GDP Growth (in Gov.) −0.008 0.005 −0.008 0.031
GDP Growth (in Opp.) 0.012 0.005 0.011 0.024
Party in Opposition 0.991 0.001 0.983 0.006
Constant 0.061 0.935 −0.213 0.791 −2.130 0.011 −2.702 0.003
Elections 649 540 649 540
Log Likelihood -419.132 -335.965 -419.132 -335.965
χ2 239.42 166.10 239.42 166.10
p > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
incumbents in non-democracies more likely to remain in power than their democratic coun-
terparts. Once again, economic growth favors successor parties when they are in power and
hindered their chances of winning when they were out of power.
The difference between majority winning parties and those that participate in coalition
governments is somewhat different. The first and most notable difference is that the parties
that enact reforms when they do not have an ideological burden are more likely to find
themselves in a coalition than winning government outright. This pattern appears to be
driven largely by junior coalition members and indicates that too many reforms when not
needed can damage a party’s ability to win votes, but they do enable them to still enter
into government. Time also appears to influence the difference between outright winners and
coalition winners. As the number of elections held increase, parties appear to weaken (or new
parties strengthen) to a point at which coalition governments become necessary as winning
an outright majority is more difficult.
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The variables related to the conditions of the opening and past regime conditions were
mostly irrelevant to the difference between majority winners and coalition winners. The
only exception being parties that faced defeat in the initial election were also much more
likely to take part in a coalition governments than were those that managed to win the
vote outright. One interesting indication in the first model is in the different behavior of
coalitions in democracies and non-democracies. In non-democracies, coalition partnership
did not appear to differ significantly from the reference category of a democratic incumbent.
What is interesting is that incumbency made little to no difference in non-democracies either
when coalitions are considered. This may well be due to the nature of parliamentary coalitions
in non-democracies, which were most often pro-presidential coalitions of minor parties (or
the main parties in systems dominated by independent candidates) in the weak legislatures
under strong presidencies often found in Sub-Saharan Africa and Soviet Central Asia.
Participation in coalition government is more likely to occur than winning an outright
majority when a party is in the opposition in a democracy. This appears to indicate that when
successor parties are in power, they rarely required to form a coalition to govern following
an election. This means they appear to either win or lose the election outright. Instead,
successors that do join coalition governments tend to do so by moving from opposition into
a coalition government.
Economic controls do not really provide any new or novel findings in this model from
any of the previous models. In fact, incumbents tend to benefit from economic growth once
again and be more likely found as solo governing parties than as a part of a coalition. When
parties are in opposition prior to an election, growth makes them once again more likely to
be found in coalition than in a majority government.
5.3 Conclusion
The success of former ruling parties in competitive elections appears to be a relatively clear
story. First, there is a relatively strong narrative that parties succeed through building elec-
toral strength. The key factors in party strength appear to come from a mix of structural
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factors related to the opening and the ability of a party to secure a sufficiently large voter
base after the opening. The analysis of the data described above points to the following
conclusions as to why and how parties succeed.
First, the transformation of a party clearly matters in all electoral contexts. Revisiting
the hypotheses described above, it is clearly shown that the empirical evidence supports the
ideologically contingent hypothesis and not the universal benefit of reform hypothesis. The
first hypothesis, that reform helps parties with anti-democratic ideological legacies, is the
most strongly and consistently supported of these. The hypothesis that change in parties
without a burdensome legacy are less likely to be successful is generally upheld, though with
a little less confidence than the former.
The fact that the impact of party reform is different depending on the ideological legacy
of a party is crucial to the understanding of this relationship. What my analysis shows is
that parties that do have an anti-democratic legacy face a significant drag on their ability to
win voters over and thus win elections. The evidence shows that these parties are rewarded
for changing those elements significantly. This reward comes in spite of the fact that they are
potentially dropping core resources related to their identity and leadership in the process.
The problem for parties with less burdensome ideologies appears to be a little less severe. In
general, the advice for these parties goes along the line of the old adage “if it ain’t broke,
don’t fix it.” When parties without a burdensome legacy do go about making major changes
to the party they appear to gain little or nothing by doing so, and in the process, they
unnecessarily abandon key party resources in terms of top leaders and party identity.
The electoral experience of a party has what is perhaps the most surprising finding. The
hypothesis that parties with competitive electoral experience will fare better in winning gov-
ernment office is consistently refuted. In fact, the evidence points to the opposite being true.
In all the models utilized, competitive electoral experience had a negative impact on party
success. This finding was more pronounced in presidential elections than in parliamentary
elections as well. These findings likely come from number of sources. First, electoral experi-
ence may benefit opposition parties from the competitive era significantly more than it does
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the ruling party. When elections are opened to increased competition, these systems are more
likely to have opponents with significant experience not only running in unfair competitive
elections, but this experience is also directed at the ruling party. This also increases the
likelihood that the opposition parties will have more viable presidential candidates and pos-
sibly greater unity against the former ruling party. In cases where the regime did not hold
elections, the opposition is likely to be significantly weaker and more prone to infighting,
allowing divide-and-rule tactics to work in post-opening elections. The other side of this
explanation is that ruling parties in uncompetitive multiparty elections do not actually gain
any usable electoral experience. In fact, these parties are more likely focused on dominating
and restricting the ability of the second-tier parties from threatening their rule that they
do not pose a threat. They have accumulated experience not with competition, but instead
with manipulation that is dependent on controlling the state. In such an environment, it is
not inconceivable that a party’s abilities to compete in elections become atrophied due to a
reliance on manipulation and the knowledge that the outcome will always be in their favor
in non-competitive elections. For the hapless opposition parties, elections are a serious but
unwinnable affair. At the same time, for the ruling party elections are merely a fac¸ade aimed
at supporting the legitimacy of the regime.
More generally, former ruling parties do appear to be able to retain power through domi-
nation of a political system. The evidence above regarding the role of incumbency on success
is relatively clear and consistent. Parties that are able to win and hold power do appear to
be able to succeed in dominating the political system after the opening to more competi-
tive elections. These parties appear to be able to re-consolidate rule based on some form of
competitive authoritarianism following the opening. Incumbency in non-democracies does
appear to swing both ways though, as is shown by the negative impact on former ruling
parties when they are in opposition following a turn to competitive authoritarianism.
The impact of economic growth presents an interesting finding. As many studies have
previously shown, I also find that there is a consistent and statistically significant impact
of economic growth or decline that is contingent on whether a party is in or out of power.
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Parties that are in opposition in negative growth are more likely to come into power and
the opposite direction is also true. What is particularly interesting though is how little the
impact of economic growth and decline appears to matter substantively when compared to
other variables. The small impact of economic growth/decline indicates that it is potentially
a factor of why a party may win one election over another, but that many of the other factors
at play determine if the party is competitive enough to benefit from the economic situation
in the first place. From the perspective of a successor party, a recession may weaken their
opponent’s vote share by four percent in the election, but if your party is not already strong
enough to run in second place, you will not be the party to beat them in the coming election.
The impact of resources carried over from the prior regime during the opening period
also matters. Much like I have shown in the previous chapter, the conditions of the opening
have a significant impact on whether a party is successful or not. The performance of a party
also depends on its ability to translate resources into the competitive era, and harsh opening
conditions such as bans, coups, wars, and initial electoral defeats appear to strip away at that
resource base, making parties both less likely to survive and less competitive when they do.
This finding is also more pronounced in parliamentary elections that presidential elections; an
observation that is likely due to the importance of personal politics in presidential elections
and an ability of leaders to win with fewer institutional trappings.
The last question I sought to answer was if there was a difference in how a party succeeds.
Overall, my analysis points broadly towards the claim that the main route to party success is
through increasing their vote share. When I looked at the difference between parties winning
through coalitions and those winning outright, the key difference was not one of whether
a party had changed its ways in order to be a more viable coalition partner, but instead
was more a question of the factors that determine vote share. The main difference between
parties that won elections outright and those that participated in coalitions was largely due
to the fact that the parties did not win enough votes to govern outright. When winning
elections outright and winning as a coalition leader are compared there is almost no notable
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difference in the mechanisms for each.3 A look at junior coalition partners provides only
slight evidence that a party’s reforms matter for how they win. This is not the expected
direction of anti-democratic parties reinventing themselves to be viable partners (this leads
to them winning outright), but instead appears to be a feature of parties that reformed when
an identity change was not needed. These reforms do not necessarily mean they are being
considered as more or less good coalition partners, but instead are ending up in coalition
governments because they are not able to win enough votes to win outright.
Overall, this paints a picture in which the main deciding factor in whether a party runs
a majority government, coalition government, or is a junior coalition partner is mainly a
feature of their share of the electorate. When a party is successful enough at winning a
large enough vote share, they are either able to eventually win elections on their own, or
become simply too big to ignore during coalition formation. This is an interesting finding,
given recent discussion of the possibility of including the Communist Party of Bohemia
and Moravia (KSCM) in future Czech coalition governments. Although their vote share has
been incredibly stable over the past two and a half decades, the degree of fragmentation in
the other parties in the Czech parliament means the Communists remain one of the larger
parties, despite never enacting more than minor changes to their platform. With increasing
voter disillusion with the established post-communist Czech parties, it becomes quite likely
that the KSCM will be included in a government in the near future, not because of any
specific trustworthiness of the KSCM, but rather because it is holds a share of seats that
becomes too large to ignore or form an alternative coalition around.
In conclusion, success is fundamentally a combination of the party’s structural assets
and strengths and what a party does with these. Former ruling parties are able to bring a
number of key resources into competitive politics after an opening. Some of these may greatly
benefit a party, while others may be a hindrance to success. The parties that succeed are
those that are able to retain these strengths through the opening process and strategically
drop those legacy elements that are particularly off-putting to democratically-minded voters.
3This model is currently not included due to size/space and the small number of cases in each
category making some of the asymptotic assumptions of the multinomial logit model questionable.
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Parties that miscalculate these strengths and weaknesses are more likely to become trapped
as minor parties at the fringes of politics than parties that seriously contest power across
multiple elections. These parties may be able to survive for long periods of time, depending
on the factors from the previous chapter, but will be unable to win sufficient vote shares
to either win control of government outright or be large enough to make an irreplaceable
coalition partner. In the following chapter, I conclude by looking at the interplay between
party survival and success and developing a more complete narrative of successor party
performance after electoral openings.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions: The Interplay of Success and Survival and Implications for
Further Research
At the beginning of this work, I set out to explain what leads to the variation in the perfor-
mance of political parties that had previously governed in non-competitive political systems
once they face more competitive elections. Their performance can be measured in two basic
concepts. The first, survival, revolves around whether the party is able to exist as an orga-
nization that is capable of contesting elections for long periods of time. The second, success,
focuses on the ability of the party to actually win offices and control government. One of
the key motivations of this work is to determine why some parties may be able to have
one without the other; particularly, why some parties can survive for decades without ever
achieving power. These parties by many accounts should have faded away from electoral
politics. Instead, a significant number remain involved in electoral politics, yet never achieve
even minimal levels of success. Still other parties see early successes, yet they fade away after
they are defeated.
I claim that the future of a party in competitive elections can be largely determined by
the resources that a party has prior to the opening of electoral politics to competition and
what a party does with those resources. Party survival is a feature of the relationship between
the party and other institutions of the non-competitive regime. When the party is one of
the dominant institutions of the regime, a party should succeed for long periods of time and
when the party is only a minor regime institution, the party should be more likely to fail as
time passes. The success of a party comes from the ability of a party to focus on retaining as
much of the party’s positive legacy as possible, while distancing themselves from the most
anti-democratic elements that may present a burden in multi-party electoral politics.
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In the preceding chapters, I test these theories and find support for these general claims by
looking at each separately. In this concluding chapter, I seek to look at how these two claims
interact in influencing the performance of a party in competitive politics. My general finding
is that there are three essential causal processes that depend on the role of the party in the
prior regime. The first two focus on parties that mark a continuation of the previous party or
are the dominant successor. These differentiate between those that were a primary element of
the non-competitive regime and those that were not. When the party was dominant, party
survival is almost certain, but success is dependent on how a party manages its identity
and legacy. When parties are not dominant, survival is highly dependent on success. Those
parties that do not stay in power, or quickly regain power are likely to disappear from
electoral politics. The third pathway is less important and focuses on minor successors to
dominant party regimes. These parties are short-lived and often radical splinter parties in
which success is almost always dependent on a like-minded major party (often the primary
successor) bringing them on board as a junior coalition partner.
In the remainder of this chapter, I will further elaborate on the interaction of success
and survival in a few ways. First, I will look at the general trends of party performance
based upon a tabulation of regime and party traits. Following that, I will briefly compare
the relevant factors by telling the narrative of a few cases of political parties to illustrate
these processes. Finally, I will conclude with reflections on the why and how questions of this
causal process before finishing by discussing potential implications and additional questions
that arise from this study.
6.1 Trends in Survival and Success
Table 6.1 provides a general summary of what I have found in the relationships between
survival and success in the parties studied. My theoretical claims fall into four essential
outcome expectation groups. Below, I describe each group in the table in terms of what
parties are expected to be found there and compare that to my actual findings. In terms of
the actual outcomes, I am defining the survival of a party in terms of whether they are able
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to stay above a 5% threshold of parliamentary support, and success as the ability to lead
government either as a coalition leader or as a sole governing party at least once after the
opening election unless otherwise mentioned.
Table 6.1: General Observations




Major (Yes) Expectation: Expectation:
or Minor (No) Survival & Success Likely Survival & Success Possible
Finding: Finding:
Survival almost certain and
success likely but dependent
on country-specific conditions
(typically ethnic/regional)
Survival contingent on success,
parties fail by fading into irrel-
evance after repeated electoral
defeat or suddenly after vio-
lent defeat
Examples: Examples:
SLD (Poland), MPLA (Angola),
CPP (Cambodia), PRI (Mexico)
PR (Dom. Rep.), NDC (Ghana),
KBL (Philippines)
Minor (Yes) Expectation: Expectation:





Minor Reform With Burden: Both types are rare, but
Parties are extremely durable,
failures due to civil wars, par-
ties rarely win elections after
the opening.
appear to follow the pattern
of other parties with a minor
role where Survival is depen-
dent on Success.
Major Reform, No Burden:
Cases are rare, no clear pat-
tern
Examples: Examples:




The first block in table 6.1 shows the expectation and outcomes for parties that are
primary successor parties to regimes in which the party played a major role in the regime
(including those in which that role was shared with another institution). These parties also
make the “correct” reforms to their party identity. Parties in this category that have an
attachment to an anti-democratic ideology take action to reform and reinvent their identity
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in order to attract new supporters. When these parties are not attached to an explicitly
anti-democratic ideology they only make minimal reforms to the party. In doing so, they are
able to avoid alienating core supporters. Overall, these parties are expected to both succeed
and survive following an electoral opening. My findings fit well with this expectation, with
survival being almost certain and these parties are able to win government office in all but a
few cases. Secondary parties in this category are not likely to succeed or survive in the long
run due to a lack of resources, but may find themselves as minor coalition partners to the
primary successor at times.
The second block in table 6.1 contains parties that played a major role in the prior
regime but either do not carry out major reforms despite having a clear anti-democratic
ideological legacy or that lack an anti-democratic burden but make major reforms anyway.
Both of these ideal party types are expected to survive for an extended time period, but are
unlikely to be successful. Those that do not reform their burdensome ideology are likely to
retain a significant minority of the electorate as a stable voter base, but be unable to attract
enough voters to be truly competitive for office. Those that reform excessively are expected
to alienate core supporters in a search for new voters and lose voter recognition with the
positive elements of their legacy. Secondary parties in this category are expected to fade away
into irrelevancy over time. These secondary parties are typified by the hardline Communist
splinter parties that opposed even minor reforms in the primary successor and mainly exist
as protest parties that quickly fall short of even the most permissive electoral thresholds.
The general observation of outcomes in this group is as expected, with a few exceptions in
which either a party is able to win elections or fails to survive due to post-opening political
violence.
The third block in table 6.1 parties that played only a minor role in a regime that was
dominated by other actors like the military or personalist president, and either reformed a
burdensome legacy or made only minimal changes to a non-burdensome legacy. For these
parties, success and survival are possible but not as certain as in the first block. The general
observation for this group of parties is that they remain dependent on control of the state
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for their survival, making survival largely a function of a party’s success. Because of this,
the fate of these parties is relatively stable if they are able to retain power or win back
power quickly after defeat. Parties that lose elections are likely to fade away if they cannot
win back national office in the next few elections, particularly in the case of parties from
personalist regimes that lose their leader. Even if these parties retain power following the
opening elections, the are also vulnerable to being overthrown by political violence after the
opening of multiparty competition.
The final block in table 6.1 that is theoretically possible are parties with a minor role in
the prior regime that fail to reform despite an anti-democratic legacy, or that make major
changes to non-burdensome ideologies. In these cases, success and survival are both expected
to be highly unlikely. Unlike their counterparts with a major role in the previous regime, these
parties have little to no support base to fall back on. In that regard, they are very similar
to the secondary parties noted in the second category above. The only exceptions in which
these parties are expected to have any chance of success or survival in post-opening politics
are cases in which the charismatic regime leader remains committed to using the party in
elections in the future and/or the regime is able to retain power consistently following the
introduction of competitive elections. Actual cases in this category are extremely rare in the
data, but the few that do exist appear to follow a similar pattern to the other parties that
played only a minor role in the prior regime.
Table 6.2: Success and Survival: Primary Parties Only
Reform Type (Ideological Burden)
Role in Major (Burden) Minor (None) Minor (Burden) Major (None)
Regime Performance Cases % Cases % Cases % Cases %
Major Never Win, Survive 3 10.71 1 4.17 4 50.00 0 0.00
Never Win, Fail 1 3.57 3 12.50 1 12.50 0 0.00
Succeed, Survive 22 78.57 17 70.83 2 25.00 1 33.33
Succeed, Fail 2 7.14 3 12.50 1 12.50 2 66.67
Cell Total: 28 24 8 3
Minor Never Win, Survive 0 0.00 1 3.70 0 0.00 0 0.00
Never Win, Fail 1 50.00 8 29.63 1 50.00 2 66.67
Succeed, Survive 1 50.00 14 51.85 1 50.00 1 33.33
Succeed, Fail 0 0.00 4 14.81 0 0.00 0 0.00
Cell Total: 2 27 2 3
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Table 6.2 shows the distribution of outcomes in how parties in each of these categories
actually performs. The values for survival focus on parties that remain above the 5% lower
house threshold. Success is defined by winning at least a the role of a coalition government
leader (excluding republic-level elections in the USSR). The results are only tabulated for
primary successor parties, as almost all secondary parties fail and very few are able to
lead a government. The few that do have any degree of success are found in cases where
the distinction between primary and secondary party is not as clear, as is the case of the
turbulent politics of the Caucasus republics in the years immediately following the collapse
of the Soviet Union.
The first set of observations in table 6.2 contains parties that had a major role regime
in the regime and also make the “correct” reforms. These two groups of parties are the
most common types observed in the data. Twenty-eight parties conducted major reforms to
their anti-democratic legacy while twenty-four conducted only minimal reforms to a non-
burdensome ideology. Of the first group almost all have been both successful and have
survived for the entire period of study. Only three of the parties matching this general
description have failed during this period. One key feature that all three of these have in
common is that they are successors in peripheral regions of Communist states that broke
up at the opening. The first of these, Slovakia’s Party of the Democratic Left (SDL) failed
by merging into a larger party that had originally formed around defecting MPs from the
SDL, but did have limited success as a junior coalition member. The other two both are
found in the Caucasus region of the former Soviet Union. The United Communist Party of
Georgia was the least successful of the two, despite winning a significant vote share in the
mid-1990s. Two features conspired to prevent their success and survival. The first being the
violent nature of the opening process in Georgia and the rise of nationalist politics. The
second was the interference of a secondary successor party based around the former Foreign
Minister and Soviet Politburo member Eduard Shevardnadze’s Citizens’ Union of Georgia,
which ruled as a party of power until being ousted in the 2003 Rose Revolution. The final
failure was Armenia’s Pan-Armenian National Movement, which was filled by members of
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the then-banned Communist party. The PANM remains in existence as an organization, but
has failed to break the 5% threshold of seats in Armenia’s highly personalized politics.
Another three parties in this category have survived, but have never been successful,
despite expectations. All have faced particularly difficult local conditions. Die Linke in Ger-
many has faced an uphill struggle to become a large enough feature in politics to participate
in government largely due to being overwhelmed by being absorbed into one of the most
highly developed party systems in the world. The presence of the West German Social
Democrats (SPD) has meant that Linke has faced difficulty in pulling away votes from the
left until recently as the SPD has become a more centrist party. The other two have failed
to win more for ethnic reasons than regional. Guyana’s People’s National Congress (PNC)
party has been unable to win power back since opening, despite being the dominant oppo-
sition party to the ruling People’s Progressive Party (PPP). Parties in Guyana are largely
arranged around ethnic lines, with the PPP representing the Indo-Guyanese plurality and
the PNC representing the Afro-Guyanese minority (Day, 2002). Similarly, the coalition of
various successors in Lativa (most recently known as Harmony Center) has performed well,
even winning a plurality in two elections, but has consistently had coalitions formed against
it after the election. Latvian coalitions based around Communist successors primarily focus
on the support of the Russian-speaking minority and are typically kept out of power by
coalitions of ethnic Latvian parties.
The picture looks much the same when parties that make minor reforms to non-
burdensome pasts are considered. Of these, seventeen of the twenty four parties fell into the
expected category of success and survival. A few more parties are noted to have failed in
this sub-category. Three fail without ever succeeding. All three of these parties do continue
to exist as organizations, but have been unable to rise above the 5% threshold of seats.
The People’s Progressive Party (PPP) in Gambia was violently overthrown and was banned
initially by the incoming Jammeh government. Guinea’s PDG-RDA is not so much a surprise
in its lack of survival, but in the fact that it did survive the intervening regime of Lansana
Conte between the time it was overthrown in 1984 and the 1992 opening election. The third
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party that has fallen out of competition is Zambia’s UNIP. The UNIP’s failure appears
largely attributable to the actions surrounding former president Kaunda and the decision of
the party to boycott elections after he was banned from running in 1996. They continue to
exist, but only as a very minor party.
Three other parties had some level of at least minimal success but fell below the 5%
threshold. The first two of these parties, the PPN-RDA in Niger and the PPC (successor to
MDR-PARMEHUTU) in Rwanda, both faced a very similar story to Guinea’s PDG-RDA
in that they both faced an intervening non-competitive regime before the start of opening
elections. In the case of the PPN-RDA, the party’s only success was as a minor legislative
coalition member after the 1993 elections, while Rwanda’s PPC has been a consistent junior
partner of Kagame’s RPF government despite never winning more than one seat in the
Chamber of Deputies. The third party, the Basotho National Party, has actually “un-failed”
recently, by placing over 5% of the seats in the 2015 election. It has generally performed
better than 5% in national vote share, but has often been the victim of malapportionment
in the assignment of seats.
The next major group of parties shown in table 6.2 consists of parties that had a major
role in the prior regime but either did not significantly reform their anti-democratic legacy or
significantly reformed a non-burdensome legacy. The first thing of note is that both cases are
relatively uncommon, with eight and three primary successors, respectively. This, when taken
with the larger number of successors found in the previous category, appears to indicate that
parties are highly cognizant of their burdensome past and more often than not take measures
to modify that identity. As mentioned above, these parties are expected to be survivors but
not likely to be successful. Also a large number of secondary successors are found in this
category, but none of these survive for long as is expected due to the lack of resources when
compared to their primary counterparts.
My observations of this group tend to point to these parties being very likely to survive,
except when they are involved in violent politics in the post-opening period. The typical
parties found in this group include Communist parties that may have won the first pre-
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independence election, but were unable to win post-independence elections despite surviving
the entire period. Among those parties with anti-democratic backgrounds, only one party
truly stands out from the rest in its ability to succeed. The Party of Communists of Moldova
(PCRM) is the main outlier in this group as it has repeatedly won a majority in Moldovan
elections after the opening. This party did make a number of minor reforms, including
softening its stance (though not abandoning Marxism-Leninism), changing leaders, and an
updating of their name from the Moldavian Communist Party. The other party that has
survived with some degree of success is the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU) which has
participated in coalition with the (now defunct) Party of Regions. The continued survival of
this party is highly in doubt now due to the events of 2014-15 and the loss of its traditional
voter base in the civil war and the likelihood of the party being banned in the remainder of
the country.
Only two of these parties have failed, the Socialist Party in Yemen and Cambodian
National Unity Party (successor to Khmer Rouges). In both cases, these parties chose to
avoid electoral politics and opt for a military solution, and also in both cases failed. The
Yemeni Socialists still exist as an organization, but the combination of the 1994 civil war,
1997 electoral boycott, lack of elections since 2003 (in which they fared poorly), and political
uncertainty about the existence of Yemen itself makes it difficult to predict whether they
will recover as a party or not.
Very few parties enacted major reforms to their party’s identity when they did not have
an anti-democratic identity. Of those that did, only one party, GOLKAR in Indonesia has
survived and had a small degree of success in that country’s highly fragmented party system
(leading a coalition government in 2004 with just under a quarter of the assembly seats).
The other major party in this category was the New National Party of South Africa,1 which
had minimal success as a junior coalition party in a grand coalition led by the African
National Congress party. The New National Party failed to exist as a party through a series
1Arguably their ideology could be considered anti-democratic, but I have chosen to code the
two Apartheid parties in South Africa and Rhodesia as non-burdensome as they were not opposed
to multi-party competition (indeed both had limited competition) but instead opposed multi-racial
participation.
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of mergers, losing most of its partisans in an abortive alliance with its larger opposition ally,
the Democratic Party, after the 1999 elections, and finally disbanding after a disappointing
showing in the 2004 elections with the remnants of the party leadership joining the ANC.
The next major category shown in table 6.2 contains the second most observations.
Twenty nine parties came from regimes where they played a minor role and either reformed
a negative legacy or made only minimal changes to a non-burdensome legacy. Of these, the
vast majority came from regimes without anti-democratic ideological backgrounds and made
minimal reforms (27 of 29). The expectations of both survival and success being possible are
also seen in the distribution of outcomes in this category. With a few minor exceptions,
success and survival go together in this category. The bulk of parties either never win an
election after the opening and go on to fail, or manage to win a significant number of elections
in the post-opening period. Those parties that do not fail in this category win on average
60% of all elections, compared to only 44% for their counterparts with a major role in the
prior regime.2 Of the parties that succeed in elections before failing, two were deposed by
coups after the opening (Mauritania’s PRDR and Madagascar’s AREMA) and two only had
minimal success as a minor coalition partner (Nicaragua’s PLN, and Mali’s UDD).
Only one party really stands out as an outlier in this category. The Malawi Congress
Party (MCP) has never won control of power, yet consistently runs second or third in national
elections, with just under 20% of the vote in the most recent parliamentary polls and nearly
30% in the presidential election. The MCP appears to be an anomaly similar to Guyana’s
PNC, in that both have a stable ethnic voting base that appears to allow them to maintain
supporters. In Malawi, this appears to allow the party to survive despite the fact that it
is categorized as having a minor role in the personalist regime of Hastings Banda, and has
consistently been out of power.
The final major category shown in table 6.2 includes parties with a minor role in the
past regime and either made few reforms to a negative legacy or made significant reforms
to a non-burdensome legacy. These parties are expected to be the least likely to survive or
2This difference is significant at a 95% level of confidence in a 1-tailed t-test.
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succeed. In fact, they appear to be the least likely to exist in the first place. Only five such
parties are found. Of these, they are entirely split between those that fail at both success
and survival and those that succeed at both. Much like the previous category, the loss of
power spells the end of these parties.
The two that survived and succeed, Panama’s PRD and Guinea-Bissau’s PAIGC, both
have a similar history of frequently winning assembly elections, although only intermittently
winning presidential polls. In both cases, the party has never lost two consecutive national
elections. Two others that failed all lost power after the departure of their iconic leaders and
were unable to regain it. Spain’s Falange never has had more success than winning a single
assembly seat despite continued efforts, and Myanmar’s National Unity Party has been an
also-ran in both the multiparty elections of 1990 and 2010. The final party in this group is
somewhat of an oddity, the Conservative Alliance for Zimbabwe, which was never able to
win representation after the abolition of the separate white roll in elections.
6.2 Illustrative Cases
In the following section, I will briefly follow the electoral pathways of a few key parties to
compare the difference in outcomes. Although I have already found statistical evidence on
how party outcomes differ depending on their traits at the time of an electoral opening, I will
demonstrate the process with a few illustrative cases. The goal here is not to explain why a
party takes a particular strategy towards the opening process. Instead, I seek to put some
life to the abstractions of the statistical models of the previous chapters. Two comparisons
of similar parties will be made. The first paired comparison will be between the electoral
fortunes of two Central European Communist successor parties, the Communist Party of
Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) in the Czech Republic and the Democratic Left Alliance of
Poland. These two parties represent party dominated regimes with a similar anti-democratic
burden, but successor parties that took dramatically different paths after the end of single
party rule. The second comparison is between Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party
(PRI) and the Dominican Republic’s Social Christian Reformist Party (PR). Both cases
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demonstrate parties that had relatively vague ideologies and did not significantly change
with the opening from non-competitive multiparty to competitive multiparty elections, but
they differ strongly on the balance between personality and party.
6.2.1 Czech Republic and Poland
I have chosen to illustrate the pathways of these two cases because in many ways the parties
have similar institutional pasts, but take divergent strategies at the time of opening. Much
has been made in the regional literature on how various Communist regimes in Eastern
and Central Europe vary on different dimensions: bureaucratic legacies (Kitschelt, 1995;
Ishiyama, 1999), balance of internal factions (Huntington, 1991), and availability of space for
opposition to form (Grzyma la-Busse, 2002; Kitschelt, 2002). This aside, when compared with
a broader spectrum of regimes, what is more striking is not the variation within Communist
systems, but the institutional similarity of these regimes.
Both Poland and Czechoslovakia have very similar regime backgrounds regarding the
role of their ruling parties, the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) and Czechoslovakian
Communist Party (KSC), respectively. Although there are minor variations in the timeline,
the Communist regimes came to power following the end of German occupation and were
consolidated with Soviet supervision and support by the end of the 1940s.3 The history of
each regime is also relatively similar, with general stability disrupted by reformist pressures
and the ensuing intervention by the Warsaw pact (the 1968 Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia
and 1981 Solidarity protests in Poland).
These two cases typify the case of a strong party-centric regime. In the cluster classifica-
tion utilized earlier, both are classified as plebiscitory party regimes. Parties in both cases
provide the central governing mechanism and are well institutionalized. Although individual
leaders in both countries were not regularly changed, leadership turnovers did occur with
the party changing top leaders multiple times (six in Czechoslovakia and four in Poland).
The party was deeply entrenched in society with branches of the party running from top
3The Czechoslovakian party has a longer independent history dating back to pre-war elections,
while Poland’s Workers’ Party was largely formed under Soviet occupation.
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central committees down to basic cells of the party functioning in workplaces and residential
complexes. Party membership in the final decade of rule in both cases was widespread with
roughly ten percent of all residents belonging to the party. These parties also had significant
capabilities beyond controlling the state, and in both cases these two parties had control over
major publication outlets including daily newspapers, periodicals, and ideological journals.
Elections played a similar role in both cases. The general regime type description of
these two regimes considers the role of elections to be primarily plebiscitory, as turnout
was extremely high, but competition low. There are some slight variations on the details of
how elections were used in each case. Both Poland and Czechoslovakia maintained a system
of what Sartori (1976) called “simulated pluralism.” In this case, multiple satellite parties
contested elections in a broad united front coalition led by the ruling party but with no real
independence. Poland differed slightly in that elections permitted multiple candidates for
each seat on the government list, while Czechoslovakia’s elections consisted of a closed list
with only a single candidate nominated per seat.
Poland and Czechoslovakia shared generally similar opening processes as well. Both coun-
tries transitioned relatively quickly to stable electoral democracies with little to no threat of
authoritarian backsliding. Although the process was slower and involved more consultation
with the opposition in Poland than Czechoslovakia, both processes were peaceful and led to
the holding of early elections allowing multiple parties to participate. The other difference
is that in Czechoslovakia, the process for the breakup of the Czech Republic and Slovakia
begins with the end of the Communist system.
The real differentiation begins with the actions of each party during the opening process.
As a clarification, I am not seeking to directly explain why each party took the action they
did. Instead, my goal is to focus on the result of those decisions on post-opening politics.4
In the case of the Czech Communists, the story is mainly one of continuity and minor
4I can speculate that the main reason why the Czech (and also Russian) Communist parties
do not reform extensively during the opening process is due to the more “organic” nature of these
parties. In both cases, the party is a native creation that predates the immediate aftermath of the
Second World War. These parties likely have deeper roots in society making them more likely to
focus on retaining their core base than parties like Poland’s PZPR, which was largely imposed on
Poland by the Soviet Union.
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modifications. In Poland, the party changes dramatically during the transitional government
period.
In Czechoslovakia, the opening process was extremely short. The Communists held off
on action longer than many of their neighbors, waiting until protests at the end of 1989 to
enact reforms. The KSC makes its first reforms at the end of 1989. The KSCM provides a
good illustration of partial party reform by a Communist party. The first element to their
reforms in 1989 was to accept the loss of the party’s unique role in control of the state.
The second part of the reforms of the KSC was the replacement of most of the party’s top
officials during the transition, both by action of the extraordinary party congress held in
December 1989, and by the defection of partisans (Hanley, 2002). Two big issues were at
play in the transformation from the KSC to the KSCM. The first was the incipient breakup
of Czechoslovakia into its two components, and second the debate over the direction to take
the KSCM. The territorial component largely determined the minor name change to the
KSCM to reflect the new territorial boundaries of the party. The ideological component was
more contested. The primary divisions were found between those favoring a full change into
a democratic socialist party as had been seen in surrounding countries, those that wished
to continue as Communists with minor reforms (“neocommunists”), and those that sought
a Stalinist revival. By the end of 1993, both the democratic socialist camp and the hardline
Communist camps had departed the party, leaving behind the core “neocommunist” element
of the party (Hanley, 2002).
In Poland, the process and outcome were different. The Polish reform process had taken
a much more gradual pathway than did the Czech process, this process started as early as
1986, with the top leadership of the party extensively replaced by the end of 1988 (Day
et al., 1996). This process also led to semi-competitive elections in 1989 in which the PZPR
fared poorly despite planning the elections to be tilted in their favor. Following that defeat,
the party lost control of its central role in the state under the subsequent Solidarity-led
government.
147
The PZPR’s transition into the SLD by way of its core member, the Social Democracy
of the Polish Republic (SRP) Party diverges from their Czech counterpart in that there was
a more clear outcome from the extraordinary party congress held after their defeat. Here,
the Polish PZPR did not have the same sort of division and infighting as the Czechs had
and were able to make a more decisive transition, both changing the name of the party
completely and clearly abandoning Marxism-Leninism in favor of Democratic Socialism.
At a first glance, there appears to be very little difference in the electoral performance of
the KSCM and SDL in their multiparty debuts as is shown in Figures 6.1 and 6.2, respectively.
In each case the parties place between ten and twenty percent in lower house elections. The
key difference is the relationship of that vote percentage relative to other parties in the
system. In the Czech elections, the KSCM was significantly below the top placing party
(Civic Forum) which finished with thirty six percent of the vote. The Polish first elections
were much more fragmented. The SLD coalition in the 1991 election won a similar share
of the parliament, with slightly more than thirteen percent of the Sejm seats. The main
difference is that in Poland, the outcome of the election resulted in a high degree of party
fragmentation, with the next highest party winning only two more Sejm seats than the SLD.
Figure 6.1: KSCM: Lower House Elections
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The electoral performance of these two Communist successors diverges dramatically
between the first and second elections. The story of the KSCM in post-opening elections, as
seen in figure 6.1, is one of extreme stability in electoral returns, running a consistent third
place behind the Civic Forum/Civic Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Party.
KSCM vote shares over the eight observed elections have a mean of just over fourteen per-
cent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, with remarkably low variation (the standard
deviation is three percent). The main variation from this is seen with exceptional winnings
in the 2002 elections in which they managed to take just over twenty percent of the seats
with about eighteen percent of the vote, but still remaining in third place. One final note-
worthy feature of Figure 6.1 is the nature of the support for the first placing party. Over
time, the KSCM’s vote has remained stable, but the vote share of the top placing party in
the elections has declined to meet the level of the KSCM. This makes it entirely possible
that the KSCM may eventually win a plurality of the vote share, although their coalition
potential for other parties is an unknown, as they were avoided in the Social Democrats’
2013 coalition formation process. The KSCM appears likely to remain a major party outside
of government as it has for over two decades. The only likely scenario in which the KSCM
would join government would involve a continuation of weak performance by the other major
parties leading to the KSCM’s inclusion as a coalition partner due to the inability of the
Social Democratic Party to put together an acceptable coalition of minor parties as was the
case in 2013.
In the case of Poland, the SLD has had much wider variation in electoral performance,
as can be seen in figure 6.2. The mean seat share won by the SLD in the seven observed
election is much higher than their Czech counterpart, at almost twenty three percent, but
varies wildly from a minimum of six percent in 2011 to a maximum of forty three percent in
2001 (standard deviation of fifteen percent). The SLD rotated back and forth from the top
placing party to second place repeatedly during the 1990s, winning parliamentary elections in
1993 and 2001. The SLD was also competitive in presidential elections, winning the runoff in
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Figure 6.2: SLD: Lower House and Presidential Elections
the 1995 election and winning outright in the 2000 contest.5 The SLD suffered a major shock
to their support in the early 2000s following the resignation of SLD prime minister Leszek
Miller in 2004 following a major bribery scandal. This marks a change in Polish politics in
which the SLD drops out of contention for second place (which becomes a contest between
two right-leaning parties). The SLD remains the leading party of the left in Poland, but
has stabilized its performance somewhere in the ten to fifteen percent range of vote support
similar to that of the Czech KSCM. The performance of the SLD after the scandals of the
early 2000s appears to indicate that any additional support that the SLD had won in its
transformation into a western social democratic party was largely lost in the scandal, but
that there remains a large enough base upon which the SLD is likely to survive in the near
future.
5The Czech Republic did not directly elect its president until 2013 (to which the KSCM did not
nominate a candidate), making a comparison unhelpful.
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6.2.2 Mexico and Dominican Republic
The next set of illustrations seeks to look at the difference that personalization makes in
the ability of a party to survive. The two cases chosen here are both presidential systems
in Latin America and have a number of key similarities, but differ largely on the role of
the party in the prior regime. In both cases, the regime conducted non-competitive mul-
tiparty elections that included independent opposition parties (as opposed to the national
front parties found in Poland or Czechoslovakia). In both cases, the party did not have an
openly anti-democratic ideology. The Reformists (PR) in the Dominican Republic identified
as a center-right nationalist party. Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) initially
identified as a moderate leftist party, but maintained a broad variety of factions with var-
ious ideological tendencies (Day et al., 1996; Magaloni, 2006). In neither case was there any
pressing need for major party reform, and in neither case was there significant reform to the
party.
The regime types did differ significantly, beyond the use of limited multiparty elections.
The regime type classifications for each come from two very different regime families. Mexico
in many ways is more similar to Poland and Czechoslovakia in regards to the role of the party.
The PRI existed in an electoral authoritarian party regime, the sub-group of party-dominated
regimes in which elections typically had a small degree of competition and moderate turnout.
In fact, Mexico’s system shows one of the greatest degree of party domination of other regime
institutions, as the PRI is one of the few parties that regularly changed party leadership.
This was accomplished through the dedazo process by which outgoing president nominated
his successor and determined the chain of succession from loyal partisans before bowing
out of politics (Magaloni, 2006). In the case of the party-dominated Communist examples
mentioned above, leaders were removed but irregularly and typically in times of major reform
or crisis.
The Dominican Republic under the PR was quite different. This regime provides a good
example of an electoral personalist system, with the PR primarily being a vehicle for the
candidacy of Joaquin Balaguer. Elections were similar to those in Mexico, but the role of
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the party differs in that it exists to support its leader. Finally, the PR was a much younger
party at the time of opening than was the PRI. The PR had first come into being in the
early 1960s and had risen to power with Balaguer in the 1966 elections. The PRI was one of
the longest-lived parties, existing in its current form (and in power) since 1929 and tracing
some of its roots back to the 1910-1917 revolution (Day and Degenhardt, 1980).
In both cases, the opening process was peaceful and took place by making reforms to
the political process ahead of regularly scheduled elections. In the Dominican Republic, the
process took place rather quickly when compared to Mexico. In this case, external pressure
from the United States led Balaguer to allow the 1978 election to be conducted fairly, leading
to his defeat (Nohlen, 2005). In Mexico, the process of opening was much more gradual and
happened in a number of phases. In 1977, the PRI reformed electoral laws to allow for more
opposition representation leading to the PRI to win fewer than three quarters of the vote
in both presidential and parliamentary elections by for the first time since the 1950s. The
second round of electoral reforms in 1986 and 1987 allowed the 1988 elections to be the
first elections that were structurally competitive at all levels, despite the fact that there
was clear manipulation of the results in the presidential election (Magaloni, 2006). The
opening of Mexican politics definitively occurs by 2000, when the PRI loses control of the
presidency, although they been reduced to simply a plurality in congress by 1997. I consider
the opening in Mexico to be 1988 when the system shows an opening in competition, even
though competitiveness followed behind (using Sartori’s (1976) terminology).
In both cases, the early period after the opening is one in which the party in question
is relatively successful. Figure 6.3 shows the performance of Mexico’s PRI. The main story
here is a combination of success and survival throughout the post-opening period. The PRI’s
electoral performance peaks in the 1991 congressional elections with the party taking sixty
four percent of the lower house seats. This support declines steadily until about the time
of the 2000 elections. The PRI wins the 1994 presidential election and retains a significant
majority of the lower house seats in that same election. The major change comes about in
2000, when the PRI is defeated in the presidential election for the first time ever. Although
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they were defeated in the presidential polls, the PRI did manage to retain their plurality
in the lower house in this election (the majority had slipped away in the 1997 mid-term
elections). The decline of the PRI’s electoral support hit bottom in the 2006 elections in
which the PRI lost its plurality of seats for the only time ever. The PRI does appear to have
recovered from this defeat and returned to its position as the largest party in Congress in
2009 and regained the presidency in 2012.
Figure 6.3: PRI: Lower House and Presidential Elections
Figure 6.4 shows the electoral pattern for the PR. Despite defeat in the first two post-
opening elections, the PR remained a serious competitor. The 1986 elections marked the
return of Balaguer and the PR to power, winning both the presidency and a plurality in the
lower house. Through the next two elections, the general pattern was for Balaguer to win
the presidency, but for his party to fail to win even a plurality in the lower house. This is
a marked difference from Mexico, where the opposite pattern occurred. The major break in
the performance of these two parties comes with the early presidential elections held in the
Dominican Republic in 1996. This election was held as a result of claims of fraud in the prior
elections and included the stipulation that the aging Balaguer would no longer be able to
run for president. The departure of Balaguer from presidential politics caused a major shift
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in the electoral performance patterns of the PR. The electoral support of the PR dropped
considerably throughout the 2000s with the party ultimately falling below five percent of the
lower house seats in the 2010 election and to not nominate a candidate for president in the
2012 election.
Figure 6.4: PR: Lower House and Presidential Elections
One of the key features that differentiates the performance of these two parties is the
difference in performance even when times were good. The PRI, with its past at the center
of the Mexican regime continued to perform better in congressional elections than it did in
presidential polls. This along with the PRI’s lack of personalized leadership also helped carry
the party through the loss of the presidency. In the case of the PR in the Dominican Republic,
the situation was different. The PR performed relatively consistently while Balaguer was
their presidential candidate, but performance dropped off precipitously afterward. The PR
provides an excellent example of a party that can succeed and even survive for a significant
period of time, despite a weak institutional background. The main condition of this survival
is that the party’s leader remains at the head of the party. Parties that exist to support
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personalist leaders can survive even when out of power, but they are not likely to survive
long once they have lost both power and their leader.
6.3 Concluding Remarks
The general patterns of party survival and success show additional support for the multi-
variate analysis of the previous chapters. I will conclude by reviewing what I have found over
the entire work regarding the causal processes and patterns observed. Then I will address the
broader implications of my findings particularly regarding the relationship between regional
studies and institution-based approaches and on the likelihood of democratization. Finally,
I conclude with the questions that remain unanswered and some potential directions for
furthering this research agenda.
The main narrative when success and survival are viewed together shows that there are
clear relationships between the two but the causal processes are different. The key story
behind survival is one of party resources and their continuity in spite of changes. Where
parties played a major role in their prior regime, they are likely to have those resources.
Parties that played a major role in the non-competitive regime have a number of ways in
which they are able to accrue the necessary resources in order to survive the loss of the
advantages of state resources and support.
First, these parties are likely to hold a monopoly on the political class within a country.
The bulk of individuals with the skills for governing the state as well as operating a party in
competitive politics are found within the party. The greater degree to which a party controls
this class means the party is more able to compete against newcomers and to survive defec-
tions from within its ranks. This mechanism helps explain my findings regarding electoral
support when semi-competitive elections were a core feature of the non-competitive regime.
In this case, the ruling party has a sufficient resource base for survival (as well as a monopoly
on governing experience), but the political class is divided, with some of the skilled individ-
uals established in the second-tier parties. This division very likely explains why lower vote
shares are found when past elections featured limited competition.
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The second part of the story of survival by parties that played a major role in the prior
regime is their ability to establish resources relative to their rivals. This appears to take the
form of building up material and financial assets by which they are more able to sustain
themselves in the turbulence of competitive politics. When the party is a major feature of
the regime, they are more able to invest resources from the state into developing the party.
My findings appear to show that any time a party is a major player, including when that
role is shared with other actors, the party is able to build up a sufficient base to survive.
Harsh conditions in the process of opening elections appears to impact the party’s ability to
hold onto resources. In these cases, the party often has a share of its assets frozen or seized
by the state. The parties with a greater depth of resources therefore are more likely to have
back-up resources and personnel resources that are more able to withstand these periods
than are parties with fewer resources to begin with.
Where the party plays a minor role, survival is also a story of party resources. In these
cases, the survival of a party is highly dependent on some form of external support. The first
potential source of support is the ability of a party to retain control over the state, making
survival dependent on the continued success of the party in winning power. The party itself
is not as prominent an institution or backed by deep resource and staff pools as are their
counterparts that played a major role in the non-competitive regime. Continued control of
the state provides that resource base from which the party can continue to feed. In this way,
the party may open elections to a degree of competition, but must come out on top to survive.
These parties essentially have two choices if they are to survive in the post opening period.
First, they must maintain that control over the state at any cost, making these parties likely
to turn to competitive authoritarian tactics (see Levitsky and Way (2002)). They are likely
to use popularity to win elections if possible, but are also likely to utilize a sufficient amount
of manipulation in the electoral process in order to prevent defeat. The second option these
parties may exercise over the long term is to shift resources into the party from the state
over time. This route would allow the party to take a more dominant role in a post opening
system and facilitate survival in the event the party loses power in future elections.
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These parties may also survive if the core element of the non-competitive regime (pres-
ident, military, etc.) remains a patron of the party after the opening. The example of the
Dominican Republic described above shows the ability of a party to continue to play a key
role while its charismatic leader remains involved, but also the problem facing these parties
if these leaders must depart the party. These parties are thus quite prone to external shocks
both during the opening and afterwards. Hostile opening conditions that can potentially strip
a party of its leaders, patrons, control over the state, and its meager independent resources
have been consistent factors in why these parties fail. Post-opening shocks such as the death,
deposition, or banning of the party’s patron put these parties at a high risk of collapse as
well.
Success appears to be based on how a party can leverage its identity in order to bring
on new supporters and voters. There are two clear patterns observed. The first pattern is
the same as described above for the survival of parties that held only a minor role in the
previous regime. These parties do not have a sufficient resource base to survive defeat, and
success is a crucial factor in the survival of these parties Here, electoral success may often
be less about the party managing its identity to gain popularity, but instead one of electoral
manipulation.
The second pattern focuses on party identity and how it is managed. Parties that succeed
are those that are able to focus on the positive aspects of their past while dropping the
negative legacies that are often associated with non-competitive systems. Parties and their
successors must make a gamble when faced with that legacy. A party may continue to base
itself on its old legacies and identity by making minimal changes. This conservative strategy
focuses on retaining the party’s core supporters and identity. When parties have few resources
to start with, retaining this identity through the name or leader of the party may well be
crucial in retaining continuity with the positive aspects of the past.
Ideology also plays a special role in when a party needs to make changes to its identity
in order to win electoral support. Parties with ideologies that are vague or frequently found
in competitive democracies have a simpler decision to make. These parties are also not as
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deeply connected with the state ideology as those with a stronger Fascist or Marxist ideology
and have less of a negative connection to the past. These ideologies are not specifically anti-
democratic and thus can provide either an identification to the positive aspects of the past
or to ideologically minded voters in the future. Parties that make major changes to these
“harmless” ideologies run a risk of alienating the voters that did identify with that position
with no real guarantee of gaining new voters to replace them.
Where the party has an anti-democratic ideology (in almost all observed cases Marxism-
Leninism) the calculations are different. In most cases, these non-competitive regimes are
firmly consolidated and the most extreme elements of their revolutionary ideology have
been abandoned in practice in favor of more pragmatic interpretations (see Huntington
(1970) and Linz and Stepan (1996)). These parties appear to retain a core group of true
believers that are sufficient for the party to survive, but they are typically observed to
have a “glass ceiling” of support at around ten to fifteen percent of the electorate at best.
To go beyond that point, the party must make significant changes. It is these cases in
which a major break from the past has potential to help a party succeed. This change risks
alienating some hardline supporters of the old system, who frequently form minor splinter
successors that typically retain the original ideology when the main successor does make
reforms. The reformed successor does consistently see benefits from this change though.
Parties that break from the past significantly appear able to win over a sufficient part of
the electorate to win elections outright. The few that have made major changes and not
succeeded do so largely because of identity issues as well, being viewed as connected with a
minority ethnicity or regional base. Removing an ideological label that most of the population
had already abandoned for a newer position appears to put the party much more in line with
the electorate and pays off with electoral victories.
There are a number of implications that my findings have beyond supporting my the-
oretical claims. Although my core theoretical claims do not seek to answer questions of
democratization and regional studies, a few observations can be made on those topics from
my findings. In regards to the likelihood of effective democratization, it appears the role of
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the party in the regime may have an impact. The two different pathways by which parties
survive after an opening lead me to this conclusion. Where parties are a major element of
the regime, they (and their members) are very likely to survive the transition to competitive
politics, regardless of whether they remain in power or not. This observation leads me to
suggest that in cases where the party plays a major role in the regime, that party should be
more open to free and fair competition after the opening of elections, as these parties have
little to fear in terms of survival. In fact, if they realign their own image to fit within the
most basic principles of electoral democracy, they are very likely to be in and out of power
in the new democracy.
Where parties play a minor role in the non-competitive regime, the outlook for effective
democratization is less optimistic. The requirement of success in order for these parties
to survive makes them less likely to accept defeat in elections. The potential danger of
irrelevance and permanent loss of access to the state’s resources means that defeat in these
systems with a weaker party legacy is far more costly. The need for these parties to retain
access to and control over the resources of the state means they are more likely to cling
to power at all costs, making free and fair elections less likely. Parties in this situation
are more likely to cling to power through manipulated elections by making the playing
field uneven, driving opponents to boycott the electoral process, and even stealing elections
if necessary. This does not imply that democratization is impossible after the opening of
multiparty elections, but it does place a significant barrier to effective competition. There
are exceptions, like Ghana, in which the ruling party eventually accepts defeat and opens the
system to rotation in power after the opening.6 When the ruling party is defeated, I can say
less about the potential for democratization. In these cases, the potential for democratization
is present, but heavily depends on the disposition of the new rulers and their choices to either
allow for free and fair competition, or instead to establish their own electoral authoritarian
system.
6In this case, the fact that the party’s popular leader stood aside as president but remained with
his party even after its defeat appears to have influenced the ability of the party to survive defeat.
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The next set of implications regard the placement of these findings within a regional
context. First, there are some connections between regions and institutions. One of the
important findings I make when classifying regime types and studying party traits is that
there are types that may be more prominent in some regions than in others. This observation
points to a tendency of regime types and ideologies to cluster in certain regions (particularly
Europe and the Americas), but critically, these traits are not exclusively related to a par-
ticular region. For instance, Marxism and party-dominated regimes may be the dominant
types in Europe, but they are found in various combinations around the world. This finding
provides an intriguing jumping-off point for future analysis on the patterns and spread of
particular non-democratic regime types over time and region.
The second observation in terms of regional politics focuses on the post-Communist
countries of Europe. One of the major strains in the regional literature focuses heavily on
the differences in the post-opening experiences of these countries. These studies frequently
focus on how features of the prior Communist system impact the democratic development of
these particular countries. What I find in a global analysis is a story of similarity rather than
differentiation. The story of the post-Communist transitions in terms of whether a party will
continue to exist or whether it can win elections, is very much the same in almost all of these
countries, particularly the European post-Communist states. I find that the high degree of
similarity in the institutional past and courses of action taken by these parties leads to an
extremely similar set of outcomes. The particular clustering of regime types and ideology
mentioned previously led to this high degree of similarity in the outcomes.
In this work, I set out to explain two very specific aspects of the performance of political
parties after electoral openings. In the process, there are a number of different directions in
which this study can lead to additional questions. One important direction for additional
study mentioned above is to look into the patterns and origins of different non-competitive
political regimes. Although there is a broad global variation in regime types, I have observed
noticeable trends in regime types both across regions and time periods. I have found clear
connections between these regime features and party traits and party performance in com-
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petitive elections, but currently am not able to explain the deeper causes of why these regime
types exist in the first place. A focus on why and when particular regime types are adopted
and abandoned can provide a valuable direction in building both a deeper understanding
of what leads parties to survive or succeed and also can provide a deeper understanding of
non-democracies in general.
Another direction focuses more on the why of the opening process. Currently, I assume the
opening process to be a largely exogenous factor to be controlled for in order to understand
how the before of the regime impacts the after of the party. The opening process itself does
deserve a more nuanced study as a dependent variable itself. A deeper empirical study of when
and how electoral openings occur is an important step in better understanding a number of
factors related to these political changes. The other opening-related question that remains
unanswered is the question of why some political parties make reforms when others in very
similar situations do not. It remains puzzling that a notable handful of Communist successor
parties do not make major reforms, when it is clearly the dominant strategy and by doing
so winning elections is highly likely. I can speculate from my research that the main reason
for this is due to the degree to which the party ideology is “native” to the country. States
where the Communist system is more deeply rooted in politics prior to the establishment
of the non-competitive regime are more likely to have a large base of believers to fall back
on. This comes from a pattern of observing unreformed Communists primarily in the core
regions of Czechoslovakia and the former Russian Empire (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine), but
systematically answering this question was beyond the current scope of the project. A future
analysis of this question along with when and why openings occur may provide valuable
information allowing a more accurate prediction of the future of a party before an opening
occurs.
The final two questions that remain to be answered revolve around the post-opening
period. The first follows on my work on success and survival by seeking to answer the
question of who supports these parties. Although I find evidence that parties that modify
their anti-democratic identity are able to attract new voters, I have not determined who
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these voters are. The next step in this direction is to focus more on survey-based data and
individual voter preferences to look into which voters these parties are attracting by their
various actions. This research path has two goals, first to see more broadly who is voting for
and supporting these parties more broadly. The second is to focus on what the impact of a
party change is on the decision-making process of voters, specifically, how do changes in the
party translate into changes in voter preference?
Finally, there remains the question of what the impact of the former ruling party is on
the post-opening political scene. As described above, I have found some evidence of a rela-
tionship between the role of the party in the prior regime to whether it must cling on to
power to survive. This tendency would appear to have a negative impact on democratization.
What remains unanswered though is the question of how the presence or absence of a suc-
cessor party impacts an array of indicators of governance and democracy. Are these parties
stabilizing features in a post-opening regime that enhance good governance outcomes and
democracy, or are they disruptive features that breed corruption and block effective demo-
cratic competition? Do they promote building more stable party systems or prevent the
formation of stable and effective parties? Can they have both positive and negative impacts,
and when? Turning success and survival into independent variables would help study these
impacts on political systems and provide important insights into the broader role of successor
parties in post-opening regimes and the desirability of allowing a successor party to form or
not after removal from power.
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Table A.1: List of Parties and Successors Included
Country Original Name Successor Name Primary? Opening Years
Afghanistan People’s Democratic Party of
Afghanistan
Homeland Party Yes 1990-2005
Albania Party of Labor of Albania Socialist Party of Albania Yes 1990-1992
Albania Party of Labor of Albania Communist Party of Albania No 1990-1992
Algeria National Liberation Front National Liberation Front Yes 1988-1997
Angola Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola
Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola
Yes 1991-1997
Bangladesh Bangladesh Awami League Bangladesh Awami League Yes 1975-1991
Bangladesh Bangladesh Nationalist Party Bangladesh National Party Yes 1982-1991
Bangladesh Jatiya Party Jatiya Party Yes 1990-1991
Benin Party of the Popular Revolu-
tion of Benin
Union of Progressive Forces Yes 1990-1991
Brazil National Renewing Alliance Social Democratic Party Yes 1979-1989
Bulgaria Bulgarian Communist Party Bulgarian Socialist Party Yes 1989-1990
Bulgaria Bulgarian Communist Party Bulgarian Communist Party No 1989-1990
Bulgaria Bulgarian Communist Party Bulgarian Communist Party
(Marxist)
No 1989-1990
Bulgaria Bulgarian Communist Party Bulgarian Communist Party
(Revolutionary)
No 1989-1990






Burundi Union for the National
Progress
Union for the National
Progress
Yes 1988-1993





Cambodia Kampuchean People’s Revo-
lutionary Party
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Cape Verde African Party for the Inde-
pendence of Guinea and Cape
Verde/African Party for the
Independence of Cape Verde
African Party for the Inde-
pendence of Cape Verde
Yes 1990-1991
Central African Republic Central African Rally Central African Rally Yes 1990-1993
Chad Progressive Party of Chad no successor 1975-1996
Chad National Union for Indepen-









China Chinese Communist Party no opening
Comoros Udzima Forum for National Recovery Yes 1989-1992
Congo Congolese Workers Party Congolese Workers Party Yes 1990-1992
Congo, Democratic
Republic
Popular Movement of the
Revolution
Popular Movement of the
Revolution
Yes 1990-2006
Cote d’Ivoire Democratic Party of the
Ivory Coast
Democratic Party of the
Ivory Coast
Yes 1990















Czechoslovakia - Slovakia Communist Party of Slovakia Party of the Democratic Left Yes 1989-1993
Czechoslovakia - Slovakia Communist Party of Slovakia Communist Party of Slovakia No 1989-1993
Djibouti Popular Rally for Progress Popular Rally for Progress Yes 1991-1993
Dominican Republic Reformist Party Social Christian Reformist
Party
Yes 1978
Egypt Arab Social Union/National
Democratic Party
no opening* 2011-2012
El Salvador National Reconciliation
Party
National Conciliation Party Yes 1979-1985
Equatorial Guinea United National Workers
Party
no successor 1979-1996
Equatorial Guinea Democratic Party of Equato-
rial Guinea
Democratic Party of Equato-
rial Guinea
Yes 1992-1996






Gabon Democratic Party Yes 1991-1993
Gambia People’s Progressive Party People’s Progressive Party Yes 1994-1997
Continued on the next page . . .
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Germany, East Socialist Unity Party Party of Democratic
Socialism
Yes 1989-1990










Guinea Democratic Party of Guinea Democratic Party of Guinea -
African Democratic Rally
Yes 1984-1995
Guinea Committee of National
Recovery
Party of Unity and Progress Yes 1992-1995
Guinea-Bissau African Party for the Inde-
pendence of Guinea and Cape
Verde
African Party for the Inde-
pendence of Guinea and Cape
Verde
Yes 1991-1994
Guyana People’s National Congress People’s National Congress Yes 1992
Haiti National Unity Party National Union Party Yes 1986-1990
Hungary Socialist Workers’ Party Hungarian Socialist Party Yes 1989-1990
Hungary Socialist Workers’ Party Hungarian Worker’s Party No 1989-1990
Indonesia Party of Functional Groups -
GOLKAR
Golkar Party Yes 1998-1999
Iran Rastakhiz no successor 1979-
Iran Islamic Republic Party no opening
Iraq Baath Party no opening* 2003-2005





Korea, North Korean Workers Party no opening
Korea, South Democratic Republican
Party/Democratic Justice
Party
Democratic Justice Party Yes 1987
Laos Lao People’s Revolutionary
Party
no opening
Lesotho Basuto National Party Basuto National Party Yes 1986-1994
Liberia True Whig Party True Whig Party Yes 1980-1997
Liberia National Democratic Party of
Liberia
United Liberation Movement
for Democracy in Liberia
Yes 1990-1997
Libya Arab Socialist Union no opening* 2011
Madagascar Avantgarde of the Malagasy
Revolution
Association for the Rebirth of
Madagascar
Yes 1990-1993
Malawi Malawi Congress Party Malawi Congress Party Yes 1993-1994
Malaysia United Malay National Orga-
nization/Barisan Nasional
no opening* 2008
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Mali Democratic Union of the
Malian People
Union for Democracy and
Development
Yes 1991-1992
Mauritania Mauritanian People’s Party no successor 1978-1992















Mozambique Front for the Liberation of
Mozambique
Front for the Liberation of
Mozambique
Yes 1990-1994
Myanmar Burma Socialist Program
Party
National Unity Party Yes 1988-2010
Nicaragua National Liberal Party National Liberal Party Yes 1979-1990





Niger Nigerien Progress Party-
African Democratic Rally
Niger Progressive Party -
African Democratic Rally
Yes 1974-1993










Paraguay National Republican Associa-
tion - Colored Party
National Republican Associa-
tion - Colored Party
Yes 1989-1993
Philippines New Society Movement New Society Movement Yes 1986-1987
Poland United Workers Party Social Democracy of the
Polish Republic
Yes 1989-1991
Portugal National Union no successor 1974-1976
Romania Romanian Communist Party National Salvation Front Yes 1989-1990
Romania Romanian Communist Party Socialist Party of Labor No 1989-1990
Rwanda Democratic Republican









ment for Democracy and
Development
Yes 1991-2003
Senegal Socialist Party Socialist Party Yes 1992-1993
Sierra Leone All People’s Congress All People’s Congress Yes 1991-1999
Singapore People’s Action Party no opening
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Somali National Front No 1991-
South Africa National Party National Party Yes 1989-1994
Spain Falange Spanish Falange Yes 1975-1979
Sri Lanka United National Party United National Party Yes 1989
Sudan Sudan Socialist Union Alliance of the People’s
Working Forces
Yes 1985-1986
Suriname National Democratic Party National Democratic Party Yes 1987
Swaziland Imbokodvo National Move-
ment
no opening
Syria Baath Party no opening* 2012-2014
Taiwan Kuomintang Kuomintang Yes 1986-1992
Tanzania Tanzanian African National
Union/Party of Revolution
Revolutionary Party Yes 1992-1995




Uganda Uganda People’s Congress Uganda People’s Congress Yes 1985-1996





USSR - Armenia Communist Party of Armenia Pan-Armenian National
Movement
Yes 1987-1991
USSR - Armenia Communist Party of Armenia Armenian Communist Party No 1987-1991
USSR - Armenia Communist Party of Armenia Democratic Party of Armenia No 1987-1991
USSR - Armenia Communist Party of Armenia United Progressive Commu-
nist Party of Armenia
No 1987-1991
USSR - Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Communist Party New Azerbaijan Party Yes 1987-1991
USSR - Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Communist Party Azerbaijan United Commu-
nist Party
No 1987-1991
USSR - Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Communist Party Azerbaijan Revolutionary
Revival Party
No 1987-1991
USSR - Belarus Communist Party of Bey-
lorussia
Communist Party of Belarus Yes 1987-1991
USSR - Estonia Communist Party of Estonia Estonian Democratic Labor
Party
Yes 1987-1991
USSR - Estonia Communist Party of Estonia Coalition and Rural People’s
Union
No 1987-1991
USSR - Georgia Georgian Communist Party United Communist Party of
Georgia
Yes 1987-1991
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USSR - Georgia Georgian Communist Party Citizens’ Union of Georgia No 1987-1991
USSR - Kazakhstan Communist Party of Kaza-
khstan
People’s Union of Kaza-
khstan Unity
Yes 1987-1991
USSR - Kazakhstan Communist Party of Kaza-
khstan
Socialist Party of Kazakhstan No 1987-1991
USSR - Kazakhstan Communist Party of Kaza-
khstan
Communist Party of Kaza-
khstan
No 1987-1991
USSR - Kyrgyzstan Communist Party of
Kirghizia
Party of Communists of Kyr-
gyzstan
Yes 1987-1991
USSR - Latvia Communist Party of Latvia Equal Rights
Party/Socialists/Harmony
Yes 1987-1991
USSR - Latvia Communist Party of Latvia Latvian Unity Party No 1987-1991
USSR - Latvia Communist Party of Latvia Latvian Democratic Labor
Party
No 1987-1991





USSR - Moldova Communist Party of Moldova Party of Communists of the
Moldovan Republic
Yes 1987-1991
USSR - Moldova Communist Party of Moldova Socialist Party No 1987-1991
USSR - Russia Communist Party of the
Soviet Union/Communist
Party of the Russian Soviet
Federative Republic
Communist Party of the Rus-
sian Federation
Yes 1987-1991
USSR - Russia Communist Party of the
Soviet Union/Communist





USSR - Russia Communist Party of the
Soviet Union/Communist
Party of the Russian Soviet
Federative Republic
Union of Communist Parties No 1987-1991
USSR - Tajikistan Communist Party of Tajik-
istan
Communist Party of Tajik-
istan
Yes 1987-1991
USSR - Turkmenistan Communist Party of Turk-
menistan
Democratic Party of Turk-
menistan**
Yes 1987-
USSR - Ukraine Communist Party of Ukraine Communist Party of Ukraine Yes 1987-1991
USSR - Ukraine Communist Party of Ukraine Peasant Party of Ukraine No 1987-1991
USSR - Ukraine Communist Party of Ukraine Socialist Party of Ukraine No 1987-1991
USSR - Uzbekistan Communist Party of Uzbek-
istan
People’s Democratic Party Yes 1987-1991
Vietnam Vietnamese Fatherland Front no opening
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Yemen, North People’s General Congress General People’s Congress Yes 1990-1993
Yemen, South Yemeni Socialist Party Yemen Socialist Party Yes 1990-1993
Yugoslavia - Bosnia League of Communists of
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Socialist Democratic Party Yes 1990-1991
Yugoslavia - Bosnia League of Communists of
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Union of Bosnian Social
Democrats
No 1990-1991
Yugoslavia - Bosnia League of Communists of
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Croatian Peasant Party No 1990-1991
Yugoslavia - Bosnia League of Communists of
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Socialist Party of the Serbian
Republic
No 1990-1991
Yugoslavia - Croatia League of Communists of
Croatia
Social Democratic Party -
Party of Democratic Reform
Yes 1990-1991
Yugoslavia - Croatia League of Communists of
Croatia
Croatian Socialist Party No 1990-1991
Yugoslavia - Croatia League of Communists of
Croatia
Liberal Party No 1990-1991
Yugoslavia - Macedonia League of Communists of
Macedonia
Social Democratic Union of
Macedonia
Yes 1990-1991
Yugoslavia - Macedonia League of Communists of
Macedonia
Socialist Party of Macedonia No 1990-1991
Yugoslavia - Montenegro League of Communists of
Montenegro
Democratic Party of Social-
ists of Montenegro
Yes 1990-1991
Yugoslavia - Montenegro League of Communists of
Montenegro
League of Communists -
Movement for Yugoslavia of
Montenegro
No 1990-1991
Yugoslavia - Serbia League of Communists of
Serbia
Socialist Party of Serbia Yes 1990-1991
Yugoslavia - Slovenia League of Communists of
Slovenia
Party of Democratic Reform Yes 1990-1991










Zimbabwe Rhodesian Front Conservative Alliance of Zim-
babwe
Yes 1978-1987
Zimbabwe Zimbabwe National Union -
Patriotic Front
no opening
* - opening occurs after 2000





– Date of founding: used to calculate party age and if party existed before coming
to power.
– Type of founding: inspired by Janda (1980), an eight point nominal scale.
1. Electoral party formed in national elections.
2. Electoral party formed in pre-independence elections.
3. Formed by merger of existing parties.
4. Formed as a non-electoral, legal organization.
5. Formed as a non-electoral, illegal organization.
6. Formed by dictator or junta in power.
7. An armed opposition group or partisan resistance force founded in war
8. Party formed in exile.
• Party Continuity:
– Count of mergers with other parties.
– Count of splits from the party.
– Count of party name changes.
• Party Leadership:
– Count of changes in the top leader.
– Leadership for life: are leaders removed only by death, voluntary retirement, or
extraordinary measures?
– Is the leader at opening also the founding leader?
• Party Ideology:





5. Nationalist - includes ethnic parties




– Is the ideology wholly or partially a creation of a party leader? (examples:
Marxism-Leninism in USSR, Juche in North Korea)
• Party Structure:
– Central Leadership:
1. Unclear or not given
2. Democratic Centralism
3. Organized, not Democratic Centralism
4. All centralized in leader
– Does party have associated mass movements (labor unions, youth, women, local
cells, etc.)?
– Estimate of party membership.
– Party publications: Dailies, periodicals, radio, others.
• Party Competition:
– Relationship with other political parties:
1. No legal parties1
2. Sole legal party.
3. De-facto single party.
4. Multiple Parties: loyal opposition only.
5. Multiple Parties: independent opposition parties exist.
– Electoral system (coded for predominant type and type immediately before
opening):
1. No elections held
2. Indirect elections held
3. Non-competitive elections: one candidate per seat.
4. Competitive elections: multiple candidates per seat.




Table C.1: Unsuccessful Survivors
Party Reforms
Country Short Name Party Role Name Leader Ideology Regime Ideology
Germany Linke Dominant Major Changed Major Marxist
Latvia Harmony Dominant Major Changed Major Marxist
Czech Republic KSCM Dominant Minor Changed Minor Marxist
Russia KPRF* Dominant Minor Changed Minor Marxist
Ukraine KPU* Dominant None Changed Minor Marxist
Belarus KPB* Dominant None Changed Minor Marxist
Kyrgyzstan PKK* Dominant Minor Kept Minor Marxist
Guyana PNC Shared None Kept Major Marxist
Burundi UPRONA Shared None Changed Minor Leftist/Ethnic
El Salvador PCN Shared None Kept None Conservative
Brazil SDP/PPB Minor Major Kept None Conservative
Malawi MCP Minor None Changed Minor Vague/Regional
Bangladesh Jatiya Minor None Changed None Vague/Islamic
* - Party won opening election but no others.
Table C.2: Successful but Not Surviving
Party Reforms
Country Short Name Party Role Name Leader Ideology Regime Ideology
Primary Successors
Armenia PANM Dominant Major Changed Major Marxist
Yemen YSP* Dominant None Kept Minor Marxist
Comoros Udzima* Shared Major Changed Minor Vague
Mauritania PRDR Minor Major Kept None Vague
Madagascar AREMA Minor Minor Kept None Socialist
Secondary Successors
Bosnia SPRS Dominant Major Changed Major Marxist
Armenia HKK Dominant Minor Changed Minor Marxist
Georgia CUG Dominant Major Changed Major Marxist
Azerbaijan AKP Dominant Minor Kept None Marxist
* - Party won opening election but no others.
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